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 This impressive collection is essential reading for appreciating the inevi-
table contextualities of scientific knowledge. It explores how notions of 
“perspective” can illuminate the epistemic upshot of the sciences and how 
they are situated in their history, practices, representations, and sometimes 
competing aims, provocatively advancing debates about realism, pragma-
tism, explanation, and modeling in the process, all through a wealth of 
cases from physics, biology, neuroscience, and medical science . 
 —Anjan Chakravartty, University of Miami 
 An excellent collection of essays on a topic rapidly establishing itself as 
an important interpretive programme in philosophy of science. One of 
the volume’s many merits consists in showing the diversity and versatil-
ity of perspectivism while illustrating common features among its differ-
ent varieties. The reader is thus provided an enormously rich foundation 
for evaluating the role of perspectivism in understanding science and its 
practices . 
 —Margaret Morrison, University of Toronto 
 Perspectivism is a fruitful metaphor for imagining alternatives to tradi-
tional realism in philosophy of science. Massimi and McCoy have gath-
ered ten essays which show how perspectivism is illuminating in areas 
such as molecular biology and measurement theory, and also explore the 
relationships between perspectivism and other recent accounts including 
pragmatism, structural realism, pluralism, and scientific modelling. There 
is an excellent balance of established and emerging scholars in the field. 
This volume is a superb, cutting-edge text to use in an advanced graduate 
seminar . 
 —Miriam Solomon, Temple University 
 

 This edited collection is the first of its kind to explore the view called 
perspectivism in the philosophy of science. The book brings together an 
array of essays that reflect on the methodological promises and scientific 
challenges of perspectivism in a variety of fields such as physics, biology, 
cognitive neuroscience, and cancer research, just for a few examples. What 
are the advantages of using a plurality of perspectives in a given scientific field 
and for interdisciplinary research? Can different perspectives be integrated? 
What is the relation between perspectivism, pluralism, and pragmatism? 
These ten new essays by top scholars in the field offer a kaleidoscopic 
journey toward understanding the view called “perspectivism” and its 
relevance to science. 
 Michela Massimi is Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of 
Edinburgh, UK. She was Co-editor-in-Chief of the  British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science (2011–2016) and Vice President of the  European 
Philosophy of Science Association (2015–2019). She is the Principal 
Investigator of the ERC-funded project “Perspectival Realism. Science, 
knowledge and truth from a human vantage point” (2016–2020).
 Casey D. McCoy is a Postdoc at Stockholm University, Sweden. His research 
falls primarily within the philosophy of science and the philosophy of physics, 
and he has written on topics including inflationary cosmology, fine-tuning 
problems in physics, and the interpretation of statistical mechanics. 
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 Perspectivism (or perspectivalism, which one might want to call it) 1 has gained 
increasing attention in recent philosophy. Varieties of perspectivism have 
been advocated in several contexts. In epistemology, for example, Ernest 
 Sosa (1991 ) originally put forward a perspectival account that was meant 
to go beyond the dichotomy between reliabilism and coherentism. Reflective 
justification for our knowledge claims is, ultimately, a matter of perspectival 
coherence on Sosa’s view. Along similar lines, perspectival justification has 
been advocated by Jay  Rosenberg (2002 ) and, in the context of the debate 
on peer disagreement, by  Kvanvig (2013 ) more recently. In philosophy of 
language, perspectivism has featured as a tie-breaker in ongoing debates 
about epistemic possibilities and the limits of contextualism and relativism 
(see, e.g.,  Bach 2011 ). In the philosophy of time, perspectivism has found its 
way both in an analysis of our phenomenal experience of time (see  Torrengo 
2017 ) and in foundational analyses about the time arrow in physics (see 
Rovelli 2017). And when it comes to causality and the causal arrow, there 
too perspectivism has been presented as a promising way forward (see  Price 
2007 ; for a related discussion see  Beebee 2015 ). 
 Closer to home, in philosophy of science, Ron  Giere (2006 ) put per-
spectivism center stage as a viable alternative to what he portrayed as 
metaphysical realism and relativism in the debate about science and real-
ity.  Van Fraassen (2008 ) further contributed to reviving the importance 
of perspectival considerations in scientific representation. Ever since then, 
there has been a flurry of articles on the topic but no edited collection 
so far that directly addresses the problems and prospects of perspectiv-
ism in the philosophy of science. We hope that this book takes a first 
step toward remedying this lacuna. The book brings together an array 
of essays that reflect on perspectivism in science and shed light on the 
promise and limits of endorsing perspectivism in a variety of scientific 
fields and contexts. The ten essays here collected are all new and reflect 
the state of the art in this blossoming area. As maybe is to be expected in 
a book on perspectivism, each chapter offers a slightly different take on 
the topic, but the overall emphasis is on scientific challenges and meth-
odological prospects. The former concern the viability and suitability 
 Introduction 
 Michela Massimi and Casey D. McCoy 
2 Michela Massimi and Casey D. McCoy
of perspectivism to address a number of specific challenges in scientific 
fields such as physics, biology, cognitive neuroscience, and medicine, just 
as a few examples. The latter are the prospects of deploying perspectiv-
ism successfully as a methodology to tackle general issues about con-
ceptual change and semantics, modeling and representing, the nature of 
measurement, pluralism, realism, and interdisciplinarity. Some of these 
chapters speak more directly to scientific challenges; others to the meth-
odological prospects. Overall, this book is meant to be a kaleidoscopic 
journey toward a better understanding of the philosophical view called 
“perspectivism” and its relevance to science. 
 Because of its kaleidoscopic nature—and despite the lack of a common 
working definition of what a “scientific perspective” is across the ten 
essays—there are nonetheless some important common themes that run 
through this collection. The first is the relation between perspectivism 
and pragmatism. The second is the relation between perspectivism and 
pluralism. The third is the relation between perspectivism and realism. 
Let us consider each of them in turn. 
 Perspectivism shares with pragmatism a common origin in their respec-
tive commitment to uphold a view of scientific knowledge different from 
the standard (Nagelian) “view from nowhere.” Their common commit-
ment to the idea of knowledge “from a human point of view” not only 
sets perspectivism and pragmatism aside from more traditional views of 
how science tracks reality, but it also provides a common platform for 
a new emphasis that both perspectivism and pragmatism place on the 
 historicity of our scientific knowledge—that is, on how our scientific 
knowledge claims formed and developed as a result of human activi-
ties and human practices over time. A closer attention paid to the his-
toricity of our scientific knowledge goes hand in hand with a kind of 
 epistemic humility that perspectivism and pragmatism equally share (no 
matter whether the philosophical source for it is to be found in Kant or 
in American pragmatism). 
 This epistemic humility manifests itself in the way in which perspectiv-
ism and pragmatism alike deal with the problem of what we can claim 
to know within the bounds of our own epistemic perspectives. In more 
concrete terms, how can we ever claim to know what there is, if our 
epistemic access is always historically situated and perspectival? How 
to secure reference continuity across perspectival changes, for example? 
Despite these important common elements, perspectivism and pragma-
tism differ in their commitment to truth. For where the pragmatist tradi-
tion (for lack of a better word, given the significant differences among 
Peirce, Dewey, and James) drastically redefined the very notion of truth 
to better reflect human activities (either in terms of asymptotic limit of 
inquiry or of operational success in human practices), perspectivism is 
more neutral on the topic. Perspectivism can (and typically does) share 
with realism a commitment to truth as correspondence with the way 
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things are (without necessarily having to embrace the metaphysical real-
ist’s machinery about how to understand “the way things are” in terms of 
truthmakers, for example). 
 Turning to our second common theme, namely the relation between 
perspectivism and pluralism that several of these chapters address directly, 
once again it is clear that in either case there is a commitment to a plural-
ity of points of view. Perspectivism entails pluralism: to endorse perspec-
tivism about science entails an endorsement of a kind of pluralism about 
science. But not the other way around: endorsing pluralism about science 
does not necessarily entail endorsing perspectivism, for scientific plural-
ism comes in many families and flavors and not all of them would be 
amenable to being classified as “perspectivism” (or perspectival plural-
ism). Some of the methodological problems facing perspectivism concern 
precisely its pluralistic nature. When it comes to a plurality of scientific 
models in a given area or a given target system, how to resolve the ten-
sion? What is at stake in this kind of perspectival pluralism, and can par-
tial representation help solve the tension? 
 But perspectivism is not just about tackling the problems that a plural-
ity of scientific perspectives poses for scientific modeling in some areas 
of inquiry. Pluralism is, first and foremost, a powerful resource in the 
hands of perspectivists because it shows how they can accommodate and 
strive to integrate a plurality of explanations for the same phenomena in 
some areas. The challenges and prospects of interdisciplinary research 
often hang on the ability to integrate a plurality of scientific perspectives, 
each of which might only offer a partial explanation, and be nonethe-
less complementary with other explanations offered by other scientific 
perspectives. The prospects of perspectivism—qua a kind of  explanatory 
pluralism, as some of these chapters suggest—should then be assessed on 
a case-by-case basis, depending on the specific nature of the phenomena, 
their explanations, and possible (or impossible) integration. 
 Most importantly, this primarily  epistemic (i.e., explanatory) reading 
of perspectival pluralism that emerges from some of the following chap-
ters also makes clear the nature of the ontological stance that accom-
panies perspectivism. Despite the temptation to read perspectivism as 
an ontological view about how perspectives shape “perspectival facts,” 
the ontological pluralism that in various forms can be found in other 
quarters in philosophy of science is in fact absent in all the case stud-
ies here presented. Be it protein folding, cancer research, or cognitive 
neuroscience, what is common to all these case studies is the emphasis 
placed on the plurality of  epistemic goals associated with a form of 
perspectival pluralism, with no risk whatsoever of sliding into a form of 
fact-constructivism. This is an important point to mark in this journey 
toward understanding perspectivism in science. 
 Coming to our third and final common theme, namely the relation 
between perspectivism and realism that is here indirectly implied in some 
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of the major treatments of perspectivism/pragmatism and perspectivism/
pluralism, the questions that loom large are: Is perspectivism compat-
ible with realism? Can the two be reconciled? Some of these chapters 
indirectly address these broader questions by looking at either semantic 
issues or at the role of explanation and understanding, or by situating 
perspectivism within a broader trend of rethinking realism in light of his-
toricity. A trend emerges from these chapters, one that is at pains to clarify 
why perspectivism is not tantamount to relativism, nor is it a redundant 
platitude akin to a kind of instrumentalism about science. Some authors 
strike a middle ground for a variety of perspectival realism that is meant 
to spell out the nature of reference continuity across perspectival changes. 
Others highlight the family resemblances with structural realism and its 
rationale while also pointing out the relevant differences. And yet other 
authors consider the question as to whether perspectivism can vindicate 
realist commitments borne out of a suitable notion of explanation, or 
whether it sits more comfortably with a non-factive understanding of 
phenomena. 
 These three main common themes are intertwined in these ten chapters. 
They are illustrated sometimes with a wealth of details from scientific 
case studies and at other times with a profound sensitivity to the history 
of science. Ultimately it does not matter how one defines the notion of 
“scientific perspective” (e.g., à la Giere, or à la van Fraassen, among oth-
ers; with reference to scientific models, Kuhnian paradigms, or concepts 
and conceptual schemes). What matters most is what perspectivism can 
achieve, how it enters the practice of science, the challenges it poses, and 
the solutions it offers. 
 The book opens with  Chapter 1 by Hasok Chang, who lays out his 
version of pragmatism and uses it as a lens through which to reflect on 
perspectivism in its various guises. For Chang, pragmatism is a “deep or 
thoroughgoing empiricism,” which, however, is not an independent meta-
physical or epistemological doctrine but a conception of knowledge in 
the service of practical goal-oriented action. Such a pragmatism is allied 
with perspectivism, he argues, for both are rooted in an understanding of 
science as a humanistic activity and both see knowledge as the product of 
this activity. He urges a deep perspectivism on this basis, one that holds 
that the relation between the world and our knowledge of it is incor-
rigibly perspectival. A common implication of pragmatism and perspec-
tivism, understood in this way, is the historicity of science and scientific 
knowledge, which accordingly motivates and grounds the integration of 
history and philosophy in the study of science. 
 Historicity and integration pervade also Melinda Bonnie Fagan’s 
 Chapter 2 . Fagan situates her engagement with perspectivism in her 
ongoing project on interdisciplinary research. She poses the “explana-
tory challenge” for interdisciplinary research, which arises from the 
diverse explanatory commitments in different specializations being an 
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impediment to integrated interdisciplinary explanations. Fagan notes sig-
nificant parallels with ongoing debates about perspectivism in the phi-
losophy of science. She makes use of the latter debate in taxonomizing 
possible relations between models and uses the parallels between the two 
to apply this taxonomy to the explanatory challenge. 
 Epistemic humility and semantic considerations for perspectival real-
ism are the focus of  Chapter 3 by Paul Teller. Teller characterizes per-
spectivism as the view that human knowledge is always from a particular 
perspective, and agrees with Giere that perspectivism gives a realist view 
of science. Teller argues that perspectival realism is unlike generic scien-
tific realism, which subsumes a particular kind of semantic realism Teller 
calls “referential realism.” Referential realism is the view that (some) 
terms in scientific theories have non-empty extensions about which those 
theories make (approximately) true statements. Referential realism, how-
ever, fails, according to Teller: the world is too complex for the extensions 
of terms to be determined with our meager epistemic faculties. There are 
simply far too many ways in which a term’s extension can be determined, 
given our limited access to the world. Teller’s alternative to this general 
story of reference is pragmatic in character: our terms refer directly to 
idealized scenarios, but we can judge successful reference to the world 
by assessing the extent to which our perspectival use of referential terms 
succeeds in ways that we care about. The upshot is that once we see that 
this is how reference works, it should become clear that perspectivism is 
the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of reference a miracle! 
 The prospects and challenges of reconciling perspectivism and realism 
are the ongoing concerns of  Chapter 4 by Juha Saatsi. Saatsi advocates a 
modest scientific realism, which he believes can address the challenges that 
scientific realism faces, such as those advanced by perspectival realists. 
Although some of the latter urge a perspectival account of knowledge, 
he believes that the perspectival aspects of science are best assimilated 
into the realist view in what he calls “explanatory perspectives.” These 
explanatory perspectives play an important role in something that real-
ists should be committed to: the accumulation of scientific  understand-
ing . Explanatory perspectives integrate both non-factive and factive 
elements, including (among the former) idealizations and false meta-
physical presuppositions and (among the latter) the provision of true 
explanations. Saatsi’s explanatory perspectives are explicated with his 
favored account of explanation, the counterfactual-dependence account, 
which is grounded in real modal connections in the world. Accumulat-
ing understanding is accordingly characterized as the increasing abil-
ity to answer counterfactual what-if-things-had-been-different questions.
To illustrate how his account can address some of the perspectival chal-
lenges to scientific realism, he gives an extended example, the history of 
physical accounts of the rainbow. Despite the various synchronic and 
diachronic perspectives on the rainbow, he urges that with his account 
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we can nonetheless appreciate a steady accumulation of scientific under-
standing about this phenomenon. 
 The relation among perspectivism, pluralism, and realism is the topic 
of Collin Rice’s  Chapter 5 . Rice too is concerned to resolve the chal-
lenge presented by multiple conflicting idealized models, which afflicts 
accounts of the explanatory use of idealized models in science. He appeals 
to the notion of a “universality class,” a collection of models that display 
similar patterns of behavior despite being heterogeneous in their physi-
cal features. The goal is to present an alternative account of how ideal-
ized models can provide scientific explanations. He argues, furthermore, 
that such explanations give rise to scientific understanding in a factive 
sense. One may yet be a realist in the face of the plurality of models in 
science, since explanations that rely on universality classes do in fact cap-
ture true modal information about the world. 
 In  Chapter 6 , J. E. Wolff uses models of measurements as a case for 
exploring two forms of scientific realism that are meant to address the 
problem of plurality of models in science: structural realism and per-
spectival realism. She distinguishes their motivations in the follow-
ing way: structural realists address the plurality of models by looking 
for similarities, namely structural commonalities, between the models, 
whereas perspectival realists emphasize how differences among a plural-
ity of models can be complementary. In comparing these realist alter-
natives, Wolff chooses to focus on measurement theory. She gives two 
reasons: (1) Measurement theory is not a “first-order” science so much 
as a “meta-science” concerned with the representation of measurements 
in any science; as such it can give a different perspective on realism than 
typical case studies focused on particular sciences like physics or biology. 
(2) Measurement theory directly treats representation as part of its remit, 
and representation is, of course, one of the main points of contention in 
the scientific realism debate. She points out how the representationalist 
theory of measurement can be easily seen as a form of structural real-
ism about measurement; however, this framework depends on the prior 
determination that a physical attribute satisfies the right axioms specify-
ing a particular measurement structure. It is here that perspectivalism can 
enter the picture, she argues, for the representational theory of measure-
ment does not specify how the attribution of structure is to be justified. 
The perspectivalist can argue that the only such justification available is 
one from a specific scientific perspective; in this way, Wolff urges the idea 
that perspectival realism and structural realism are not competing realist 
accounts but complementary ones. 
 David Danks aims to face up to two threats to perspectivism in 
 Chapter 7 . First, the risk that perspectivism might collapse into an 
“unsafe” relativism, where knowledge claims and the like become group 
specific. If perspectivism is to be a view about science, Danks argues, it 
needs to account for the “objectivity” of science (however, that should be 
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understood philosophically). Second, perspectivism risks appearing too 
“insubstantial” to be informative. Claims such as “that objects in the 
world are complex” or “that humans’ epistemic means are very lim-
ited” are uninformative by themselves to be helpful, at least without con-
siderable supplementation. But Danks argues that perspectivism can be 
safe and substantial. He identifies two sources of perspectives: concepts 
and goals.  Concepts do not merely mirror the world, he notes. Rather, 
they actively shape or distort information received by an epistemic agent: 
they give rise to distinctive perspectives that depend on what our (evolv-
ing) concepts are. Danks also links perspectives with  goals . He points out 
that our goals determine, to some extent, our cognitive behavior, some-
times in such a way that we ought to believe falsehoods. Thus, insofar 
as concepts and goals are shared, the risk of collapsing into relativism is 
avoided. And as they are grounded in features of human cognition, con-
cepts and goals make perspectives substantive. Danks’s version of per-
spectivism, notably, is not just a view of science, since concepts and goals 
are part of our everyday perspectivism: it is a perspectivism of everyday 
lives and scientific lives alike. 
 Integrating a plurality of perspectives is the main theme of the final 
three chapters. In  Chapter 8 , Mazviita Chirimuuta introduces a dichot-
omy of research programs on the motor cortex of the brain, between 
what she calls the “intentional perspective” and the “dynamical perspec-
tive.” In questioning the relation between these perspectives, which are 
taken by practitioners to be in conflict, she applies Massimi’s accounts of 
perspectival truth to see if an integrated pluralism of perspectives might 
be available. She argues, however, that the mutual reinforcement of 
knowledge claims from the different perspectives, required by Massimi’s 
account of truth, can only be maintained at the level of each perspective’s 
mathematical formalism and quantitative results. The standard interpre-
tations of these perspectives lead directly to a clash between them, from 
which only an instrumentalist (or better, a Kantian kind of) pluralism 
is left possible, according to Chirimuuta. Accepting the complexity of 
the brain and other entities in the world, Chirimuuta favors the pluralist 
response to the multiple perspectives, which she argues is necessary to 
understand this complexity. As a realist perspectivalism is not possible 
in her case study, she opts for the instrumentalist route, closing with a 
defense of it from the charges of relativism and fictionalism. 
 In  Chapter 9 , Anya Plutynski draws on pluralist, pragmatic, and perspec-
tival ideas in addressing the relations between different theories, models, 
and research traditions (her preferred unit of analysis) in cancer research. 
She objects to the common narrative of scientific change that sees theo-
ries and so on in competition, where one theory “vanquishes” and succeeds 
another. This narrative has been pushed at times in cancer research—
recently, for example, in Laplane’s book  Cancer Stem Cells , which forms 
Plutynski’s main case study. Laplane opposes her favored cancer stem cells 
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(CSC) theory against the “classical theory”; Plutynski, however, shows that 
Laplane gives a false dichotomy, for the adversarial opposition of these two 
theories is not based on practice-based matters of fact. Cancer is a complex, 
heterogeneous disease, manifesting different features on different temporal 
and spatial scales, a disease that one can therefore only understand from a 
variety of partial perspectives. The right perspective to adopt in a context 
depends on practitioners’ purposes. This flexibility in perspectives, analo-
gous to Stein’s idea of a dialectical tension between realist and instrumen-
talist attitudes, best explains approaches in cancer research. Cancer theories 
are complementary, and not in conflict, she urges. 
 In  Chapter 10 , Sandra D. Mitchell addresses the relations between plu-
ralities of models that arise from the partiality of representation. She 
defends the idea that multiple, compatible models can be integrated in a 
way that increases scientific knowledge. To illustrate how her “integrative 
pluralism” works, she shows how three perspectives on protein folding—
the physical, the chemical, and the biological—can “fill out” and correct 
one another. Their relationship is not a one-dimensional reductive one 
but one of integration. On the face of it, though, different perspectival 
models can appear to be in conflict by using divergent methods and rep-
resentations. Mitchell argues, however, that this apparent conflict is actu-
ally productive: the preservation of pluralism precisely allows for mutual 
integration through mutual informing and correcting. 
 Clearly, understanding the many faces of perspectivism in contempo-
rary philosophy of science requires engaging both with specific problems 
arising in some scientific fields and more general methodological issues 
concerning its relations with pluralism and realism. A lot more work still 
needs be done to unpack the view, its potential, and prospects. We hope 
that this volume can provide a first important step in this direction. 
 Note 
 1 . In what follows, we use the terms “perspectivism” and “perspectivalism” inter-
changeably, because not much hangs on using one or the other in terms of 
meaning. Different authors in different contexts have been using either of the 
two expressions interchangeably and so will we, in keeping with this practice. 
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 Pragmatism, Perspectivism, and 
the Historicity of Science 
 Hasok Chang 
 1 
 1 Introduction: Humanism and Science 
 In this chapter, I wish to shed some light on perspectivism through the lens 
of pragmatism, especially in relation to scientific knowledge. The initial 
plausibility of this exercise lies in the fact that perspectivism and prag-
matism share a deep humanist impulse, which is to regard science as a 
thoroughly human activity, even when it is aimed at the production of the 
most abstract and objective kind of knowledge. (Here I am using the terms 
“humanist” and “humanism” much more broadly than a strict reference 
to Renaissance humanism would dictate.) I will begin by outlining my 
interpretation of pragmatism in section 2; in fact, this is the first publica-
tion in which I attempt to lay out my view of pragmatism in any detail, 
so some details are necessary and this will constitute the longest part of 
the chapter. This will be followed, in section 3, by brief reflections on the 
relation between pragmatism as I understand it and perspectivism in its 
various guises. Afterwards, in section 4, I will explore one of the most 
important implications of pragmatism and perspectivism, namely the  his-
toricity of science and scientific knowledge. A methodological advocacy 
of “integrated history and philosophy of science” will naturally follow. 
 Humanism in relation to science is a commitment to understand and 
promote science as something that human agents do, not as a body of 
knowledge that comes from accessing information about nature that exists 
completely apart from ourselves and our investigations. Perhaps this humanism 
is not such a controversial stance (its roots go at least back to Immanuel 
Kant), but I think there is much value in considering its meaning and impli-
cations carefully. The most important thing about humanism as I see it 
is not a focus on the biological species  Homo sapiens . For enthusiasts of 
artificial intelligence, animal cognition, or extraterrestrial intelligence, if we 
find or create serious non-human intelligence worthy of an epistemology, 
we might even want to call such agents “human beings” too. 
 In the rest of this chapter I will not speak explicitly of humanism, because 
I want to avoid the possibility of being mistakenly seen as advocating 
“human chauvinism.” Also, what I want to express by “humanism” can be 
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adequately expressed by the designation of pragmatism, which I think 
is the best expression of humanism among existing philosophical tra-
ditions. The most fundamental point about pragmatism, as I take it, is 
that knowledge is created and used by intelligent beings who engage in 
actions in order to live better in the material and social world. 
 2 What Is Pragmatism? 
 2.1 Beyond Semantics: Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Practice 
 What is pragmatism, and what does it imply for the philosophy of sci-
ence? It seems that pragmatism has largely fallen off the standard phi-
losophy curriculum, so it may not be such a bad idea to start with a quick 
review of the standard meanings of pragmatism. Let us pick up from 
where today’s students and general public are likely to begin. Google 
defines pragmatism as “an approach that evaluates theories or beliefs in 
terms of the success of their practical application.” 1 In more and better 
detail,  Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1986) defines prag-
matism as 
 an American movement in philosophy founded by C. S. Peirce and 
William James and marked by the doctrines that the meaning of con-
ceptions is to be sought in their practical bearings, that the function 
of thought is to guide action, and that truth is preeminently to be 
tested by the practical consequences of belief. 
 This is in fact quite a good definition. The first part of it is a version of 
Peirce’s “pragmatist maxim,” paraphrased by James here: 
 to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need 
only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object 
may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reac-
tions we must prepare. 
 ( James 1907 , 46–7) 2 
 The Peirce–James pragmatist maxim naturally led to the semantic inter-
pretation of pragmatism, which is perhaps the dominant one today. 
Christopher Hookway says, “the pragmatist maxim is a distinctive rule 
or method for becoming reflectively clear about the contents of concepts 
and hypotheses: we clarify a hypothesis by identifying its practical conse-
quences” ( 2016 , sec. 2). In this way, pragmatism shares much with oper-
ationalism, the homegrown philosophy of the Harvard physicist Percy 
Bridgman, and with the verificationism that was widely taken as a core 
doctrine of logical positivism. This focus on meanings continues in the 
current pragmatist works of Robert Brandom, Huw Price, and others. 
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 In a similar vein, James presented pragmatism as a “method for settling 
metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable” ( 1907 , 45). 
Unless some “practical difference” would follow from one or the other 
side’s being correct, the dispute is idle.  Hookway (2016 , sec. 1) recalls “a 
memorable illustration of pragmatism in action” by James, which shows 
“how the pragmatist maxim enables us to defuse an apparently insolu-
ble (albeit ‘trivial’) dispute.” On a visit to the mountains, James’s friends 
engaged in a “ferocious metaphysical dispute” about a squirrel that was 
hanging on to one side of a tree trunk while a human observer was stand-
ing on the other side. James described the dispute as follows: 
 This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly 
round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves 
as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between 
himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The 
resultant metaphysical problem now is this:  Does the man go round 
the squirrel or not? 
 ( James 1907 , 43) 
 James proposed to solve the problem by pointing out that which answer 
is correct 
 depends on what you  practically mean by “going round” the squirrel. 
If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the 
south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obvi-
ously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive 
positions. But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of 
him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and 
finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go 
round him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, 
he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back 
turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any 
farther dispute. 
 ( James 1907 , 44) 
 In this manner, the “pragmatic method” promises to eliminate all apparently 
irresoluble metaphysical disputes, and rather more important ones, too. 
 Even though I completely endorse the semantic tradition of pragmatism, 
my own emphasis is different. My inclination follows Philip  Kitcher’s 
(2012 , xii–xiv) warning against the “domestication” of pragmatism. Focus-
ing on semantics is a very effective method of domestication, making 
pragmatism look like a rather innocuous and interesting variation on nor-
mal analytic philosophy. I want pragmatism to be a philosophy that helps 
us think better about how to do things, not just about what our words 
mean. Recall the second part of the dictionary definition of pragmatism: 
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“the function of thought is to guide action.” Hearing the story of James’s 
squirrel, one might wonder: “But isn’t this just a matter of defining one’s 
terms carefully? Does it really have anything to do with pragmatism?” 
My take on that question is that the disambiguation offered by James 
is tied closely to potential practical ends. If my objective is to make a 
fence to enclose the squirrel, then I have gone around the squirrel  in the 
relevant sense ; if the objective is to check whether the wound on his back 
has healed, then I have failed to go around the squirrel in the relevant 
sense. It is the pragmatic purpose that tells us which meaning of “going 
round” we  ought to mean. 
 2.2 Pragmatism as Empiricist Realism 
 One very important reason why people often do not like to go beyond 
the semantic dimension of pragmatism is the fear of what happens if we 
go further and adopt the pragmatist theory of truth. This issue needs to 
be tackled head-on. It is a core part of my interpretation of pragmatism 
that we should reject the common misperception and prejudice that prag-
matism just means taking whatever is convenient as true. The “pragmatic 
theory of truth” attributed to James is widely regarded as absurd, and 
this has contributed greatly to the disdain for pragmatism among tough-
minded philosophers. Here is probably the most notorious statement by 
James: “ ‘The true,’ to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way 
of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our 
behaving . Expedient in almost any fashion” ( James 1907 , 222). I think 
James’s choice of the word “expedient” was unfortunate, as sounding too 
much like just “convenient” or “useful”—or perhaps the word had quite 
a different connotation back then; that is for James scholars to debate. At 
any rate, the statement actually continues as follows: 
 And expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what 
meets expediently all the experience in sight won’t necessarily meet 
all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, 
has ways of  boiling over , and making us correct our present formulas. 
 ( James 1907 , 222) 
 I want to argue that what this passage really shows is James the 
staunch empiricist, declaring that the source of truth is experience, and 
that it is futile to entertain any more grandiose notion of truth. This pro-
vides an important clue to my interpretation of pragmatism. My proposal 
is to understand pragmatism as a deep or thoroughgoing empiricism, 
which recognizes experience as the only ultimate source of learning and 
refuses to acknowledge any higher authority. Something does need to be 
said in justification of empiricism, but for now let me take it as a credo, 
as an article of faith; some sort of empiricism might be the inevitable 
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starting point of epistemology in our scientific age, as much as the pre-
sumption of God would have been the inevitable bedrock of any intel-
lectual discourse in Europe in an earlier age. 
 The spirit of empiricism has been summarized rather poetically by 
Clarence Irving  Lewis, in his review of John Dewey’s  1929 masterpiece, 
 The Quest for Certainty : 
 Man may not reach the goal of his quest for security by any flight 
to another world—neither to that other world of the religious mys-
tic, nor to that realm of transcendent ideas and eternal values which 
is its philosophical counterpart. Salvation is through work; through 
experimental effort, intelligently directed to an actual human future. 
 ( Lewis 1930 , 14) 
 This passage is especially nice because it brings together the two pragma-
tist philosophers that I have found most inspiring. 
 On such an empiricist conception of knowledge, how might we make 
sense of traditional epistemic and metaphysical notions such as truth and 
reality? Central to my thinking is the notion of  operational coherence , a 
harmonious fitting-together of actions that is conducive to a successful 
achievement of one’s aims. 3 To put it somewhat more precisely: an activity 
is operationally coherent if and only if there is a harmonious relationship 
among the operations that constitute the activity. The concrete realiza-
tion of a coherent activity is successful ceteris paribus; this serves as an 
indirect criterion for the judgment of coherence. Operational coherence 
pertains to an epistemic activity (or a system of practice), not to a set of 
propositions; it is measured against the aims of the activity (or system) 
in question. Coherence may be exhibited in something as simple as the 
correct coordination of bodily movements needed in lighting a match or 
walking up the stairs, or something as complex as the successful integra-
tion of a range of material technologies and various abstract theories in 
the operation of the Global Positioning System. It has social and emo-
tional aspects as well as material and intellectual ones. 
 Coherence is the chief characteristic underlying a successful epistemic 
activity. It is the vehicle through which the mind-independent world is 
brought to bear on our knowledge. Operational coherence carries within 
it the constraint by nature, and in fact it is the only way in which real-
ity can give input to our knowledge. Using this notion of coherence, I 
propose a new coherence theory of truth: a statement is true in a given 
circumstance if (belief in) it is needed in a coherent activity (or system of 
practice). 4 Truth understood in this way comes with a specific scope or 
domain attached to it in each case, which allows us to legitimize intuitive 
statements such as “Newtonian mechanics remains true in the domain of 
macroscopic objects moving at low velocities.” And because coherence is 
a matter of degree, so is truth—and I think that is also right. J. L. Austin 
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noted long ago ( 1979 , 117, 130–131) that “very true,” “true enough,” 
and such are perfectly sensible locutions. Catherine  Elgin (2017 ) has more 
recently shown the pragmatic power of “true enough” accounts. It is not 
necessary to conceive of truth itself as a binary yes-no property, 5 and 
insist on speaking in terms of approximate truth or partial truth when we 
wish to discuss degrees of truth. The notion of (empirical) truth I propose 
can ground a kind of realism that is not at all contrary to empiricism. 
 2.3 The Empirical Learning of Methods 
 One salient feature of the deep empiricism that I see in pragmatism is 
empiricism concerning methods, which received its full articulation in 
Dewey’s late work  Logic , which he strikingly subtitled  The Theory of 
Inquiry . According to  Dewey (1938 , 12), scientific methods and logical 
rules arise from successful habits of thinking. Content and method are 
learned through the same process of inquiry. Success is being “operative 
in a manner that tends in the long run, or in the continuity of inquiry, to 
yield results that are either confirmed in further inquiry or that are cor-
rected by use of the same procedures” (13). This is how method-learning 
happens: 
 through comparison-contrast, we ascertain  how and  why certain 
means and agencies have provided warrantably assertible conclu-
sions, while others have not and  cannot do so in the sense in which 
“cannot” expresses an intrinsic incompatibility between means used 
and consequences attained. 
 (104) 
 And “we know that some methods of inquiry are better than others in 
just the same way in which we know that some methods of surgery, farm-
ing, road-making, navigating or what-not are better than others” (104). 
 Dewey stressed the continuity of rules—of logic, everyday inquiry, and 
the scientific method (4–6). According to him, even logical rules, like any 
other rules, receive their justification through the success of inquiry. He 
considered that “all logical forms (with their characteristic properties) 
arise within the operation of inquiry, and are concerned with the control 
of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions” (4). 6 What he called 
the “fundamental thesis” of his book was that “logical forms accrue to 
subject-matter when the latter is subjected to controlled inquiry.” 7 So it 
was crucial to look at the history of logic, which he regarded as a pro-
gressive discipline. Dewey argued that we needed logic to suit the modern 
scientific way of thinking, and lamented that logicians of his day tended 
to retain the form of classical logic while abandoning the metaphysical 
and operational underpinnings of it. 8 In chapter 5 of  Logic , he undertook 
a contextual analysis of Aristotelian logic, arguing that it was a system 
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admirably suited for the science and philosophy of ancient Greece (per-
haps only Athens), but no longer suited to the mode of scientific and 
philosophical thinking, which had changed dramatically since then. As 
some key elements of Aristotelian thinking that had been abandoned, he 
identified essentialism, the emphasis on quality over quantity, static clas-
sification as the form of knowledge, and the heterogeneous and hierarchi-
cal structure of the universe. 
 2.4 The Empirical Validation of the A Priori 
 What I am calling the deep empiricism of the pragmatists even touched 
upon the nature of a priori knowledge, as already indicated by Dewey’s 
views on logic. On this point, the most eloquent exponent of pragma-
tism was Lewis who, according to L. W. Beck, once declared “I am a 
Kantian who disagrees with every sentence of the  Critique of Pure 
Reason ” (in  Schilpp 1968 , 273). The core of Lewis’s disagreement 
with Kant was that Lewis denied the existence of synthetic a priori 
judgments. He did think that there was an important a priori element 
to knowledge, but that it was always analytic: “ The a priori is not a 
material truth, delimiting or delineating the content of experience as 
such, but is definitive or analytic in its nature ” ( Lewis 1929 , 231). A 
priori propositions are inherent in “conceptual systems,” but these sys-
tems are constructed and chosen by us on “instrumental or pragmatic” 
grounds (x). Once we have chosen a conceptual system, within it the a 
priori elements are analytically true. 9 
 Lewis called his position “conceptual[istic] pragmatism” and acknowl-
edged his debt to James, Dewey, and especially Peirce, but signaled a 
distance from “orthodox” pragmatism (xi). However, I think Lewis’s take 
on the a priori deserves to be brought into the mainstream of pragma-
tism. It is the epitome of deep empiricism that even the adoption of the a 
priori is made on empirical grounds. Lewis explains: 
 While the  a priori is  dictated neither by what is presented in experi-
ence nor by any transcendent and eternal factor of human nature, 
it still  answers to criteria of the general type which may be termed 
pragmatic. The human animal with his needs and interests confronts 
an experience in which these must be satisfied, if at all. Both the 
general character of the experience and the nature of the animal will 
be reflected in the mode of behavior which marks this attempt to 
realize his ends. This will be true of the categories of his thinking as 
in other things. And here, as elsewhere, the result will be reached by 
a process in which attitudes tentatively assumed, disappointment in 
the ends to be realized, and consequent alteration of behavior will 
play their part. 
 (239, emphases added) 
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 This pragmatic nature of the a priori also makes it historical, as various 
neo-Kantian thinkers ranging from William Whewell to Michael Fried-
man have emphasized: “there will be no assurance that what is a priori 
will remain fixed and absolute throughout the history of the race or for 
the developing individual”; “if the a priori is something made by the 
mind, mind may also alter it”; “the determination of the a priori is in 
some sense like free choice and deliberate action” (233–234). In this con-
nection, Lewis pays some attention to the actual history of science: 
 New ranges of experience such as those due to the invention of the 
telescope and microscope have actually led to alteration of our cat-
egories in historic time. The same thing may happen through more 
penetrating or adequate analysis of old types of experience—witness 
Virchow’s redefinition of disease. What was previously regarded as 
real—e.g., disease entities—may come to be looked upon as unreal, 
and what was previously taken to be unreal—e.g., curved space—
may be admitted to reality. But when this happens  the truth remains 
unaltered and new truth and old truth do not contradict . Categories 
and concepts do not literally change; they are simply given up and 
replaced by new ones. 
 (268) 
 It is interesting to consider how Lewis’s view on the a priori extends to 
logic. Lewis (vii) himself said that his pragmatist epistemology in fact 
arose from his work in symbolic logic, which was highly respected. There 
 are different systems of logic, and anyone who wants to reason logically 
must start by adopting a particular system of logic. But the only plausible 
and non-arbitrary way of justifying the choice of a logical system would 
be on pragmatic grounds, because appealing to the rules of logic for this 
choice would clearly be question-begging. So it may actually turn out that 
the treatment of logic is the most convincing part of pragmatism! With 
Lewis’s contribution, and the current proliferation of non-classical logics 
and their successful application in the design of intelligent systems, I think 
we must admit that Dewey has been vindicated in his fundamental thesis: 
“Logical forms accrue to subject-matter when the latter is subjected to 
controlled inquiry” (101). And then it was perhaps natural for Lewis to 
generalize such thoughts about logic to say that the justification of the 
choice of any conceptual system can only accrue from the experience of 
trying to apply the system in question to various areas of inquiry (x–xi). 
 2.5 The Active Nature of Knowledge 
 Having considered what pragmatism should mean, we can attempt 
an overview of the fundamental question of epistemology: what is the 
nature of knowledge? Pragmatism as I see it does not sit well with the 
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propositional conception of knowledge that forms the bedrock of episte-
mology in the analytic tradition. With its emphasis on method-learning 
and practices of inquiry, pragmatism needs a conception of knowledge 
understood as an ability, the ability to achieve certain aims. The propo-
sitional conception of knowledge was quite explicitly criticized by James 
and Lewis when they attacked the “copy theory” of knowledge. Accord-
ing to James: 
 The popular notion is that a true idea must copy its reality. Like other 
popular views, this one follows the analogy of the most usual expe-
rience. Our true ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them. Shut 
your eyes and think of yonder clock on the wall, and you get just 
such a true picture or copy of its dial. But your idea of its “works” 
(unless you are a clockmaker) is much less of a copy, yet it passes 
muster, for it in no way clashes with reality. Even though it should 
shrink to the mere word “works,” that word still serves you truly; 
and when you speak of the “time-keeping function” of the clock, or 
of its spring’s “elasticity,” it is hard to see exactly what your ideas 
can copy. 
 ( 1907 , 199) 
 Lewis was more succinct: “Knowledge does not copy anything presented. 
It proceeds from something given toward something else. When it finds 
that something else, the perception is verified” ( 1929 , 162). 10 Here Lewis 
is echoing Dewey’s notion of inquiry, viewed thoroughly and explicitly 
as a process: “ inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an 
indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent 
distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situ-
ation into a unified whole ” ( Dewey 1938 , 104–105). 11 Here it may be 
argued that Dewey was developing a notion from Peirce, who in “The 
Fixation of Belief” had set out a perspective on inquiry as a process in 
which we “struggle to free ourselves” from a state of doubt and “pass 
into the state of belief” ( 1877 , 5). Even though Peirce tended not to 
focus on the practices of inquiry, when he did comment on them he was 
clear about their processual dimension. And Cheryl Misak adds that the 
important thing Peirce regarded as wrong with the state of doubt is “that 
it leads to a paralysis of action” ( 2013 , 33). 
 “The knower is an actor,” declared James (quoted in  Putnam 1995 , 17). 
Dewey went on to develop this vision fully, complete with his own 
memorable slogan: “we live forward” ( Dewey 1917 , 12). Experience is 
active, full of expectations and reactions, contrary to the impoverished 
view of it in traditional empiricism as the recording of information. 
Experience, and knowledge too, is something taken by active agents. 
Inquiry is pervasive in life, an essential activity of an organism coping 
in its environment. 
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 A pragmatist philosophy of science should recognize clearly that scien-
tific inquiry is itself a kind of human experience. Learning from experi-
ence also requires learning about the nature of that experience of learning. 
Pragmatist philosophical attention needs to be turned to the process of 
knowledge-production itself in order to provide an elucidation of epis-
temic activities. What do we do in order to gain knowledge, to test it, to 
improve it, to use it? How best do we organize and support such epistemic 
acts that we engage in? If we conceive of pragmatism generally as a philo-
sophical commitment to engage with practices, then pragmatist epistemol-
ogy will concern itself with all practices relating to knowledge. I believe 
that this is something that pragmatists were seriously engaged in. 
 For my own thinking about scientific practice, I have devised notions of 
“epistemic activities” and “systems of practice” ( Chang 2014 ). What  kinds 
of things do scientists do when they do science? They engage in some very 
complex practices, which may be analyzed as composites of many different 
kinds of basic epistemic activities, such as describing, predicting, explain-
ing, hypothesizing, testing, observing, detecting, measuring, classifying, 
representing, modeling, simulating, synthesizing, analyzing, abstracting, 
and idealizing. Many of these categories may seem like simple types of 
mental acts, but when we ask how any of it is actually done in particular 
situations, we discover that a complex network of material, mental, and 
social activities are involved. As an illustration, take something that would 
seem very far removed from actions: the definition of a concept. Consider 
what one has to  do in order to define a scientific term: formulate formal 
conditions for its correct verbal and mathematical use; construct physical 
instruments and procedures for measurement, standard tests, and other 
manipulations; round people up on a committee to monitor the agreed 
uses of the concept and devise methods to give penalties to people who 
do not adhere to the agreed uses. In one stroke, we have brought into 
consideration all kinds of unexpected things, ranging from operationalism 
to the sociology of scientific institutions. “One meter” or “one kilogram” 
would not and could not mean what it means without a whole variety of 
epistemic actions coordinated by the International Bureau of Weights and 
Measures in Paris. Even semantics is a matter of doing, as Wittgenstein 
and Bridgman taught us long ago. 
 3 Pragmatism and Perspectivism 
 Having sketched my own interpretation of pragmatism, I now want to 
consider how it relates to perspectivism. As indicated at the start by refer-
ence to humanism, perspectivism has a great deal of affinity with prag-
matism as I see it. They are both rooted in taking science as an activity 
carried out by humans or other intelligent  agents , and scientific knowl-
edge as a product of such an activity. Any knowledge arising from a par-
ticular activity will bear a clear contextual or perspectival stamp of its 
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origins. The only real difference may be in emphasis, pragmatism being 
more explicit than perspectivism in its action-orientation. 
 But what exactly is perspectivism? I start by following the recent expo-
sition by Michela  Massimi (2018 ), in which she consciously builds on the 
earlier articulation by Ronald  Giere (2006 ). Overall, she defines perspec-
tivism (or perspectival realism) in the philosophy of science as “a family 
of positions that in different ways place emphasis  on our scientific knowl-
edge being situated .” There are two main ways of being situated: 
 (1) Our scientific knowledge is  historically situated , that is, it is the 
inevitable product of the historical period to which those sci-
entific representations, modeling practices, data gathering, and 
scientific theories belong. 
 And/Or 
 (2) Our scientific knowledge is  culturally situated , that is, it is the 
inevitable product of the prevailing cultural tradition in which 
those scientific representations, modeling practices, data gather-
ing, and scientific theories were formulated. 
 ( Massimi 2018 , 164) 
 As Massimi’s definition indicates, there is no consensus on the precise 
interpretation of perspectivism. And what I want to do, especially in the 
light of various considerations made above in my interpretation of prag-
matism, is to advocate a rather strong form of perspectivism—Kitcher’s 
warning against domestication should be applied to perspectivism as well 
as pragmatism. Massimi goes part of the way with me here in stating that 
“truth-conditions for scientific knowledge claims vary in interesting ways 
depending on the context in which they are uttered and used” (171). I 
could not agree more, but I do not think it goes far enough. It is not only 
the truth conditions for a knowledge claim that are perspectival but the 
knowledge claims themselves. Even if we just take the semantic version 
of pragmatism, the very meanings of any concepts or terms we use are 
only contextually fixed. So there cannot be any knowledge claim that is 
not perspectival. Now, I may agree with the common notion endorsed by 
Massimi that “there are perspective-independent worldly states of affairs 
that ultimately make our scientific knowledge claims true or false”; how-
ever, I remain with Kant in insisting that such states of affairs, as such, 
are not expressible. 12 So it is not only “ our ability to know these states 
of affairs” that “depends inevitably on the perspectival circumstances or 
context of use” (171), but—I further argue—the very possibility of artic-
ulating anything about the state of the world. All we can ever talk about 
are conceptualized objects, which are in the realm of Kantian phenomena 
rather than things-in-themselves. 
 It might be useful to lay out here the three separate layers of perspectiv-
ism that I see. This is my own perspective, as it were, on perspectivism. 
Pragmatism, Perspectivism, and Science 21
Each of the three layers is compatible with some version of pragmatism. 
However, my own reading of pragmatism tends to go with the third and 
deepest layer of perspectivism. 
 (1) The same content can be expressed in different ways—in different 
languages, or using different expressions, that are not incommensurable 
with each other. In such cases, it can be considered that the strict meaning 
of the different expressions is the same. However, there will typically be 
different connotations attached to the different expressions, and such dif-
ferences in connotation can also embody divergent expectations, and can 
prompt and facilitate divergent courses of action. For example, consider 
how classical mechanics can be expressed in the Newtonian, Lagrangian, 
and Hamiltonian formulations. Even though it can be shown that these 
formulations are formally equivalent to each other, there are very sig-
nificant practical consequences in problem-solving and further theorizing 
that follow from the choice. 
 (2) Different perspectives can make us highlight and focus on differ-
ent aspects of a given object, and can also blind us to other aspects. This 
sense of perspectivism is consonant with quite a literal reading of “per-
spective”: if we look at a three-dimensional object in the normal human 
way, we will only see a two-dimensional picture whose content depends 
on the direction from which we are looking. Or we can project very 
different-looking shadows of one and the same three-dimensional object 
in different directions. A similar image of “viewing objects or scenes from 
different places” is the device with which  Giere (2006 , 13) initially intro-
duces the idea of perspectivism in his book. Generalizing this thought 
in a metaphorical way to the role that conceptual frameworks play in 
our cognition, we say that we can learn about something in different 
perspectival ways, like the proverbial blind people feeling different parts 
of an elephant. On a large scale,  Giere (2006 , chap. 4) takes it that scien-
tific theories or models provide such perspectival representations of the 
world as maps based on different projection methods do with the earth. 
This level of perspectivism still allows the possibility that we can build 
a true picture of the object, by unifying enough well-placed perspectival 
pictures of it, as we can similarly construct a three-dimensional image of 
an organ in a CT scan based on various two-dimensional cross-sections 
taken with x-rays. This view is perfectly compatible with the standard 
sort of scientific realism. 
 (3) Going more deeply perspectival, one can argue that the relation 
between our knowledge and the world cannot be spelled out in a straight-
forward way as given in the two above interpretations of perspectivism. 
Projection is a metaphor, as is “perspective” itself. The very seductive 
and deeply misleading aspect of those metaphors is that we take it for 
granted that the three-dimensional objects we are perspectivally study-
ing exist “out there” in themselves, well-formed independently of all 
our cognition and action. When we are facing the universe, we do not 
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have the equivalent of the perfectly understood three-dimensional object 
that we try to represent from various two-dimensional perspectives. 
The strong pragmatism I have articulated argues against the cogency 
of such a notion of ready-made reality and affirms the strong ontologi-
cal perspectivism that Anjan Chakravartty warns us against: “there are 
no perspective-transcendent ontological facts or states of affairs” ( 2017 , 
177). People often imagine that the broadly accepted “scientific” pic-
ture of the world is the ready-made reality, rather than just one per-
spectival picture; this is to commit the error of “hypostatization,” as 
Dewey named it. 13 Any phenomenon of nature that we can think or 
talk about at all is couched in concepts, and we choose from different 
conceptual frameworks (as C. I. Lewis emphasized), which are liable to 
be incommensurable with each other. If we take “perspective” to mean a 
conceptual framework in this sense, then we can see that ontology itself 
is perspectival. Only unspeakable noumena may be imagined to exist in 
an absolute sense, guaranteed to be shared between incommensurable 
frameworks. 
 The kind of realism sanctioned by the last kind of perspectivism is 
strongly pluralist: each good perspective offers a true account that is 
worth preserving and developing, without the need or sometimes even 
the possibility to reduce or bind it to another perspective ( Chang 2018 ). 
The knowledge gained from each perspective answers to reality in its 
own way, but not in a way that is straightforwardly comparable to other 
ways. All this is not to deny that it may be possible to make productive 
links, sometimes even reductive or unificatory ones, between different 
perspectives; however, whether such links are possible is an empirical 
question—neither a foregone conclusion nor an inescapable imperative. 
The pluralism expressed here can resist the usual attack on perspectiv-
ism through the charge of relativism. A recent, well-reasoned instance of 
such an attack is Chakravartty’s book on “scientific ontology,” where he 
denounces the “Kant on wheels” type of ontology as incoherent ( 2017 , 
186). Yet Chakravartty actually seems to be a strong ontological pragma-
tist and pluralist: 
 We know only about those ontological packages that have proven 
sufficiently successful as posits in these particular contexts . . . noth-
ing in scientific practice precludes the existence of other packages and 
behaviors that are unknown to us and, indeed, the hubristic image of 
our own ontological powers that would be required to think other-
wise should arguably give one pause. 
 (196–197) 
 It is in my view immaterial whether or not he likes to use the label of 
“perspectivism” to characterize this view. 
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 To sum up: pragmatism, as I articulate it in this chapter, strengthens 
perspectivism. Not only is such pragmatism consonant with various ver-
sions of perspectivism (partly due to the humanist grounding that they 
both share), but it should give perspectivists the courage to see just how 
deeply perspectivism can and should go. 
 4 The Historicity of Science and the Need for Integrated HPS 
 If we take seriously the pragmatist or perspectivist view of knowledge and 
inquiry as articulated here, what follows about the nature of science? And 
what does that imply about how we should practice the history and phi-
losophy of science (HPS)? Here I return to the idea of pragmatism as deep 
empiricism. If the only learning we can do comes from experience, then 
learning about how to learn can only come from a study of the history of 
learning. If philosophy of science concerns itself with understanding and 
improving the methods of science, then it can only function properly by fol-
lowing the history of science. So, the epistemological side of philosophy of 
science is inseparably tied to history of science. This is an intuition that most 
practitioners of HPS already have, but I believe that the intuition should be 
grounded in a clearer and more explicit conception of knowledge. 
 It is an empirical fact that humans have learned that there are some 
valid patterns of inquiry that are quite common in various kinds of situ-
ations. As Dewey put it, “inquiry, in spite of the diverse subjects to which 
it applies . . . has a common structure or pattern . . . applied both in com-
mon sense and science” ( 1938 , 101). In Dewey’s view, there is a continu-
ity among various types of rules that govern everyday inquiry, scientific 
practice, and logical inference (4–6); scientific methods and logical rules 
arise from successful habits of thinking, and they receive their justifica-
tion through the success of inquiry (12). 
 Another observation to add to the basic historicity of learning is that 
truly empirical processes of learning need to be iterative. I had acquired a 
dim awareness of this from my work on the development of temperature 
measurement standards, through which I came up with the notion of 
“epistemic iteration” with a little bit of inspiration from Peirce ( Chang 
2004 , 44–48, 220–234). But Dewey had seen the iterative nature of learn-
ing in a very general light. The key question, according to Dewey, was 
“whether inquiry can develop in its own ongoing course the logical stan-
dards and forms to which  further inquiry shall submit.” And “one might 
reply by saying that it can because it has” ( Dewey 1938 , 5). Because there 
are no “standards  ab extra ” that inquiry can rely on, it must be possible 
to have a “self-corrective process of inquiry” if we are to get anywhere. 
Logical principles, at each stage of this process, are “operationally  a pri-
ori ” (14). This view is very consonant with that of Lewis about a priori 
principles in general. 
24 Hasok Chang
 Now consider the nature of knowledge as well as inquiry. If knowledge 
is the product of inquiry, and inquiry is an iterative process as we have 
just described, then knowledge can only be understood fully by knowing 
the history of inquiry, because any stage of knowledge can only develop 
by relying on the previous stage, and its shape is ineliminably influenced 
by its starting point. It is not good enough to know the current conditions 
of science, because present science is not only a response to present needs, 
but it is in large part also determined by our inheritance, which arose 
from answering past needs. 
 Learning about the past conceptions and techniques that have shaped 
our present science is not just a matter of description. It is actually 
much more crucial for a normative project. In order to re-process our 
inheritance intelligently, we should first understand how it came into 
being. Benedetto Croce once said, “only historical judgment liberates 
the spirit from the pressure of the past” ( 1941 , 48). Learning the his-
tory of how scientists came to believe today’s orthodoxy can not only 
aid our understanding of the science, but it may also reveal that what 
we take as evident and necessary truths today were results of past deci-
sions that were contingent and could have gone in a different way. Such 
awareness of past contingency also allows the possibility of making that 
contingency real again in the present; thereby history of science can 
legitimately support normative philosophy of science too, quite con-
trary to common impressions of the fundamentally descriptive nature 
and mission of historiography. 
 In the converse direction of dependence, why the history of science 
needs the philosophy of science will perhaps be quite obvious to most 
perspectivist readers of this volume. No history can be written as a “view 
from nowhere.” And no history of science can be written in a philosophy-
of-science vacuum, if we take philosophy of science as a field that provides 
notions about the nature of scientific practice and scientific knowledge. 
The question is what kind of philosophy we should take as our historio-
graphical framing device. The old internalism, which was certainly ame-
nable to history–philosophy integration, achieved the integration only 
in a diminished fashion. It tended to talk of knowledge as theories and 
experiments existing in the service of theories. It was linked up with a 
truth-focused justificationist epistemology firmly based on the proposi-
tional conception of knowledge. This kind of history–philosophy integra-
tion was only made possible by impoverishing the history. Pragmatism 
and perspectivism offer superior alternatives. 
 Here I return to the broad humanist framing with which I began this 
chapter. If we appreciate the acquisition and development of knowledge 
fully in the context of human life, we need to examine the development of 
scientific knowledge that serves the purposes of life. Recall the humanist 
flourish of the Vienna Circle Manifesto: 
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 Everything is accessible to man; and man is the measure of all things. 
Here is an affinity with the Sophists, not with the Platonists; with the 
Epicureans, not with the Pythagoreans; with all those who stand for 
earthly being and the here and now. 
 ( Neurath et al. 1973 , 306) 
 “ The scientific world-conception serves life, and life receives it ” (318). 
Such an outlook on science can best be framed not in terms of logical 
positivism as it is commonly understood, but in terms of pragmatism 
taken as deep empiricism. 
 There are many reasons to pursue integrated HPS, and many ways 
for doing it. 14 What has been lacking in my own advocacy of integrated 
HPS is a broad philosophical grounding for it, a general philosophical 
perspective from which integrated HPS is a crucial thing to be doing for 
those who concern themselves with the place of science in human life. 
The need for integrated HPS arises naturally if we take a humanist view 
of science. 
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 Notes 
 1 . This definition appears on simply searching for “pragmatism” in Google, and 
it is part of the Google Dictionary (www.google.be/search?q=Dictionary). 
 2 . For the original formulation, see  Peirce (1878 , 293). 
 3 . For some preliminary thoughts along this direction published so far, see  Chang 
(2016 ,  2017 ,  2018 ). In  Chang (2016 ), I used the phrase “pragmatic coherence.” 
 4 . A preliminary exposition of this account is in  Chang (2017 ). The epistemic 
activity in question does not have to be one of explicit testing. Sometimes a true 
statement is explicitly verified; other times its truth consists in its involvement 
in other kinds of successful activities. 
 5 . Many-valued logics are possible, and in fact seem to be flourishing. 
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 6. Dewey references Peirce in connection with this thought, in footnote 1 on 
page 9. 
 7 . That was the first of his “six theses” about logic ( Dewey 1938 , 14–21). 
 8 . Dewey argued that logical principles were only “operationally a priori” at 
each stage of the evolution of knowledge ( Dewey 1938 , 14). If that is the 
situation even with logic, need we say much about the revisability and evolv-
ability of the methods of science? 
 9 . The following statements are helpful in clarifying Lewis’s position: “The 
necessity of the a priori is its character as legislative act. It represents a con-
straint imposed by the mind, not a constraint imposed upon mind by some-
thing else” ( Lewis 1929 , 197). “The paradigm of the  a priori in general is 
the definition. It has always been clear that the simplest and most obvious 
case of truth which can be known in advance of experience is the explica-
tive proposition and those consequences of definition which can be derived 
by purely logical analysis. These are necessarily true, true under all possible 
circumstances, because definition is legislative” (239–240). 
 10 . See also  Lewis (1929 , 165). 
 11 . Dewey went on to dissect the inquiry process into several steps ( Dewey 1938 , 
105–112). 
 12 . There are, of course, intricate debates about how much Kant was willing 
to enter into metaphysical commitments reaching beyond the phenomenal 
realm. See, for example,  Massimi (2017 ) for discussion. 
 13 . See  Fesmire (2015 , 64–73) for a nice exposition. 
 14 . See  Arabatzis and Schickore (2012 ), and references therein, for a relatively 
recent assessment of the state of play in this area of work. 
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 Explanation, Interdisciplinarity, 
and Perspectives 
 Melinda Bonnie Fagan 
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 1 Introduction 
 This chapter engages with perspectivism as part of an ongoing project 
on explanation as collaboration. The latter project requires some intro-
duction, which will set the stage for my engagement with perspectivist 
ideas. The goal of this chapter, hence, is twofold. First, I show that a focal 
problem for my project, the explanatory challenge for interdisciplinary 
research, has significant parallels with recent debates about perspectiv-
ism. Second, I use those parallels to construct a taxonomy of possible 
relations between models in interdisciplinary research. The result is a 
repurposing of the perspectivism debate as a step toward answering the 
explanatory challenge for interdisciplinary research. I conclude with a 
sketch of the next steps in the project. 
 The remainder of this section provides the necessary background. The 
project on explanation as collaboration is a contribution to philosophy 
of science in practice, an increasingly prominent approach that examines 
the actual practices of scientists rather than philosophical idealizations 
or reconstructions. The starting point for this project is a broad view 
of scientific practice as socially complex, comprising many diverse and 
dynamically interacting lines of inquiry. Three features of science in prac-
tice are of particular interest for my purposes: 
 1. Scientific practice is very heterogeneous, both over time and across 
specializations. 
 2. Scientific specializations differ from one another in their epistemic 
goals, methods, norms, and products. 
 3. Among the most distinctive products of a scientific specialization are 
its explanations. 
 These three features set the stage for the explanatory challenge for inter-
disciplinary research, which is presented in the next section. Here, I pro-
vide a bit more background in order to clearly indicate the stance from 
which I approach scientific perspectivism. 
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 At any given time, scientific practice as a whole consists of a multi-
tude of diverse specializations, many proceeding more or less indepen-
dently from others, with some in the process of merging or splitting. 
With increasing numbers of researchers and more elaborate technology 
and training programs, the rate of specialization splitting is increasing. 1 
What I term a specialization is very similar to Darden and Maull’s classic 
account of a scientific field: 
 a field is an area of science consisting of the following elements: a 
central problem, a domain consisting of items taken to be facts relat-
ing to that problem, general explanatory factors and goals providing 
expectations as to how the problem is to be solved, techniques and 
methods, and sometimes, but not always, concepts, laws and theories 
which are related to the problem and which attempt to realize the 
explanatory goals. 
 ( Darden and Maull 1977 , 44) 
 There are two differences between Darden and Maull’s notion of a field 
and a specialization, as I use that term here. First, their concept of a 
field is conceptual and historical, not sociological. A specialization, as I 
conceive it, is a sociological entity as well as a conceptual and historical 
one, comprising multiple epistemic agents interacting with one another 
in a cultural context. Second, Darden and Maull define a field as aimed at 
explanation, conceived as a form of problem-solving. I relax the assump-
tion that explanation is a necessary scientific goal, allowing that some 
specializations may not aim at explanation. Not all problem solutions in 
science involve explanation, though many do. I retain, however, Darden 
and Maull’s focus on explanation—not because explanation is all there is 
to scientific practice, but because it is an important part of that practice 
and, moreover, one with social (collaborative) dimensions that have not 
been sufficiently appreciated. Explicating these social dimensions is the 
overall goal of my larger project on explanation and collaboration. 
 An explanation, as I use the term, is a product of scientific inquiry, 
constructed with a set of tools and in accordance with norms of a special-
ization, on which the honorific “explanation” is bestowed by members 
of that specialization. On this view an explanation is an epistemic arti-
fact, produced and recognized by a scientific community. This approach 
allows for many different styles and forms of explanation; it is, so to 
speak, an actor’s category for scientific communities. This starting point 
excludes ontic accounts of explanation that locate explanatory factors in 
the world itself rather than in our representations of it. That exclusion is 
not a problem for my purposes, however. This is because any explanation 
provided by the world must be interpreted by scientists in order to play 
a role in scientific practice. Such an interpretation, including reference 
to the world independent of human thought and action, if endorsed by 
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an actual scientific specialization, is an explanation in the sense of the 
term used here. So ontic accounts of explanation such as, for example, 
 Craver’s (2007 ) are not excluded by this approach. 
 2 Explanation in Interdisciplinary Contexts 
 The above preliminaries clarify my practice-oriented approach to scien-
tific specialization and explanation. This section introduces the problem 
my project aims to solve. The trend of increased specialization motivates 
scientific research spanning multiple specializations—interdisciplinary 
research. Increasing prevalence of interdisciplinary research through-
out the sciences is indicated by a number of empirical measures. 2 This 
trend is a response to increased specialization, which fragments scientific 
knowledge into narrow spheres of specialized technical expertise. Such 
fragmentation makes it increasingly likely that researchers from differ-
ent specializations need to work together to answer significant questions 
about the world. This need is most obvious for practical challenges such 
as climate change, sustainable energy, and global health, which demand 
contributions from multiple scientific disciplines ( Koskinen and Mäki 
2016 ). But knowledge transcending the narrow confines of a single spe-
cialization is of epistemic value in many cases. 
 Its value notwithstanding, interdisciplinary research faces a number of 
challenges and obstacles. Many are institutional, such as funding oppor-
tunities, patterns of scientific work organization, peer review practices, 
expectations for promotion and tenure, and architectural design of work-
spaces. Such institutional challenges have been the focus of most research 
and policy efforts on interdisciplinarity to date ( MacLeod 2018 ). How-
ever, interdisciplinary research also presents epistemic challenges, which 
stem from the difficulties of combining key aspects of the scientific method, 
such as data collection practices, modes of inference or analysis, norms of 
model construction, and standards for scientific knowledge. These chal-
lenges are a problem in social epistemology of science. 
 Explanation presents a particularly serious epistemic challenge for 
interdisciplinary research. As noted above, scientific specializations vary 
widely in their goals, methods, and epistemic standards. They also face 
stringent “selective pressures,” in that a given specialization must con-
tinuously attract researchers and resources in order to persist. Special-
izations that do so tend to exhibit harmony or coherence in their goals, 
methods, norms, and objects of inquiry. 3 Such coherence is achieved 
over time and with hard-won labor, through the mutual adjustment of 
a specialization’s objects of inquiry, goals, methods, and norms to one 
another. Concomitant with this mutual adjustment within a specializa-
tion is diversity across specializations. It follows that specializations are 
differentiated from one another in key aspects of the scientific method. 4 
The epistemic challenges for interdisciplinary research are all aspects of 
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the general problem of achieving harmonious fit among elements of a 
research program—methods, norms, and epistemic goals—that hail from 
two differentiated sources. Explanations are among the most distinctive 
epistemic products of a specialization. 5 Although the goal of explanation 
is broadly shared across the sciences, it is conceptualized and accom-
plished in diverse, locally specific ways. Different specializations impose 
different standards on construction and evaluation of explanations. Those 
standards, or norms, provide specific constraints on what a successful 
explanation should be like—the features it should exhibit, as such, and 
the ways it represents or otherwise relates to the target of explanation. 6 
 The diversity of explanations across the sciences is mirrored by the vari-
ety of philosophical accounts of explanation, each of the alternatives being 
based on different scientific exemplars. For example, consider the Standard 
Model of particle physics, the linchpin of which is the Higgs mechanism. 7 
A key part of the model is a gauge theory that unifies the known physical 
forces. It is constructed to satisfy two constraints: to retain the mathematical 
properties of gauge theory while breaking symmetry of the field. Empirical 
data constrain but do not determine the model; as many as 30 distinct mod-
els are known to be consistent with “the observable facts” in this case. The 
Higgs mechanism is, evidently, a significant scientific explanation. It is also 
highly distinctive in its relation to physical theory, unificatory aims, model-
ing constraints, and relation to empirical data. Extrapolating features of this 
explanation to other specializations imposes an external standard on the 
latter. For example, the double helix model of DNA structure, an exemplar 
of explanation for molecular biology, contrasts with the Higgs mechanism 
in all the respects noted above: it is not based on mathematical theory, does 
not aim to unify all biological phenomena, is constructed to accommodate 
a wide range of experimental results, and is interpreted causally or function-
ally. Researchers committed to one specialization’s view of explanation often 
find the explanations of others wanting. The same goes for philosophers, 
who cannot as individuals be conversant with more than a few scientific 
specializations. 
 Although the problem has not been studied systematically, there is 
some reason to think that interdisciplinary projects across the sciences 
often fail to thrive, or even begin, due to discrepant explanatory norms 
and goals. Examples of failed interdisciplinary explanation have been 
documented in synthetic biology/humanities ( Rabinow and Bennett 
2012 ), prokaryote/eukaryote phylogeny ( O’Malley 2013 ), and systems 
biology/stem cell research ( Fagan 2016 ). If interdisciplinary researchers 
are committed to different views of explanation, this can lead to ten-
sion and forestall effective collaboration. Precisely because explanation 
is an important goal for many scientific specializations, yet understood 
in distinctive ways across specializations, it presents a stark challenge to 
interdisciplinary research. How, if at all, are genuinely interdisciplinary 
explanations possible? 
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 Consider the simplest case, in which two independent specializations 
aim to explain the same phenomenon, such as the mechanical properties 
of solids under strain or human sexual behavior. 8 By “independent” I 
mean that the specializations involved are neither descendants of a recent 
split nor recently merged but which have been proceeding for some non-
negligible time interval as separate lines of inquiry, constructing explana-
tions in accordance with their distinct goals, norms, and methods. Once 
it is discovered that two independent specializations aim to explain the 
same real-world phenomenon, there are four possible outcomes: the 
two explanations may remain isolated from one another, coincide, con-
flict, or be integrated in some way. 9 The first is likely the most common, 
but is inapplicable to interdisciplinary research. The second outcome 
allows for smooth merging of distinct specializations into a new inter-
disciplinary specialization. That outcome is likely to be very rare, for the 
reasons noted above. Conflict, the third possible outcome, is the tradi-
tional response when different explanations of the same phenomenon are 
proposed—but like the first, this is incompatible with the goals of inter-
disciplinary research. So it is the fourth outcome that is of interest here. 
How can different explanations be integrated so as to construct a genu-
inely interdisciplinary explanation? This is the explanatory challenge for 
interdisciplinary research. 
 My strategy for answering this challenge is to weave together insights 
from the debate over scientific perspectivism and from the social episte-
mology of science. The former offers guidance in characterizing the possible 
relations between explanations constructed by different specializations. 
The latter indicates normative constraints that, applied to those relations, 
yield an account of explanation for interdisciplinary research. This result 
is not proposed as a general account of explanation but instead charac-
terizes an epistemic virtue that is of interest beyond interdisciplinarity: 
comprehensiveness. This argument demonstrates that social norms for 
collaboration also have the epistemic benefit of increasing the compre-
hensiveness of explanation. That epistemic benefit can be understood in 
terms of perspectives as well. Combining distinct perspectives is a way of 
enhancing knowledge and understanding. That full account is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, however. The more modest task undertaken here is 
to show the relevance of the perspectivism debate for my project and to 
use this debate to ground a framework for analyzing relations between 
models constructed from different perspectives. 
 3 Models and Perspectives 
 Explanations constructed in interdisciplinary research may be conceptu-
alized as models. Models have many functions in science, one of which is 
the explanation of phenomena of interest. The nature of explanation by 
models is an unsettled issue, with current debates focusing on whether 
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representational accuracy is required ( Frigg 2010 ;  Kaplan and Craver 
2011 ), whether such explanations must be causal ( Woodward 2003 ;  Rice 
2015 ), and the role of similarity relations between explanatory models 
and their targets ( Weisberg 2013 ;  Parker 2015 ). The diversity of expla-
nations across the sciences renders it unlikely that univocal answers on 
these points will be forthcoming. But one general claim about models in 
science does hold quite broadly: models and their roles are influenced 
by model users’ purposes. If those purposes include explanation, then 
users’ ideas about explanation inform their practices of model construc-
tion as well as resulting products. Methods of constructing explanatory 
models, and norms that guide these methods and constrain resultant 
products, vary widely across specializations. Explanatory models are, 
in this way, localized to the goals, methods, and standards of particular 
scientific specializations. In interdisciplinary research aimed at expla-
nation, models or modeling resources from multiple specializations are 
needed to construct an explanatory model adequate to the purpose. So 
the explanatory challenge for interdisciplinary research can be refor-
mulated in terms of divergent explanatory  models , with the latter term 
referring to an epistemic product constructed for explanatory purposes 
by members of a specialization. 10 
 The idea of explanatory models localized to scientific specializations is 
related to the notion of diverse perspectives. A perspective, in the every-
day sense of the term, is a stance from which an object appears to one or 
more observers, roughly synonymous with “a point of view.” From differ-
ent perspectives the same object may present very different, even incom-
patible, appearances. The content of a perspective can be articulated as 
an indexical statement: “This is how it is from here.” In art, the term 
has a more precise technical meaning, associated with strategies for real-
istically rendering three-dimensional scenes in two-dimensional media 
( Giere 2006 ;  van Fraassen 2008 ). Visual perspective is characterized by 
having an origin, orientation, grain, marginal distortion, occlusion, and 
spatial distortion. The origin, traditionally, is the painter’s or viewer’s 
eye, while orientation is the direction in which that eye is looking—the 
angle of the gaze. Grain is the level of detail permitted by a perspective, 
ranging from rough to fine. “Marginal distortion” refers to the limits of 
the mode of viewing in a particular perspective. Occlusion is related; this 
term refers to focusing on some features so as to block or shadow others, 
which are thereby occluded in that perspective. Systematic spatial distor-
tion is another hallmark of visual perspective: relative sizes of objects are 
represented differently than in reality (e.g., projection in two-dimensional 
maps of the earth). 
 These features of visual perspective have analogs in scientific model-
ing. Briefly, the origin corresponds to the user, orientation to features of 
the user’s context, grain to the degree of abstraction, marginal distortion 
to the limits of the model, occlusion to the selection of some features of 
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the target at the expense of others, and spatial distortion to idealization. 
Perspective in the everyday sense is also relevant to models in science. In 
philosophical discussions of scientific modeling, a model is taken to offer 
a (partial, often idealized) representation of a target object ( Giere 1988 ; 
Morgan and Morrison 1999;  Weisberg 2013 ). This partiality and contex-
tual selectivity can be characterized as perspectival. For example, Mitchell 
and Gronenborn assert that, in scientific modeling, “what is represented 
and what is left out are usually tailored to meet some explanatory or 
pragmatic goal. This type of selection encodes what is sometimes referred 
to as a ‘perspective’” ( Mitchell and Gronenborn 2017 , 707). Models of 
real-world targets do not, and arguably cannot, accurately represent 
those targets in every respect ( Teller 2001 ). The features represented, and 
the degree of accuracy required, are chosen in light of model users’ pur-
poses. Such selective, partial representation is what makes models useful. 
In this sense, models are inherently perspectival. Their perspectival aspect 
permits multiple models of a single worldly target, incompatible with one 
another and yet all scientifically legitimate. 
 This situation is the starting point for debate about perspectival real-
ism. But the perspectival view of models also applies to the explanatory 
challenge for interdisciplinary research. Different specializations produce, 
among their other results, explanatory models of phenomena of interest. 
Each partial, limited model is constructed by researchers within a special-
ization in accordance with its norms and methods for explanation. In this 
way, each specialization can be considered a distinct perspective within 
which explanatory models are constructed. The different specializations 
involved in interdisciplinary research contexts bring different perspec-
tives to bear on the phenomenon of interest. Social scientists sometimes 
describe interdisciplinarity in exactly these terms. For example, Stichweh 
concludes his sociological study of scientific disciplines with the statement 
that “differentiation along disciplinary lines has the great advantage of 
viewing reality from radically different angles. The risks that the one-
sidedness of each perspective entails are thus avoided” ( 1992 , 12). In an 
important subclass of interdisciplinary contexts, the goal is to construct 
a single explanation from these diverse perspectives. This task is under-
taken when specialized explanatory models are individually inadequate to 
account for the phenomenon of interest. In such cases, members of differ-
ent specializations must somehow combine their respective explanatory 
models of the phenomenon of interest. So the challenge is one of integrat-
ing models constructed from distinct perspectives to create a single (“uni-
fied”) explanation of the phenomenon of interest. 11 Responding to this 
challenge requires showing how this unification is possible, explicating 
and articulating conditions for its success, and distinguishing the resul-
tant interdisciplinary explanations from other epistemic results. The first 
step is showing how models from different perspectives can possibly be 
integrated. And here the debate over perspectival realism offers important 
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insights. That debate is not, of course, about explanation or interdisci-
plinarity; my approach here is to repurpose insights that emerge in that 
debate rather than contribute to it directly. 12 I do so by canvassing differ-
ent relations between models from different perspectives that emerge in 
the debate initiated by  Giere’s (2006 )  Scientific Perspectivism . 
 In  Scientific Perspectivism , Giere defends “perspectival realism” as a 
viable alternative to traditional scientific realism about theories, distinct 
from antirealist relativism. Giere proposes perspectivism based on the 
metaphor of color vision, arguing that scientific theories and observa-
tions (both models, according to Giere) are perspectival in the same way 
as descriptions of color: they tell us what the world appears to be like 
from a particular standpoint. All justified realist claims by scientists are 
therefore qualified and conditional. Giere takes these qualifiers and con-
ditions to have the form: “according to this highly confirmed theory (or 
reliable instrument), the world seems to be roughly such and such” (5–6). 
A consequence of this perspectival account is that quite different descrip-
tions of the same bit of the world are not incompatible. Rather, each 
describes a different way of experiencing the world, such that one is not 
an unqualifiedly better representation of that world than another. Dis-
agreement (and normative selection of “the best” model) is possible only 
within a perspective. 13 
 Giere’s account contrasts with traditional scientific realism, which he 
characterizes in terms of the following conditional: if models constructed 
from different perspectives represent the world in incompatible ways, then 
at most one can be (approximately) true. It follows that in such cases there 
is direct conflict between models that must be resolved. The task then is to 
select, out of a set of competing alternatives, the model that is most likely 
correct. Traditional scientific realism thus allows for only one possible rela-
tion between distinct models of the same target phenomenon:  direct con-
flict among competing alternatives. Giere rejects this traditional account, 
obviously, but does not otherwise say much about how models from dif-
ferent perspectives might relate to one another. Although he allows that 
agents can switch perspectives and compare results among them (83–84), 
Giere does not discuss combining or merging different perspectives, apart 
from the intriguing remark that an experimental test involves the “mesh-
ing” of theoretical and observational perspectives (89, 93). 
 In response to Giere, philosophers take a range of positions as to 
whether perspectivism is a genuinely realist alternative to both traditional 
scientific realism and to antirealism. In this debate the relation between 
models and the world is of primary concern, rather than between models 
from different perspectives. Yet ideas about this issue emerge obliquely, 
yielding an interesting array of results.  Chakravartty (2010 ,  2017 ) 
argues, contra Giere, that perspectivism amounts to traditional scientific 
realism. Building on  Rueger’s (2005 ) proposal that incompatible models 
describe a system of interest relationally (“from this perspective it looks 
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as if . . .”), Chakravartty argues that real-world systems have dispositions 
non-perspectivally and that these are differentially revealed by different 
detection methods (i.e., perspectives). Apparently incompatible models 
are reconciled by seeing them as revealing different dispositional facts 
about a single target system. An explanation, according to Chakravar-
tty, describes how non-perspectival facts about a real system’s structure 
produce the different behaviors/capacities that appear to us under differ-
ent circumstances. This account of explanation posits an  indirect relation 
between models from different perspectives; they are reconciled, or ren-
dered consistent with one another, by an underlying structural descrip-
tion that coordinates them. Lacking a structural explanation, we can 
still answer contrastive “what-questions” by picking out the appropriate 
answer among the multiple perspectives on offer. Thus, another relation 
among models from different perspectives is via a long conjunction of the 
claims made by different models about a target  T , stating each method 
and dispositions of the target revealed by that method. Such a conjunc-
tion has the form: “method  x reveals  a about  T , and method  y reveals  b 
about  T , and so on.” 14 The relation between different models included 
in such a conjunction is minimal; one is linked to another via the formal 
connective “and,” with no substantive relation posited to hold between 
any. I refer to this minimal connection between models from different 
perspectives as  simple additivity . 
 Morrison (2011 ) takes issue with Giere’s distinction between perspec-
tivism and antirealism, arguing that the plethora of incompatible models 
of the atomic nucleus ascribe inconsistent “fundamental properties” to 
the target of inquiry, such that “there is no way to build on and extend 
the models in a cumulative way” (351). Construing alternative models 
of the atomic nucleus as offering different perspectives on its structure 
without the prospect of cumulative extension is, according to Morrison, 
tantamount to antirealism about atomic nuclear structure. Cumulative 
extension, she suggests, requires a unifying core or coherent treatment of 
all the different alternatives. The latter is available in other cases, such as 
models of turbulence, which are reconciled as different ways of elaborat-
ing the same set of basic principles; they are alternative idealizations 
based on a shared common structure. Morrison refers to this relation 
between models as “complementary,” but as I argue below, that term 
is better reserved for a different relation. Morrison’s core idea is much 
like Chakravartty’s account of explanation: the different models do not 
directly relate to one another but are all subsumed by a more abstract or 
general model. Accordingly, I will refer to this relation as  subsumption . 
Another possibility suggested by Morrison’s account, although not one 
she discusses, is  direct cumulative interaction among models from distinct 
perspectives. 
 Chirimuuta (2016 ) offers a different criticism of Giere, arguing that the 
metaphor of vision obscures some resources for perspectival realism and 
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that the sense of touch, the operation of which involves active engage-
ment and interaction with the world, is a more appropriate guiding meta-
phor. Her key claim is that “scientific representations inform us about the 
natural world in virtue of their interactive and interested qualities” (746). 
That is, scientific representations, although perspectival, can inform us 
about the world through interaction with it. On her “haptic” account, 
partiality, interestedness, and interaction are not obstacles to realism but 
constitutive of a realist role for perspectival representations in science. 15 
Although Chirimuuta does not characterize relations between models 
from different perspectives per se, her account emphasizes the  interactive 
processual nature of the model-world relation. Relations between models 
can be conceived in this way as well. 
 Massimi (2016a ,  2016b ) also looks to interaction to formulate an alter-
native to Giere’s perspectival realism. She argues that a scientific claim 
meets the criterion of “success from within,” supporting realist “success 
to truth” inferences, just in case that claim (i) performs adequately with 
respect to standards of its own, originating perspective; (ii) expresses a 
proposition that is in fact true; and (iii) meets standards of performance 
adequacy appropriate to its original context as assessed from another 
scientific perspective. The idea of (iii) is adapted from perspectival analy-
ses of knowledge and belief, which distinguish context of use from con-
text of assessment for knowledge claims. This contextualist distinction is 
adapted from that between a theorist’s perspective and that of epistemic 
agent  S , commonly invoked in analytic epistemology. In classic thought 
experiments, the theorist judges that  S does (not) know that  p , in accor-
dance with standards that the theorist justifiably takes to be appropriate 
to  S ’s situation. 16 Perspectival theories of knowledge make these different 
stances part of the content of the theory itself. Massimi adapts the epis-
temological distinction between context of use and context of assessment 
to the case of multiple scientific perspectives. Scientists can judge the 
ongoing performance adequacy of a knowledge claim by the standards of 
its originating perspective, as those standards are interpreted in their own 
perspective. The criterion of success from within supports a realist dis-
tinction between approximately true parts of theories and “idle wheels” 
(after Kitcher).  Cross-perspectival assessment is unlike the other relations 
canvassed here, in that it is not a relation between models as such, but 
a mode of relating different perspectives with respect to claims made in 
one. Cross-perspectival assessment tracks how every single perspective 
fares with respect to standards of performance adequacy when assessed 
from the point of view of other (synchronic or diachronic) perspectives. 
 Massimi’s notion of a perspective as a “context of assessment” is com-
patible with the idea that specializations amount to different perspectives 
from which explanatory models are constructed. But an explanatory 
model typically consists of more than one claim (and often non-linguistic 
elements as well). If claims are considered to be parts of models, then 
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cross-perspective assessment is an indirect relation, mediated by the 
standards of assessment constitutive of perspectives. In order for one 
perspective to assess the standards of performance adequacy of another 
perspective, the two must be sufficiently similar for the judgment to be 
warranted; conceptual distance blocks cross-perspectival assessment 
( Massimi 2016b ). This is not a problem if different perspectives are con-
ceived as stages within a historical lineage of, for example, theories of light, 
motion, or the atom. 17 But it does seem to block cross-perspectival assess-
ment across disparate specializations, as the standards of performance-
adequacy for explanation in particular are typically very different. I return 
to this issue in the conclusion. 
 This survey of positions in the recent debate over perspectival realism 
yields the following list of relations, which can in principle hold between 
models from different perspectives: 
 • Direct conflict ( Giere 2006 ) 
 • Simple additivity ( Chakravartty 2010 ) 
 • Subsumption; indirect reconciliation ( Morrison 2011 ;  Chakravartty 
2010 ) 
 • Interactive process ( Chirimuuta 2016 ) 
 • Cross-perspective assessment (Massimi 2018) 
 • Direct cumulative interaction (adapted from  Morrison 2011 ). 
 The next task is to refine the above list of possible relations to articulate 
a conceptual framework for analyzing relations between models from 
different perspectives. 
 4  Cross-Perspective Relations Between Models: 
General Framework 
 Eliminating the relations inapplicable to interdisciplinary research and 
generalizing the others yields a preliminary taxonomy of possible relations 
between explanatory models from different specializations ( Table  2.1 ). 18 
The taxonomy is framed by two crosscutting distinctions (direct/indirect 
and similar/different) and two continuous axes (degree of integration and 
stage of model construction). The last generalizes the insight of Chirimuuta’s 
 Table 2.1 Four-Place Taxonomy of Relations Between Models 
 direct  indirect 
 similar  overlap  subsumption 
 simple additivity 
 cross-perspective assessment 
 different  conflict 
 LK-complementarity 
 contrastive  
N-complementarity 
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haptic metaphor: that relations between diverse models may hold, or not, 
at different stages of the model construction process, ranging from an initial 
sketch to an explanation that is complete according to the standards of its 
specialization. The degree-of-integration axis is anchored at one extreme 
by the relation of simple additivity. The latter involves no substantive con-
nection between models from different perspectives; their contributions are 
simply strung together in a conjunction, making the connection between 
models one of bare logical consistency. Most interdisciplinary research 
aimed at explanation will require more substantive connections between 
models. However, there is no need to rule it out in principle. 19 The oppo-
site extreme on this axis is mutual dependence, or reciprocity, between all 
elements of models from different perspectives. This latter is illustrated by 
Chirimuuta’s concept of an interactive process, as well as  van Fraassen’s 
(2008 ) view of ongoing “joint construction” of theoretical and experimen-
tal perspectives. 20 These two axes provide a general graphical framework 
for characterizing relations between models from different perspectives in 
terms of stage of model construction and extent of integration. 21 
 Alongside this framework, the two crosscutting distinctions yield a four-
place taxonomy of relations between models. The direct/indirect distinc-
tion is readily seen from the initial list of relations in section 3. Conflict 
between models is a direct relation: different models make incompat-
ible claims about the same target and thus directly contradict with one 
another. Subsumption, in contrast, is an indirect relation: different mod-
els are rendered compatible by each being subsumed by a more funda-
mental model ( Morrison 2011 ) or underlying structure ( Chakravartty 
2010 ). Chirimuuta’s haptic metaphor prioritizes direct engagement. The 
general point is that models from different perspectives can either relate 
to one another directly or via an additional mediator. The most familiar 
direct relation between models is one of overlap or coincidence; different 
models have certain features in common. Such points of coincidence, or 
zones of overlap, can serve as “joints” that connect models across perspec-
tives. But for models constructed in different perspectives, differences are 
likely to outnumber similarities. This is the second distinction: models 
may relate to one another in virtue of their similarities or in virtue of their 
differences. The latter may seem counterintuitive. To better motivate it, I 
next argue for an addition to the list above:  complementarity . 
 Direct conflict, at first glance, appears incompatible with explanation 
in interdisciplinary research. As noted above, the challenge for such cases 
is to integrate or unify explanatory models from different specializations; 
direct conflict would seem to be a non-starter. 22 Nonetheless, despite 
first appearances, this relation can hold between models from different 
perspectives. What is incompatible with interdisciplinary research—or, 
rather, with the class of such cases aiming at explanatory models con-
structed with contributions from all participating perspectives—is the 
way direct conflict is resolved through traditional theory choice. The 
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traditional view is that, faced with a set of conflicting models, we must 
select the best for the purpose at hand. But when multiple perspectives 
are in play, there is no neutral stance from which “the best model” can 
be chosen. Such a stance is the “view from nowhere” that perspectivists 
repudiate. In interdisciplinary research, each perspective has something 
to contribute but cannot hope to provide a satisfactory explanation on its 
own. So, in these cases, conflicting models cannot relate to one another 
as mere competitors. 
 There is, however, another way to conceptualize the relation among 
directly conflicting models from different perspectives: as a form of com-
plementarity. The idea is illustrated by occlusion in visual perspective (see 
section 3). Occlusion is a kind of representational limitation on model 
construction in the visual perspective: selecting one feature to represent 
rules out or otherwise compromises successful representation of other 
features of the same target. A feature that is blocked or distorted by rep-
resentation of another in a model is occluded in that model. One model’s 
occlusion can be another’s successful representation—this is one reason 
multiple models of a phenomenon are sought in the first place. But mod-
els that complement one another in this way cannot, in general, simply 
be combined into a single coherent model of their shared target. They 
directly conflict by representing the target in mutually exclusive ways. 
This is an example of a direct difference relation between models; they 
relate to one another by contrast. 23 But models that represent a target in 
conflicting (mutually exclusive) ways can be related more abstractly, as 
complements or “negative images” of one another. To return to the visual 
metaphor: that which one model casts in shadow, the other presents in 
full light. I will term this relation N-complementarity (for “negative”). 
This immediately suggests another way in which models from different 
perspectives can relate to one another: namely, by complementing one 
another more directly. In this case there is no occlusion; different models 
just supply what is missing from one another’s representations of a shared 
target. Such “lock and key” complementarity (LK-complementarity) is 
one form of mutual dependence among models from different perspec-
tives. LK-complementarity is a direct relation: different models represent 
different features of the target, compensating for one another’s partial-
ity. N-complementarity is indirect; the properties that N-complementary 
models represent the target as having cannot be combined into a single 
coherent model. Such models can be integrated only via mediating rela-
tions, such as van Fraassen’s “duality” ( 2008 ) or subsumption by another 
model. Escher’s tessellations (designs that fill the picture plane) exhibit 
both kinds of complementarity: two different visual perspectives repre-
sented in a single frame, interlocking in a pattern of contrasting colors 
and perfectly complementary shapes (LK-complementarity), yet the har-
monious whole is itself an illusion with which the viewer engages by 
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interpretively switching between ground and figure. The continuity of 
shape from edge to center, and the blending of symmetry and contrast, 
produce the appearance of a single scene that is also two. 
 This establishes a second distinction among relations between cross-
perspectival models: similarity/difference. The distinction concerns fea-
tures of models in virtue of which they connect with one another. Models 
can connect through sameness: having features common to both. Or 
they can relate to one another through difference: a contrast leveraged 
into a positive link. Most philosophical discussions of model-integration 
focus on similarities across distinct models: shared structure, properties 
depicted, and so on. The lesson of Escher’s work, and of other examples 
of complementarity across perspectives, is that models can be interest-
ingly related in virtue of their dissimilarities as well. 
 The main result from this taxonomy is that models from different per-
spectives can be integrated in virtue of similarities or differences, either 
to one another directly or else via some additional mediator. These two 
crosscutting distinctions, together with the continuous axes (degree of 
integration and stage of model construction), provide a general com-
parative framework for analyzing relations between models constructed 
in different perspectives. Models may be related to one another by 
similarity—having features in common—just as they may relate to their 
targets in this way. If this similarity relation is direct, then the shared fea-
tures are points of overlap or coincidence between models from distinct 
perspectives. These areas of coincidence serve as “joints,” connecting 
different models into a more inclusive model. Alternatively, the similar-
ity relation may be indirect, requiring a mediator. The traditional indi-
rect similarity relation involves subsumption of disparate models by a 
more “fundamental” (or abstract, or general) model of their common 
features ( Morrison 2011 ). The mediator in this case is the more funda-
mental model. Indirect relations via mediators of this sort involve hier-
archical assumptions, with the abstract shared feature being privileged. 
This privileging is often associated with explanatory power. In this way, 
explanatory issues are implicated in perspectivism, although explanation 
is not the main focus of those debates. Direct relations among models do 
not require hierarchical assumptions of this sort. Models from different 
perspectives may also relate to one another through difference, either 
directly or indirectly. The former is epitomized by the seamless fitting-
together of jigsaw puzzle pieces via complementarity in shape. Indirect 
relations of difference involve some mediating conceptual construct, 
such as a part-whole hierarchy relating different levels of description, or 
cause-effect relations representing elements of one model as causes of ele-
ments of another. These mediators also bear on ideas about explanation. 
This returns us to the issues raised at the start of this chapter concerning 
explanation and collaboration. 
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 5 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued that recent debates about perspectivism 
have important parallels with the explanatory challenge for interdisci-
plinary research. Without imposing a priori ideas about the nature of 
explanation onto scientific practice, the epistemic products of distinct 
scientific specializations recognized “from within” as explanations can 
be conceptualized as models. Philosophical discussions of perspectivism 
take as their starting point the situation of multiple incompatible mod-
els of a single phenomenon, focusing on the implications of this situa-
tion for scientific realism. The explanatory challenge for interdisciplinary 
research, characterized in terms of models, begins with the situation of 
multiple models of a single phenomenon, constructed by different scien-
tific specializations in accordance with the distinctive goals, norms, and 
methods of each. The question for interdisciplinary research is: how (if at 
all) can models from different specializations be combined so as to pro-
duce an explanatory model spanning multiple fields of expertise? Differ-
ent specializations amount to different perspectives on the phenomenon 
of interest. The notion of perspective rests on a visual metaphor, which 
maps onto key aspects of scientific modeling. Construction of expla-
nations is one kind of modeling, which differs in its particulars across 
specializations/perspectives. So the question becomes: how to integrate, 
or unify, explanatory models from different perspectives? 
 The first step toward answering this question is to examine the possible 
relations between models from different perspectives. This was done by 
canvassing positions in the perspectivism debate and generalizing from 
them ( Table 2.1 ). The next step is to identify, within this array of possible 
relations, the subset that yield interdisciplinary explanations. Although 
that task is beyond the scope of this chapter, I will conclude by sketch-
ing the approach and some preliminary results. Constraints on relations 
between models from different perspectives relevant to the explanatory 
challenge for interdisciplinary research are provided by social epistemic 
norms for collaborative activity. Construction of explanatory models 
spanning multiple specializations is a kind of collaborative activity, and 
so norms for this kind of social action apply. I propose a set of such 
norms based on recent work in social epistemology of science and social 
action theory, modifying these for the special case at issue. The resulting 
set of norms indicates that relations between models constructed from 
different perspectives should be (among other things) limited and mutual. 
These results, I argue, cohere with perspectivist insights as well. Some 
indications of this coherence can be seen by re-examining Massimi’s con-
cept of cross-perspectival assessment, the outlier among relations can-
vassed above. 
 Massimi’s account of cross-perspectival assessment includes at least 
three points that cohere with social epistemic norms for constructing 
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interdisciplinary explanations. First, her account is premised on the idea 
that our current perspective is not privileged with respect to judging 
the truth of theories (or parts of theories). The corresponding attitude 
for interdisciplinary researchers is to conceive of explanations in one’s 
own specialization as one partial viewpoint among others; no single spe-
cialization is prima facie explanatorily privileged over others. Humility 
about one’s own perspective is the common, crucial point. Second, cross-
perspectival assessment applies not to entire theories or models but to par-
ticular elements of them—individual scientific claims, in her terminology. 
This fits with Massimi’s view that changes of perspective are not abrupt 
and wholesale but instead accomplished by gradual conceptual change 
by inquirers working within (while modifying) established intellectual 
traditions. Rather than changing perspectives, my account is concerned 
with integrating models. Yet the same lesson emerges, that integration of 
models from different perspectives need not be thoroughgoing. Integra-
tion requires only a limited connection, a sturdy bridge from which to 
traverse from one part of an interdisciplinary model to another. Third, for 
the cases Massimi considers, it is reasonable to suppose enough overlap 
across perspectives for a warranted assessment of the standards of one 
perspective by another to be possible. But this is not generally the case 
for explanatory models in interdisciplinary research. Perspectives con-
ceived as distinct specializations, such as theoretical physics and molecu-
lar biology, have much less substantive overlap than those that share an 
intellectual lineage, whether as contemporaneous rivals or in historical 
succession. Yet some counterpart to Massimi’s cross-perspectival relation 
seems applicable: a sort of “self-other” location. The counterpart would 
be locating one’s own model in relation to a model constructed from 
another perspective. Following Massimi’s lead, this would be assessment 
of one’s own model in terms of its relation to another. Roughly speaking, 
the idea would be that users of a model in one specialized perspective can 
see how their model connects with the models of other specializations 
in interdisciplinary research. That is, there is a way to “travel” from one 
modeling perspective to the others via the connecting bridge that links 
those models. 
 There is, evidently, much more to do in clarifying these ideas and develop-
ing them into an account of explanation for interdisciplinary research—or, 
rather, an account of one explanatory virtue that is important in interdis-
ciplinary research: comprehensiveness. What I hope to have accomplished 
here are the first steps toward such an account, showing the relevance of 
perspectivism to the explanatory challenge for interdisciplinary research, 
using a range of positions in the recent debate about perspectival realism 
to ground a general framework for analyzing relations between models 
from different perspectives, and indicating ways that further insights from 
perspectivism dovetail with a normative social epistemic account of expla-
nation in interdisciplinary research. 
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 Notes 
  1 . Cf.  Kuhn (2000 , 250) on “a vast and still accelerating proliferation of specialties.” 
 2.  Porter and Rafols (2009 ) report a more than 50 percent increase in preva-
lence and complexity of co-authorship of scientific publications, as well as 
diversity of cited sources in article references, between 1975 and 2005. The 
 American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2015 ) charts a steady increase in 
interdisciplinarity in PhD dissertations from 2003 to 2012. Social scientists 
 Brint, Turk-Bicakci, Proctor, and Murphy (2009 ) found steady growth of 
interdisciplinary programs in US four-year colleges between 1975 and 2000. 
Scholars of interdisciplinarity distinguish between inter-, multi-, and trans-
disciplinarity. In this paper, I use the term “interdisciplinary” and its cognates 
in a generic sense, encompassing these diverse forms. 
 3 . This is related to what  Hacking (1992 ) refers to as “self-vindication” for 
laboratory sciences in particular. But the point is more general: a close fit 
between different elements of scientific practice in successful lines of inquiry 
has been noted at least since  Kuhn (1962 ). 
 4 . An exception may be specializations that have recently split, such as genetics 
and genomics. The latter, though distinguished from the former in core aims, 
rhetoric, and concepts, shares a great deal with genetics; institutionally, their 
separation is incomplete. Other specializations emerge at the interstices of 
others (e.g., molecular biology, cell biology) and thus have extensive overlap 
with these “parents” ( Darden and Maull 1977 ). 
 5 . This claim is the obverse of  Woody’s (2015 ) account of explanation as having 
the social function of binding together scientific communities. 
 6 . The practice-oriented approach taken here thus entails pluralism about sci-
entific explanation. This contrasts with the traditional philosophical aim of 
analyzing scientific explanation and/or understanding in general. A more 
modest version of that project can be pursued, however, via analysis of mul-
tiple epistemic virtues that are shared more broadly (though not universally) 
across specializations. Some of these virtues are familiar: simplicity, scope, 
accuracy. However, different specializations not only associate different col-
lections of virtues with explanation but also interpret the same virtue quite 
differently. 
 7 . This example is based on  King (2018 ). Note that the Higgs mechanism is not 
a mechanism in the causal sense usually assumed by philosophers today. The 
Higgs mechanism is (at least prima facie) non-causal. 
 8 . Generalization to cases involving three or more scientific contexts is 
straightforward. 
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 9 . The problem is actually more general than as described above, where the 
explanations to be integrated are more or less finished products. Integration 
of explanations can occur at any stage in the process of constructing those 
explanations—the challenge raised by divergent goals, methods, and stan-
dards for explanation remains. 
 10 . Regarding ontic explanation, see remarks in section 1. 
 11 . For now, I will remain neutral as to whether explanations in interdisciplinary 
contexts must be understood realistically. 
 12 . There is, however, a structural analogy between the perspectivism debate 
and my account of explanation in interdisciplinary contexts. Both are con-
cerned with different specifications of one general question: how can mul-
tiple diverse perspectives relate to one another so as to yield an epistemic 
product that is in some sense unified? For perspectival realists, the epistemic 
product is knowledge of the one real world; for myself, it is a single explana-
tory model constructed via interdisciplinary research. 
 13 . Note that Giere uses the term “perspective” somewhat differently than the 
sense meant here. Giere’s term refers to a hierarchy of models that includes 
data models, representational models, and theoretical models. His usage 
equates perspectives with sets of models that are integrated in use. Different 
scientific specializations, in contrast, comprise agents and resources for con-
structing models. Multiple perspectives (in Giere’s sense) can occur within 
a specialization (a perspective, in my sense). This terminological difference 
does not affect the canvassing of relations between models from different 
perspectives. Thanks to Michela Massimi for pushing me to clarify this point. 
 14 . For example: “What is water? It is something that dissolves salt in some 
circumstances and not in others; that behaves like a continuous medium in 
some circumstances and not in others; that is nourishing in some circum-
stances and not in others,” etc. ( Chakravartty 2010 , 412). 
 15 . “We can think of models as devices which aim to achieve a certain fit 
between a natural phenomenon, the human mind, and our particular pur-
poses. Explanatory, predictive, and practical success are a matter of achieving 
the right kind of fit, not of the attainment of some God’s eye view on the sub-
ject. There can be various ways to be successful (a plurality of perspectives), 
and sometimes the best way to achieve a good match between the natural 
phenomenon, our conceptual resources, and the tasks we have at hand, is 
through willful distortion” ( Chirimuuta 2016 , 22). 
 16 . Significantly, the theorist is presumed to have a “richer informational state” 
than agent  S , which “entitles” him or her to make the cross-perspective 
assessment of epistemic standards ( Sosa 1991 ). 
 17 . Massimi (2016b , 105) does allow for “synchronically rival” as well as histor-
ically sequential perspectives in her account. That she considers them “rivals” 
seems to exclude interdisciplinary research aimed at explanation. However, 
in new work Massimi explores the idea of complementarity among perspec-
tives (personal communication). 
 18 . An earlier version of these results appears in  Fagan (2017 ). 
 19 . Contrastive explanation, which reconciles apparently conflicting models of 
the same target by an explanatory division of labor, may be an example of 
simple additivity. On the contrastive (erotetic) account, explanatory models 
answer distinct questions about the phenomenon of interest. 
 20. Note that  van Fraassen’s (2008 ) concept of a perspective is not the same as 
the one proposed here, although the two overlap in important ways. 
 21 . Empirical studies of interdisciplinary research ( Shrum, Genuth, and Chom-
palov 2007 ;  Gerson 2013 ;  MacLeod and Nagatsu 2016 ;  MacLeod 2018 ) 
46 Melinda Bonnie Fagan
suggest that efforts at “wholesale” integration across specializations are often 
unsuccessful. More restricted connections, leaving most specialized practices 
unchanged, are associated with better outcomes. 
 22 . Models that directly conflict with one another make contradictory or incom-
patible claims about the target phenomenon, which cannot at once be true. 
Outright incompatibility between models from different disciplinary perspec-
tives is unusual, as different specializations are more likely to talk past one 
another than to clash directly. Direct conflict is thus more common among 
models within a specialization than across them. 
 23 . Van Fraassen (2008 , 315–316) suggests an abstract formalism for analyzing 
relations of this sort: “duality,” an operation on partially ordered sets that gener-
alizes the idea of a complement (in the set theory sense) or negation. The details 
of the formalism and van Fraassen’s particular use of it can be set aside here. 
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 1 Giere’s Perspectivism 
 Broadly, perspectivism is the view that human knowledge is unavoid-
ably from a particular perspective or vantage point. Such ideas have reso-
nated throughout the history of philosophy, for example, in the work of 
Leibniz, Kant, and Nietzsche, and in the contemporary work of some 
philosophers, such as Putnam and Nagel. Nancy  Cartwright (1983 ) and 
Ronald  Giere (1985 ) launched a line of work that looks at science not as 
an enterprise of finding true laws but one of constructing inexact models. 
They did not use the metaphor of perspectives, but their approach has 
been deeply perspectivist. Models are always simplifications, different 
ones working well for different explanatory and practical objectives. 
 Giere (2006) explicitly casts this line of work in the perspectivist met-
aphor, urging also that this perspectivism should count as a form of 
scientific realism. He begins (chapter 2) with the illustration of color 
vision. We are trichromats, thereby having a “colored perspective” on 
the world that differs from those of di- and tetrachromats. Giere then 
argues (chapter 3) that this understanding generalizes to observation 
with scientific instruments. The “perspective” that governs a measure-
ment with an instrument is the collection of assumptions about the 
functioning of the instrument and of the theory used in interpretation of 
the instrument’s output. Why does this count as a “perspective”? A mea-
surement outcome is only secure insofar as these assumptions obtain. 
In particular, the measurement outcome can be safely used only to the 
extent that these assumptions apply or can be taken for granted. In this 
sense, measurement outcomes cannot be detached from the perspective 
within which they were obtained. In addition, no measurement per-
spective is unique because each involves imperfect idealizations. 1 These 
conclusions apply equally to scientific observations made without 
instruments because of the commonplace that, to be useful, even obser-
vations made without instruments have to be theoretically interpreted. 
 Turning to theoretical claims (chapter 4), Giere argues that in formu-
lating theories scientists “create perspectives within which to conceive 
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of aspects of the world” (59). Following the case of observation with 
instruments, a theoretical perspective is constituted by the assumptions 
of a theory. For the same reasons that applied in the case of observation, 
all claims made within a theory are undetachable from the perspective 
constituted by the theory. 
 Natural questions arise about Giere’s perspectivism, as I have so far 
summarized it. Often a claim made in one perspective/theory can be used 
in a context governed by a different perspective. Perspectives can be com-
bined, but “[m]ultiplying perspectives does not eliminate perspectives” 
(92). The only sort of perspective-free claim that one can legitimately 
make is the conditional, with a description of the perspective as anteced-
ent and measurement outcome or theoretical claim as consequent, and 
even such claims will be from some (presumably very broad) perspective. 
 Objection! One can use tables such as that of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology to look up physical constants and use them 
just anywhere. Not really. Giere will say: to use these one must be skilled 
in their use, involving understanding of their theoretical meaning and 
the theoretical contexts in which they can be applied. Take the following 
example: the mass of an electron = 9.10938356 × 10 −31 kg. Theoretically, 
the rest mass of an object isn’t even a constant. It varies with the “impact 
parameter” with which it is measured. One has to know whether and, if 
so, how to take such complications into account. One also has to have a 
theoretical understanding of the unit of measure, the kilogram. 
 Giere claims that, although all scientific claims are from within a per-
spective, such claims count as a kind of realism when the perspective 
in question and the way it has been used meet high standards of sci-
entific practice. Why? All that Giere tells us is that such are “the most 
reliable conclusions any human enterprise can produce” (92). I think 
that the intended argument goes something like the following: Giere has 
acknowledged (chapter 1) that such conclusions are in part contingent 
on human needs, interests, and historical accidents, since these affect 
our fashioning of details of our theories. But the reliability of our theo-
ries is also very heavily contingent on “the world,” that is, on circum-
stances utterly beyond our control. Moreover, scientific standards insure 
that when accepted, such perspectival claims are still very robust. They 
will stand up in a wide range of relevant circumstances. They can be 
combined with cognate perspectives to expand our store of (still always 
perspectival) knowledge. In these senses, conclusions that meet high sci-
entific standards are “telling us something about the world.” This is the 
best—really the only—kind of knowledge of the world we can have. 
This is the most one could ask of a realist attitude. I don’t think Giere 
has more than this to offer and, yes, so far the argument is thin. Below 
I will very extensively enlarge on such considerations as supporting the 
label “realism.” 
What Is Perspectivism? 51
 2 Scientific Realism as Referential Realism 
 One consideration that, in combination with others, will favor perspec-
tival realism will be that standard scientific realism fails. I will work with 
a “generic” formulation of standard scientific realism, following common 
elements of two standard sources ( Psillos 1999 , xix ff.;  Chakravartty 
2017 , sec. 1.2). 
 In the first instance, a scientific realist wants to say that our “mature” 
theories get it right about the world, that is, that they offer important 
claims that are true. Recognizing that, broadly, even our best theories are 
simplifications or idealizations, the claim of truth is, brushing aside wor-
ries about what it is to be approximately true, qualified as approximate 
truth. 2 But to realists, well-established existence claims seem unproblem-
atically and not just approximately true. Indeed, what would it mean for 
a claim of existence of a thing or kind of thing to be “close to the truth”? 
Either there is that thing, or kind of thing, or there is not! (This issue will 
come in for closer examination below.) 
 It is useful to reformulate this generic statement. The canonical exam-
ple is the claim that there are atoms. Instead of claiming that there are 
atoms, one can reformulate this material mode statement in the formal 
mode and say that “atom” has a non-empty extension. Generalizing on 
this example yields what I call “referential realism”: 
 Referential realism : Many important terms in mature scientific theo-
ries have non-empty extensions, and the theories in which they occur, 
at least often, provide approximately true claims about the things in 
these extensions. 
 Standard scientific realism is or includes referential realism as a principal 
component. 3, 4 The point of my reformulation is that it will make appar-
ent options that are otherwise not apparent. 
 To see what is involved in referential realism, I will appeal to what I 
call “the tools of reference.” First, there are referring terms that, when 
things go well, we take to have specific referents. “The Eiffel Tower” 
refers to the Eiffel Tower. “The standard kilogram” refers to the stan-
dard kilogram. 5 “Temperature” refers to the quantity temperature. Next, 
there are predicates (understood also to include kind terms and relational 
terms), which, when things go well, we take to have specific extensions: 
for “atom,” the collection of all atoms; for “cell” (disambiguated to the 
intended biological kind), the collection of all cells; for “chair,” the col-
lection of all chairs. (I include the problematic example of “chair” to 
foreshadow the fundamental point soon to come.) 
 How do predicates get attached to their extensions? This cannot 
be directly, for then a predicate’s extension could not change and we 
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could not reason counterfactually about such extensions (what if there 
were more or different kinds of atoms . . .). Instead, for each predicate 
there must be some mediating consideration, what I will refer to as an 
extension-determining characteristic, to which the predicate is attached 
or with which it is associated, so that something is in the predicate’s 
extension just in case it has that characteristic. These characteristics 
might be properties, qualities, attributes, kinds, conditions, and so forth. 
What I will need here is only that these characteristics determine what 
things go into an extension. Otherwise I needn’t take a stand on just 
what these characteristics are or how they get attached to predicates. 
Thus, my characterization of the “tools of reference” covers a vast range 
of “theories of reference,” all of which seek to characterize how the pre-
sumed tools of reference get attached to their referents and extensions. 
Finally, the package includes the applicability of strict identity. If  a and 
 b have referents, then there is always a fact of the matter, whether or 
not  a =  b (recall Quine on this point: “No entity without identity!”). 
And for each extension of a predicate and each entity, there is a fact of 
the matter whether or not the entity is in the extension; equivalently, 
whether or not the entity has the characteristic associated with the predi-
cate in question. Referential realism, as I intend it, is to be understood in 
terms of these referential tools. 
 Once the role of the tools of reference has been made explicit, we see 
that there are two ways in which some specific claim of realism could 
fail. Using the example of atoms, it could be that the term “atom” has 
been successfully attached to an extension-determining characteristic, but 
that extension is empty. “Magnetic monopoles” might be an example of 
such failure. Or the term may never have been successfully attached to 
any extension-determining characteristic. Note that this could be, not 
because there are no candidate characteristics to be attached, but because 
there are  too many characteristics with failure to have picked out exactly 
one of them. We will see that, in the first instance, this is what appears to 
happen for “atom.” 
 3 Referential Realism Fails 
 The underlying problem is that, given human limitations, the world is too 
complicated for our theoretical terms to get attached to any extension-
determining characteristics. 6 The easy case is atoms. Are ions atoms? If 
yes, then bare nuclei would count as atoms. If no, then salt, held together 
by ionic bonds, is not composed of atoms. In the case of covalent bonds, 
quantum chemists start with the nuclei in a molecule as a “backbone” 
and then estimate properties of the “electron cloud” that envelops this 
backbone. Woody concludes ( 2010 , 427) that when seen through such 
techniques, “any reliance upon the concept of the isolated atom in devel-
oping molecular wavefunctions was gone.” 
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 Borderline plasmas provide another example. In a plasma there is enough 
energy to completely dissociate electrons from nuclei. Presumably there are 
no atoms in a plasma. But as the temperature of a gas rises, approaching 
that for a plasma state, the process will be incomplete, and there will be a 
quantum mechanical superposition of atoms, incompletely ionized states 
in which atoms have lost some of their electrons, and states with nuclei 
completely stripped of electrons. In such a state, it will be indefinite just 
which parts count as atoms. 
 Note that what I have so far argued is not that there are no candidates 
for the needed extension-determining characteristic to function for the 
term “atom,” but that there are too many. This makes room for the fol-
lowing response to the difficulty that I have raised for referential realism. 
Let us grant that we use “atom” loosely so that, strictly speaking, it does 
not have a well-characterized non-empty extension. But this loose use can 
easily be tidied up. What actually exist are things like ions, complexes of 
nuclei and electrons in covalently bonded molecules, nuclei and electrons 
in plasmas, and so on. 
 But when we get to the puzzles of quantum theory all of this becomes, 
at the very best, uncertain. Nuclei are composed of quarks and gluons, 
and functioning as they do in vast quantum mechanical superpositions 
makes it dubious whether “quark” and “gluon” have specific extensions 
at any one time. Electrons likewise coexist in superpositions with posi-
trons in pair creation and annihilation. 7 
 The case of atoms illustrates the kind of problem that I have in mind. 
But the problems are ubiquitous. The sorts of complications that arise 
for water chemistry will compromise specific extensions for molecules, 
at least in many cases. For things larger than molecules, there will be the 
same problems that arise for objects of perception that I will examine 
below. But for starters, just what is the extension of “chair” supposed to 
be? Though less extreme, the same sort of problem arises for predicates 
such as “cell.” 
 The obvious retort to these worries is: so much the worse for the tools 
of reference! Bear in mind that “the tools of reference” is an umbrella 
notion that covers any in the family of accounts that work in terms of 
reference and extension-fixing characteristics, however “characteristics” 
is more specifically understood and these characteristics come to be asso-
ciated with their predicates. The natural alternative is the family of “use” 
accounts, stemming from Wittgenstein’s “the meaning of a word is its use 
in the language,” according to which one must look to see how a term is 
used in a language community. Often such use accounts are distressingly 
non-specific. 
 What about cluster concept accounts? If the cluster in question is fixed, 
this is just another kind of characteristic and falls under the tools of ref-
erence umbrella. If the cluster is open-ended, somehow to be used at the 
discretion of language users, this will fall under the use family. 
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 A second worry. Obviously, the tools of reference function for us some-
how extremely successfully. So when I argue that the tools of reference 
fail to function as described, many readers will feel sure that something 
must have gone wrong. 
 No one gives up an account when problems are pointed out unless pre-
sented with an alternative account that meets at least some of the difficul-
ties and that enables one to see how the old account worked as well as it 
did. So I must respond to this worry by introducing my alternative. We 
use the tools of reference, with great success, by using them in idealized 
models or similar arrangements. 8 Speaking metaphorically, in the world 
described by an idealized model, the referring terms and predicates  do 
have referents and non-empty extensions. And in fortunate cases, in the 
real world such models function for us extremely well. In certain respects, 
this makes my approach a member of the use family. But my approach 
differs entirely from familiar versions of use accounts. These are sup-
posed to work by looking at the patterns of use in a language community. 
My account instead looks at whether and to what extent an idealized use 
of a referential term functions for us successfully in respects that we care 
about. This makes my approach also very non-specific in a certain sense, 
but in a way that, I submit, is appropriate. My way of thinking about use 
of referential terms gives the  form of answers to questions about how 
the term works. More specific answers to questions about success of an 
idealized use have to be answered case by case by examining just how a 
specific idealization, or a family of idealizations, functions. 
 The argument for my alternative account will be that it makes sense of 
the successful functioning of our use of the tools of reference in the face 
of the difficulties that I have explained. In particular, my examples will 
illustrate how taking the tools of reference to function through their use 
in idealizations simply sidesteps the difficulties. 
 Now to address a third anticipated complaint: the problems I have enu-
merated are just problems of imprecision, understood as ambiguity and 
especially vagueness. 9 Well, yes, completely agreed, except for the “just”! 
Characterization in terms of vagueness reformulates the problems, and 
usefully so, but does nothing to resolve them. We have no account of vague-
ness that succeeds in telling us how to make sense of “vague” extensions 
of vague predicates or, transposing to the formal mode, how to provide 
truth conditions for vague statements, such as characterizing an object as 
a chair. This is not the place to summarize the failings (with respect to the 
problems relevant here) of all extent accounts of vagueness. 10 
 4  The Alternative to Referential Realism, 
Instrumentalism, Also Fails 
 If referential realism fails, presumably the alternative is instrumentalism. At 
least among other things, theory functions as a guide to what to expect by 
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way of the deliverances of perception. Instrumentalism, broadly conceived, 
is the view that the content of scientific theories is exhausted by such 
expectations. But instrumentalism has the presupposition that unaided per-
ception does not have the failings that undermine referential realism for 
theoretical objects. We take ourselves plainly to see things around us—the 
objects of perception such as the Eiffel Tower, the standard kilogram, and 
the like. Likewise, we take ourselves plainly to see property instances that 
these objects of perception have: the pointer pointing to the numeral “5,” 
the right side of the balance pan being lower than the left side, and the 
previously blue litmus paper now being red. 
 But instrumentalism fails. It fails because this presupposition fails, and 
for the same kind of reason that referential realism fails in the realm of 
the theoretical. The world is too complicated for perception to identify 
completely specific concrete objects of perception or the properties or 
characteristics that such objects of perception might have. 
 Starting with properties, I will illustrate with the well-known example 
of perception of colors. Naively, we take ourselves visually to detect col-
ors of objects as intrinsic properties that they possess: the color of that 
scarf is bright red. Already in the early modern period it was appreciated 
that colors, and secondary qualities generally, are not intrinsic proper-
ties but a complex of the interaction between external objects and our 
perceptual systems. Today we know a great deal about the complexi-
ties of color vision. Our experience of things as colored is a complex 
process involving properties of the object perceived, the light reflected, 
extremely complex perceptual processing, and all kinds of environmental 
circumstances. 11 
 What about primary qualities, shape, size, and duration? As noted by 
many from Berkeley onward and in the respects relevant here, primary 
qualities suffer vagaries similar to those suffered by the secondary quali-
ties. A coin viewed from an angle casts an oval image on the retina but 
is still seen as round. All kinds of environmental clues (relative positions 
and sizes, textures, lighting, etc.) affect how we see relative locations, 
sizes, and shapes. Perceived temporal duration is highly context depen-
dent, and for short intervals even perceived temporal ordering of events 
can be a construction of our perceptual processing. 
 Turning to objects, we take ourselves plainly to see objects in front of 
us: that stone, that tree, that chair, the standard kilogram bar, and so forth. 
But what is actually perceptually available to us? To illustrate, imagine 
you are driving toward the Eiffel Tower. You catch sight of it—you see 
the Eiffel Tower! But wait—a bit of the top is obscured by a cloud. And 
even with nothing obscuring your vision (from the visual perspective you 
hold) you only see one side of a limited number of parts of the tower. 
That you have seen (all, or even a part of) a completely specific referent of 
“the Eiffel Tower” looks to be some kind of inference—but, of course, no 
explicit conscious inference. Perceptual experience fills in enormously. 12 
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What current perceptual science shows us is that our perceptual system 
puts together for us a visual experience as of some completely specific 
external object. Not only does the perceptual system fill in much detail 
with which we are not currently in visual contact, but just how we experi-
ence the target includes a great deal of tacit information about how the 
object would look from different angles, about the further experiences we 
would have were we to physically interact with the object, and so forth. 13 
 How might we interpret these comments? Two alternatives are avail-
able. First, there is some completely specific referent of “the Eiffel Tower” 
and likewise for other perceived objects. Our perceptual system fashions 
for us a pretty detailed model of these objects, filling in a great deal that 
is not visually available. But owing to the complexity of things, these 
models are never in any sense complete and never, where they do specify, 
completely accurate. The second alternative is just like the first, but the 
assumed target of perception is problematized. The alternative I want to 
consider is not a modern referential idealism (or solipsism), that all we 
have are our perceptions and there is nothing otherwise independent of 
us. Rather this alternative agrees, to express it neutrally, that there are 
“Eiffel Tower phenomena,” but the world is far too complex for there to 
be one specific referent of the phrase “the Eiffel Tower.” Rather, thinking 
(and acting) in terms of a unique referent is a simplification, a kind of 
idealization, of a much more complex set of circumstances. 
 This second alternative should by now sound familiar. What’s the argu-
ment for it in the case of objects of perception? As before, the problem is 
not that there are no candidate referents but that there are too many. Just 
what is to be included in the supposed specific referent of the first alter-
native? Spatially, there are so many specific physical objects that could be 
in question: With or without the concrete buttress holding up the legs? 
With or without bits of paint that have just about flaked off? With or 
without a bolt that has just come off? Just what gets included in the pur-
ported referent of “the Eiffel Tower”? For the standard kilogram bar, the 
problem is particularly acute. The bar is constantly losing and gaining 
tiny bits of matter, for example, when it is handled. Technicians struggle 
to take these into account, to get a stable standard for the kilogram, 
but never with complete success. Just what is the referent of “the stan-
dard kilogram bar”? Temporally, at just what point in time did the Eiffel 
Tower or the standard kilogram bar come into existence? 
 That there are specific objects of perception, referents for our terms 
for them, and properties that we take ourselves as perceiving them to 
have, are simplifying idealizations or models that nature puts together 
for us. The problem and the response to it are very much the same as for 
the purported referents of our theoretical terms. To provide an alterna-
tive to realism about theoretical objects, instrumentalism would have to 
be free of the difficulties for theoretical objects from which it was sup-
posed to rescue us. But instrumentalism faces exactly the same underlying 
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difficulties. The world is too complicated for us to have any exact knowl-
edge of it. At both the level of theory and the world of perception, we 
know the world though the inexact representations (call them models, 
idealized characterizations, perceptions, etc.) that we fashion or that 
nature fashions for us. 
 By this point we have a more detailed characterization of and argu-
ment for Giere’s perspectivism, as applying not just to things postulated 
by our theories but also at the level of perception. All human knowl-
edge is inexact. All human knowledge is perspectival in the sense that 
our representations are always fashioned within one or another inexact 
representational scheme. In the case of theory, we generally have a range 
of complementary theoretical perspectives. In the case of perception, for 
the most part we are built to work with the perceptual perspective that 
nature has fashioned for us, which is nonetheless a perspective because it 
is highly inexact. It is also shown to be a perspective, in the current sense, 
by the fact that we can complement it with one or another theoretical 
perspective that we use in the science of perception. 
 I need to make two qualifications to my claim that  all human knowl-
edge is from one or another inexact perspective. Combinatorial facts, 
logic, and in general, finite mathematics provide a most plausible system-
atic exception. But as soon as we get to mathematics where the incom-
pleteness results show that there are unintended interpretations, we have 
difficulties analogous to those for empirical knowledge. Second, it is to 
be emphasized that the ubiquity of perspectivism is not a logical or con-
ceptual fact about human knowledge. It is entirely contingent because of 
the complexity of the world compared to our meager human epistemic 
capacities, abundantly illustrated by examples that I have cited and innu-
merable ones similar to them. Because it is contingent, the conclusion is 
not that this is what human knowledge has to be. The world is changing 
so fast that I will not hazard how this all might look 100, 50, possibly 
even 20 years from now. Rather, I take my job as an interpreter of the 
human epistemic enterprise to characterize the nature of human knowl-
edge as it now exists or will be as long as it faces anything like the limita-
tions that now constrain it. But does the perspectivism that I have argued 
for properly count as some kind of realism? 
 5 How to Think About Realism 
 What are our options? Referential realism, or any view of which it is 
a necessary condition, fails. Instrumentalism fails. I won’t discuss other 
historically discarded views: idealism, sense data theories, and so on. The 
problem is that we need a fresh alternative. Perspectivism provides such 
an alternative. Perspectival knowledge is the best, really the only knowl-
edge (with the qualifications mentioned) humans can, in practice, have. 
We could let it go at that. The perspectivism that I have described isn’t 
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referential realism. Legions of scientific realists have laid claim to the 
term “realism.” Perspectivists could just let them have the term and move 
on. But it is also worth exploring why, just as Giere suggested, the label 
“realism” is appropriate for perspectivism. 
 To review, with just a little more detail, here is the earlier “generic” 
formulation of contemporary scientific realism, following  Psillos (1999 , 
xix) and  Chakravartty (2017 , sec. 1.2). First component: there is a 
mind-independent world that is the target of scientific (and perceptual) 
knowledge and understanding. Since most of what happens happens 
independently of what we think or wish, perspectivists eagerly embrace 
this assumption. Second component: scientific claims are to be taken 
literally, in particular as having truth values, and not to be reinterpreted 
as mere instruments for guiding our expectations about the perceptual. 
Since, as I have explained, instrumentalism is no rescue for the difficul-
ties instrumentalists see in realism, perspectivists also enthusiastically 
endorse this condition. Third component: mature theories succeed in 
giving us true, or approximately true, statements about the world and 
the things in it. Scientific realists concede that, for the characterization 
of the properties of things, all scientific knowledge is, at best, “approxi-
mately true.” But generally speaking, the position appears to be that, for 
much of mature science, the referential claims are true, full stop. 14 I have 
already detailed my reservations about referential success. In addition, 
we need some critical examination of how to understand “approximate 
truth.” 
 The reservation about approximate truth is that it is context depen-
dent and, in particular, interest dependent. This already follows from the 
circumstance that “approximate truth” is going to be a matter of degree. 
Close enough to the truth for what? That will depend on what our inter-
ests are, what is at stake. But the context dependence is much more per-
vasive. 15 To say that a false statement is approximately true comes to 
saying that what the statement describes is similar to what in fact obtains. 
But similarity is context dependent and, in particular, interest dependent. 
Any two things are similar in countless ways and dissimilar in count-
less others. To say similar without explicit qualification always has to 
be understood as similar in contextually determined respects and not in 
others. Given that approximate truth can be understood in terms of simi-
larity between what is claimed in a statement and what a fully correct 
statement would present, approximate truth has the same contextuality 
that we see in claims of similarity. One and the same statement will be 
approximately true in some respects but not in others. Which respects are 
intended is usually set by context. 
 Acknowledging the contextuality of approximate truth has an unex-
pected implication: standard scientific realism is immediately transformed 
into a perspectivist view! If, like absolute truth, approximate truth were 
context independent, then one could say of an approximately true state-
ment that it is approximately true for, well, for anything. But given that an 
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approximately true statement will be (a) close to the truth in some respects 
and not in others and (b) in those respects close enough for some things but 
not others, these context-dependent limitations constitute restrictions to 
perspectives in the sense developed in section 1. Specifying the respects 
and degrees already is robustly to characterize a perspective from which, 
or within which, a statement can be treated as true, a perspective from 
which claims cannot be exported. 
 Proper treatment of the existence claims of referential realism injects 
a second robust perspectivist component into standard scientific realism. 
For the existence claims themselves, “approximate truth” may seem to 
many a non-starter. What would it mean to say the claim that there are 
atoms is “approximately true”? Either there are atoms or there are not! 
I don’t know of any explicit statement to this effect in the realism litera-
ture, but context often suggests that this attitude is being presupposed, 
perhaps as so obvious that it needs no mention. The one hedge I know 
in the literature is Psillos’s statement: “[T]he entities posited by [mature, 
well confirmed theories],  or, at any rate, entities very similar to those pos-
ited , do inhabit the world” ( 1999 , xix, emphasis added). 
 How should we understand saying that entities of one kind are “very 
similar to” entities of another kind? If both kinds of entities exist, such 
claims are unproblematic (as long as we keep in mind the complication 
that two objects that are similar in some respects will always be dis-
similar in others). But if there are no entities of the first kind, and this is 
because the term for the first kind hasn’t been attached to an extension-
determining characteristic, it is without content to say that entities of a 
second kind are similar to those of the first kind. No entities of the first 
kind have been specified. So there are no things of the first kind of which 
we can say that they share properties with entities of the second kind. The 
best we could say is that entities of the second kind have the (or many 
of the) properties that entities of the first kind were  supposed to have. 
But then, why would they—namely, the entities of the second kind—not 
be the real entities of the first kind to begin with? So Psillos’s hedge is 
empty. We need an alternative way of addressing the referential failure of 
standard scientific realism. 
 Though having rejected the existence claims of referential realism, I 
have also recognized the usefulness of the tools of reference by thinking 
of them as operating in idealized models (accounts, theories, etc.) where 
they function as if they had referents, and the models as a whole, in fortu-
nate cases, function excellently in understanding one or another general 
aspect of how the world works. But understanding the function of the 
tools of reference as working through application in idealized models 
or idealization schemes is to characterize them as operating within the 
perspective characterized or created by those idealizations. The upshot is 
that, once the difficulties with both approximate truth and the referential 
component have been addressed, standard scientific realism  becomes a 
perspectivist account. 
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 Still, one could insist: so much the worse for realism of any kind for 
science. And, for those who have been persuaded by my arguments for 
the world of perception, so much the worse for realism for the objects of 
perception also. I think this would be hasty. While rejecting application 
of the designation “realism” in any absolute non-perspectival account, I 
will offer some considerations that support the appropriateness of using 
the term for the perspectival account I have sketched. 
 If we think of “realism” as denoting an attitude that takes imperfect 
representations nonetheless as telling us about the mind-independent 
world, this is an attitude that current scientific realists should endorse. By 
and large, “approximate truth” is good enough for realists to say that a 
theory is telling us a lot about how the world is and, one can add redun-
dantly, how it is  really . Let me offer a model, or parable, that supports 
this attitude. 
 Imagine a much simpler universe. You and I know every detail of what 
occurs in this world. Denizens of this world get a great deal pretty accu-
rately, but they get nothing exactly right. They can give descriptions of 
how macroscopic objects are shaped but get some little details wrong. The 
small mistakes don’t show that they have no grip on what such shapes 
 really are, especially when the mistakes are, for their interests, inconse-
quential. Or consider a thermodynamic example. This world is composed 
of Democritean-like particles. There is no further analysis to be had of 
their constitution. These particles engage only in rectilinear motion that 
can change on collision. The creatures of this world postulate a quantity, 
temperature. They have thermodynamics but no statistical mechanics. 
We know that their temperature is mean translational kinetic energy for 
which there are fluctuation phenomena, but the world’s denizens aren’t 
aware of these fluctuations and incorrectly believe that there are none. 
Still, they know a lot about thermal phenomena. Their “temperature” 
is an idealized quantity that applies to their world only through their 
idealized thermodynamics. Still, these denizens know a lot about what is 
really going on in their world, especially if the fluctuation phenomena are 
inconsequential to them. 16 
 I submit that such thinking shows “realism” to be a sensible label for 
“approximately true” qualitative claims, and if so, the label is sensibly 
extended to existential claims likewise. The barrier to so doing was worries 
about how to understand “approximate truth” for claims such as “things 
of kind  x exist.” But I have supplied a viable interpretation. To say that 
“things of kind  x exist” is approximately true is to say that an idealized 
model that uses the tools of reference for things called “ x ” is successful for 
an important and broad range of applications. 
 I will develop two further ways to support the appropriateness of retain-
ing the designations “real” and “realism.” I suspect that a facet of the prob-
lems with the realism debate has been roughshod use of the word “real.” 
In the first instance, “real” is used for the simple idea of reference. To say 
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that the Eiffel Tower is real is just to say that “the Eiffel Tower” has a ref-
erent. To say that Santa Claus is not real is just to say that “Santa Claus” 
has no referent. To say that “atoms are real” is just to say that “atom” has 
a non-empty extension. But then all sorts of more subtle but important 
uses and connotations of the word “real” are left by the wayside. Are 
chairs, clouds, rainbows, shadows, holes, mirages, and fairies real? There 
is a slide here, where there shouldn’t be, if the world “real” is applied 
with the clear “all or nothing” presumption. No question: chairs are real. 
Clouds also, I should think. Are rainbows real? Any discomfort with say-
ing that rainbows are real is that they are not real physical objects. You’re 
in trouble if you go looking for the end of one. But rainbows are perfectly 
real optical phenomena. Similarly for shadows and holes. They are per-
fectly real, but one has to be careful what one means by such statements. 
(Real) shadows are relatively well-localized blocked light in an otherwise 
well-illuminated background. (Real) holes are the relatively well-localized 
absence of material in an otherwise solid medium. Turning to mirages, 
they, like rainbows, are perfectly real optical phenomena, but we also deny 
that they are real in the sense that there are no objects of which they are 
mirages. And things pretty well give out when we get to fairies. 
 The example of clouds nicely illustrates the way I want to think about 
how we use the tools of reference in a way that shows the foregoing slide 
to be unproblematic. We do use the tools of reference with clouds as 
referents and extensions. We talk about “the oval-shaped cloud” and “all 
the clouds in the sky at noon.” And identity: “you and I are looking at the 
same cloud.” But  of course we have to take care with such usage. We use 
the tools of reference when the purported referents are “distinct enough.” 
When clouds begin to merge such usage breaks down. Treating clouds as 
specific, distinct objects of reference is a simplification—an idealization, 
if you will. The “distinct enough” is easily understood as follows: this ide-
alization is one that does not get us into trouble with our present practi-
cal aims. When our subject is clouds, the standards of care and the things 
that can go wrong are different from and much more demanding than the 
analogous standards of care when the subject is ordinary physical objects. 
When we get to optical phenomena, such as rainbows and mirages, we 
can still use the tools of reference, but with their own required standards 
of care. The standards of care are dependent on the kind of idealizations 
that are in question for these different subject matters—the idealizations 
that are needed to enable use of the tools of reference. 
 The moral is thus the following: scientific realists have proceeded as 
if concrete particulars and other purported referents, such as, perhaps, 
space-time points, property instances and the like, and their collections 
were all that is in question. But when using “real,” one has to take care 
to be clear: real for what kind of things? Concrete particulars? Phenom-
ena? Absence of light or material? And so on. Then we have to look at 
whether, or to what extent, treating the referent as real—more carefully, 
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using referential terms in the simplification—will work for us in the pres-
ent practical context. It is the strategy of deploying the tools of reference, 
and other simplifications, in one or another broad idealizing scheme that 
Giere had in mind with his characterization of working within one or 
another perspective. 
 Let me provide a second consideration that illuminates this general 
moral. Readers who have followed me this far won’t succumb to the 
following, but some already in section 4 will have had the following reac-
tion: the author is arguing that there are no colors, rocks, chairs, cells, 
electrons, and so forth. This is just rank skepticism! Some of these critics 
may think that skepticism about cells and atoms is arguable, but hardly 
for colors and rocks. 
 But wait! Does sophistication about color perception amount to skep-
ticism about colors? In a sense, yes. But such skepticism is utterly harm-
less. Once one sees that such skepticism about colors is innocuous, one 
quickly sees that the same goes for rocks and other macroscopic objects. 
One’s mind is then opened to taking a similar approach to “unobserv-
able” things such as cells and electrons, especially when one sees that 
instrumentalism provides no refuge. 
 To summarize the point: there is a kind of harmless skepticism that 
pervades the argument of this paper. But it is entirely mitigated once one 
takes a little care in how to understand the designation “real.” 
 Interlocutors may object at this point: if we really are in a situation like 
that of the creatures of the world of my analogy, of course, the designa-
tion “realism” is well grounded. But take away what you and I know 
about in the story—“the way things  really are,  exactly ”—and the anal-
ogy collapses. This worry gets my intent wrong. Nothing I have argued, 
claimed, or said involves or presupposes that there isn’t some unique 
way things really are, exactly. “Things are what and the way they are 
and not some other way” is a truism to which I heartily subscribe. Per-
spectivism is a manifestation of our limited epistemic powers, relative 
to the overwhelming complexity of the world. With the qualifications 
mentioned above, exact human knowledge is utterly beyond our reach. 
We are always operating within some partial and not completely exact 
representational scheme. Different schemes attain their level of success 
differentially with different aspects of things. It is these representational 
schemes that correspond to what Giere had in mind by “perspectives.” 
They are, in fortunate cases, immensely informative perspectives on the 
way things are. Add redundantly, if you like, the way things are  really . 
 Notes 
  1 . Throughout this chapter I use “idealization” very broadly for assumptions 
known to be false but advanced in the expectation that their errors will not 
interfere with the idealization’s usefulness. 
 2 . Except for entrenched instrumentalists, will any of us deny the truth of, for 
example, “water is H 2 O”? The problem here is that both “water” and “is 
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H 2 O” are imprecise or vague. The complexities of water chemistry show that 
as soon as the claim is sharpened up, it becomes false. See  VandeWall (2007 ). 
This sort of complication applies broadly across the sciences. In Teller ( 2017 ), 
I work out in detail how such considerations impact claims of truth. 
 3 . The referential component of scientific realism is often mentioned (e.g.,  Psillos 
1999 , xix;  Chakravartty 2017 , sec. 1.2;  Laudan 1981 , 33). There is also a 
critical literature ( Hardin and Rosenberg 1982 ;  Cruse and Papineau 2002 ; 
 Newman 2005 ;  Papineau 2010 ). 
 4 . Does referential realism cover structural realism? I do not have the space to go 
into this issue in detail, but on the face of it, yes, since for a structural realist our 
theories must have terms interpretable as referring to the claimed structures. 
 5 . Which I am told will have been kept and maintained after the new theoretical-
based definition of the kilogram goes into effect sometime during 2019. 
  6 . Occasionally critics demand argument that the world is indeed so compli-
cated. Examples in this section and throughout the chapter will provide 
many illustrations. 
 7 . While it requires more careful examination than I have so far given it, com-
plications of electroweak theory also may throw extensions for elections and 
other leptons into doubt. 
 8 . It is misleading to characterize such an approach as “fictional.” That a 
description is partially in error does not make it a piece of fiction. Consider, 
for example, psychiatric case histories that falsify irrelevant personal details 
to preserve privacy. For a full discussion, see Teller ( 2009 ) and especially 
 Winsberg (2009 ). 
 9 . I have examined the interconnection between ambiguity and vagueness in 
this particular network of problems in Teller ( 2018a , 293–294). The well-
understood phenomenon of ambiguity largely falls out of the discussion and 
I will focus on vagueness in the immediately following. 
 10 . I have detailed some of these considerations in Teller ( 2018b ). Also to be noted: 
since the problem I have described can be reformulated as problems of vague-
ness, the approach to addressing them, in terms of idealized descriptions, pro-
vides the seeds for an approach to vagueness that is entirely different from 
anything I know of in the literature. While I have not yet developed this idea in 
any detail, I have developed tools that I expect will be needed in Teller ( 2017 ). 
 11 . For an accessible survey of the science, see  Giere (2006 , chap. 2).  Chirimuuta 
(2015 , chap. 4) gives a more detailed exposition. 
 12 . Skeptics about what I am claiming here should see Churchland and 
Ramachandran (1998). 
 13 . There are hundreds of research articles supporting these claims. Just three 
are  Akselrod, Herzog, and Öğmen (2014 );  Churchland, Ramachandran, and 
Sejnowski (1994 ); and Churchland and Ramachandran (1998). 
 14 . The references in note 3 above can be extensively extended. 
 15 . The following is a rough and ready exposition to facilitate seeing what the prob-
lem is. A much more careful exposition is to be found in Teller (2001, 402–406). 
As explained there, the problem of similarity for approximate truth is the right 
interpretation of Miller’s infamous “language dependence” problem. 
 16 . In Teller ( 2018a ), I show that  our notion of temperature, and physical quan-
tities very broadly, have exactly the idealized status illustrated in the forego-
ing analogy. 
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 1 Introduction 
 A realist portrayal of science should accommodate the fact that science 
describes the world from numerous “perspectives.” The nature of these 
perspectives and their interrelationships have for long been the bread 
and butter of history and philosophy of science. Realists continue grap-
pling with challenges arising from the contingencies of grand theoretical 
perspectives (or “paradigms”) and the ever-increasing plurality of models 
used for predicting and explaining various phenomena. These challenges 
turn on the inconsistencies that science seems to harbor, threatening the 
realist credo that science successfully works by virtue of “getting things 
right about the world.” A natural realist hope is that these inconsistencies 
can be accommodated through an apt notion of “perspective,” which is 
compatible with the basic realist credo. 
 What notion of “scientific perspective” should realism incorporate 
then? Answering this question helps with understanding scientific real-
ism, and it is further instigated by recently developed perspectivist foils 
to more traditional realism by Ronald Giere, Paul Teller, and Michela 
Massimi. 1 These self-proclaimed “perspectival realists” have developed 
and defended views about the  perspectival nature of scientific knowledge 
that put emphasis on it “being situated” in historical and modeling con-
texts ( Massimi 2018b , 164). Thus perspectivists characterize scientific 
knowledge as “the inevitable product of the historical period to which 
those scientific representations, modeling practices, data gathering, and 
scientific theories belong,” and as being embedded in “a prevailing cul-
tural tradition in which those scientific representations, modeling prac-
tices, data gathering, and scientific theories were formulated” ( Massimi 
2018b , 164). 
 I am doubtful that the realist’s optimism and commitment toward sci-
entific progress and theorizing (especially in the fundamental sciences) are 
best captured in terms of scientific knowledge. Articulating an alternative 
vision for realism is a book-length project. The limited aim of this chapter 
is to present a different, realist-friendly notion of scientific perspective 
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that does not concern knowledge. In particular, I wish to focus on what 
I call “explanatory perspectives” in relation to a (minimally) realist com-
mitment to accumulating scientific  understanding . Shifting the focus 
from knowledge to understanding yields a different kind of perspectiv-
ism, since understanding (as presently explicated) is not knowledge but 
rather an ability. The factivity of knowledge (namely that knowledge 
entails truth) is an almost universally accepted platitude about knowl-
edge. By contrast, I will argue that explanatory perspectives in science 
and their indispensability spring specifically from the  non-factive aspects 
of theoretical representations that maximize our scientific understanding. 
 In particular, I will argue that insofar as scientists’ understanding can 
be enhanced by idealizations and/or false metaphysical presuppositions—
whether mistakenly believed or merely entertained as useful fiction—such 
non-factive aspects of theorizing naturally give rise to mutually incompat-
ible perspectives on natural phenomena. Briefly put, explanatory perspec-
tives are ways of thinking about and representing a subject matter (say, 
light) in an explanatory context, which function to augment our under-
standing of the natural phenomena we are theorizing about (say, the rain-
bow). We will see, furthermore, that understanding-enhancing non-factive 
aspects can be involved in theories that best support genuine explanatory 
understanding in a given historical or modeling context, without scientists 
necessarily knowing all the respects in which these theories are idealized 
or false. All in all, I will conclude that increasing scientific understanding 
does not just amount to accumulating knowledge, since understanding is 
not factive in the way knowledge is, and non-factive aspects of theoretical 
representations can increase our understanding without us knowing their 
non-factive status. Rather, what matters for explanatory progress is that 
understanding-providing theories and models de facto latch on to reality 
in appropriate ways so as to satisfy explanations’ basic factivity require-
ment (to be explicated below). 2 
 The present focus on explanatory understanding is limited, of course, 
but not unprincipled. Taking a stance on scientific explanations, and the 
kind of understanding they provide of natural phenomena, is critical for 
demarcating realist commitments, since realists typically take scientific 
explanations seriously in a way that antirealists do not. For realists, 
“explanation” is a success term: the mind-independent reality determines 
whether scientists have actually succeeded in explaining and providing 
genuine understanding. To this end, realists defend a suitably  factive con-
ception of scientific explanation: genuine explanations must “latch on 
to” explanatory features of the unobservable reality. 
 The realist conception of explanations’ factivity must be immediately 
qualified. On the one hand, the assumption that (genuine) explanations 
are in some sense factive is an integral part of the realist stance toward 
scientific reasoning and its progress. On the other hand, clearly, scien-
tific explanations do not require “truth and nothing but the truth,” for 
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otherwise none of our current theories or models (which invariably 
incorporate falsehoods, approximations, and idealizations) would count 
as explanatory. The burgeoning literature on scientific explanation con-
tains various suggestions for how to understand explanations’ (qualified) 
factivity. I will begin by sketching one idea below, based on the coun-
terfactual-dependence account of explanation (section 2). Regarding the 
issue of perspectivism more specifically, I will then argue that the ensu-
ing account of explanatory understanding allows the realist to identify, 
accommodate, and motivate various perspectival aspects of science. The 
argument is based on a study of different theoretical perspectives from 
which optical phenomena have been explained and understood. Focusing 
on various explanations of the rainbow, I will show how a realist com-
mitment to steady progress in scientific understanding is compatible with 
the fact that it has involved numerous mutually incompatible metaphysi-
cal perspectives on light (sections 3 and 4). In conclusion, I will reflect 
on the “realist” content of the ensuing perspectivism about explanatory 
understanding (section 5). 
 2 Explanatory Understanding and Perspectives 
 A realist portrayal of explanatory understanding is best painted with a 
clear conception of scientific explanation in mind. It is hard to make sense 
of how explanations “latch on to” reality unless we begin with a suffi-
ciently clear account of what explanations  are and how they  work ( Saatsi 
2018b ). To this end, I will now sketch one account discussed in detail 
elsewhere. 3 The key idea of this  counterfactual-dependence account is that 
explaining is a matter of providing information about systematic patterns 
of counterfactual dependence. Explanatory counterfactuals are appropri-
ately directed and change-relating, capturing objective, mind-independent 
modal connections in the world that show how the explanandum depends 
on the explanans. The explanandum and the explanans, conceptual-
ized as variables that can take different values, stand for suitably indi-
viduated worldly features. Explanatory counterfactuals provide what if 
things had been different information, indicating how the explanandum 
would have been different had the explanans been different. Paradig-
matic explanation-supporting relations are causal, but the counterfactual-
dependence account also applies to various kinds of non-causal explana-
tions, which appeal to geometrical, mathematical, or non-causal nomologi-
cal dependencies based on, for example, symmetries. 4 
 If explaining is a matter of providing information that correctly answers 
 what-if questions, it is natural to regard as more powerful those expla-
nations that enable us to answer  more such questions (with respect to a 
given explanandum). This simple idea has rich implications regarding the 
notion of explanatory power (or “depth”), since there are many ways in 
which explanations can be compared regarding their potential to enable 
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us to answer more or less such questions. Detailed analyses of explanatory 
power along these lines have been provided by, for example,  Hitchcock 
and Woodward (2003 ) and  Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010 ). The latter 
distinguish four aspects of explanatory power: 5 
 “ Non-sensitivity ” stands for an explanatory generality, having to do 
with the range of values that the explanans variables can take with-
out breaking the explanatory relationship. 
 “ Precision ” stands for the degree of precision in which the explanan-
dum is individuated relative to some contrast class. 
 “ Degree of integration ” stands for the connectedness of an explana-
tion to other theoretical frameworks as a means of extending the 
range of  what-if questions that an agent can (more easily) answer 
with respect to particular explananda, for example, by virtue of 
equipping the agent with new inferential resources. 
 “ Cognitive salience ” stands for “the ease with which the reasoning 
behind the explanation can be followed, how easily the implications 
of the explanation can be seen and how easy it is to evaluate the 
scope of the explanation and identify possible defeaters or caveats.” 
 ( Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010 , 215) 
 Explaining is a distinctive human activity, the goal of which is the provision 
of  explanatory understanding , which we can think, along with  Ylikoski 
and Kuorikoski (2010 ), as an ability to answer correctly a range of  what-if 
questions in relation to a given explanandum. The more such answers an 
agent is able to provide (by an appropriate measure), the better under-
standing she has. In the light of this conception of understanding, there 
are both epistemic and pragmatic dimensions to explanatory achievements 
and progress of science. While the counterfactual-dependence account is 
a broadly speaking realist one (assuming an appropriate reading of the 
modalities it involves), the way in which explanations provide under-
standing requires that human beings stand in an appropriate cognitive rela-
tionship to them. It is a realist account by virtue of incorporating the  basic 
factivity requirement that explanatoriness primarily derives from explana-
tion latching on to worldly things that bear an objective, explanatorily rel-
evant dependence relation to the explanandum. But explanatory theories 
and models also typically involve non-factive aspects that have to do with 
the pragmatic, human-related dimension of understanding. This is due to 
the way in which explanatory power can in various ways be increased by 
allowing a degree of misrepresentation in an explanatory theory or model. 
 Two of these ways are particularly pertinent to us. First, information 
about explanatory dependence can often be conveyed more effectively by 
using a representation that idealizes either the target phenomenon or the 
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explanatory dependence at stake. The simplifying falsehoods that idealiza-
tions incorporate can thus contribute to an explanation’s cognitive salience, 
and/or its degree of integration, and/or its non-sensitivity ( Ylikoski and 
Kuorikoski 2010 ). Second, information about explanatory dependence can 
be most effectively grasped through a non-veridical metaphysical image 
of the system at stake. For instance, in many theoretical contexts human 
beings find it easier to cognitively operate in terms that are more familiar 
and concrete. Even if these cognitive benefits are brought about through 
partially misrepresenting the target or conceptualizing it in a wrong way—
for example, in the way that  fluid models of energy and electricity do ( de 
Regt and Gijsbers 2017 , 70–71)—they can help to provide genuine under-
standing, to the extent they enable theorists to correctly answer  what-if 
questions that are underwritten by relevant explanatory dependencies in 
the world. (For example, one can use a fluid model to efficiently grasp 
dependences between electric current, resistance, and voltage.) 
 For a quick illustration, consider a simple explanatory model of tides 
as a sine function mapped on to the relative positions of the moon and 
the sun. Although the real explanatory dependence is not exactly sinusoi-
dal, considerable mathematical convenience and cognitive salience (for 
anyone familiar with sine functions) is gained by modeling it as sinu-
soidal. Similarly, representing the gravitational effect of the sun and the 
moon in terms of Newtonian gravitational force (“pulling” the water) 
can enhance this explanation’s cognitive salience (in a typical explana-
tory context), despite misrepresenting gravity as a force (acting at a dis-
tance). Modeling tidal phenomena in these terms can provide a powerful 
explanation, tracking the dependence of tides on the explanans variables 
(namely relative positions of the moon and the sun) accurately enough, in 
a way that enables an agent (with suitable training) to answer numerous 
 what-if questions regarding the explanans. 
 This simple example illustrates the interplay between explanations’ 
factive and non-factive aspects in providing explanatory understanding. 
On the one hand, tides really do counterfactually depend on the relative 
positions of the sun and the moon; the explanation is factive and explan-
atory to the extent it captures this dependence. On the other hand, an 
idealized representation, with non-veridical metaphysical posits to boot, 
can provide better understanding than a more faithful representation by 
virtue of enabling us to better answer more  what-if questions, by mak-
ing the dependence of tides on the explanans variables cognitively more 
salient to us. In this way the “user-friendliness” of an explanatory theory 
or model can trump fidelity as an explanatory virtue, since what matters 
is the understanding that it provides limited cognitive beings like us with 
particular inferential skills and training. Recognizing the importance of 
cognitive salience also helps to appreciate how the factivity requirement 
leaves room for the possibility that maximal explanatory understanding 
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is effectively gained from several mutually incompatible theoretical con-
texts. For instance, while some  what-if questions regarding tides can 
only be correctly answered in the context of general theory of relativity 
(with curved space-time and no gravitational force), the various  what-if 
questions that arise in, for example, oceanography are best answered in 
the context of Newtonian gravity in a way that involves gravitational 
force. 6 
 I will argue below that this kind of interplay between factive and 
non-factive aspects of explanations accounts for how different “explan-
atory perspectives” naturally arise in science. To anticipate the discus-
sion of the rainbow below, consider 19th-century wave theorists of 
light, who advanced scientific understanding from the perspective of 
various ether theories. Going further back, the likes of Descartes and 
Newton presumably also advanced scientific understanding of light 
from their respective theoretical perspectives. More synchronically, in 
the contemporary context we can regard geometric ray and electromag-
netic wave models of light, along with the models of modern quantum 
optics, as offering complementary perspectives on the whys and hows 
of light phenomena. These different theories and models have steadily 
advanced the scientific understanding of light, I will argue, by virtue of 
providing accumulating information about the dependence of light phe-
nomena on various features of the world. These explanatory features 
are captured by explanans variables upon which the explanandum phe-
nomenon depends in a way that is quantitatively encapsulated in these 
theories and models. This accumulation of factive explanatory content 
is compatible with radical differences in these theories’ and models’ 
ontologies and metaphysical presuppositions, which need not be fac-
tive. These (often) non-factive presuppositions can nevertheless form 
a cognitively indispensable part of the theoretical context in which the 
explanations are situated, as we will see below in relation to various 
explanations of the rainbow. 
 As a scientific realist, I wish to maintain that advances in scientific 
understanding are achievements that relate to the way the world is beyond 
the observable phenomena. Here is an obvious challenge: how to expli-
cate the sense in which Descartes, Newton, Fresnel, and others advanced 
 genuine explanatory understanding of light given that their explanations 
presupposed mistaken explanatory posits (e.g., elastic ether). Is it not the 
case that their explanatory successes were merely  apparent , undermined 
by the subsequent ontological shifts away from their mistaken explana-
tory posits? In response, some philosophers forgo the factivity assump-
tion (and realism), construing “explanatory understanding” so as to 
allow them to maintain that past scientists achieved genuine understand-
ing despite their radically mistaken theories ( de Regt and Gijsbers 2017 ; 
 de Regt 2017 ). In the realist spirit, I am inclined to insist that genuine 
understanding requires factivity with respect to the relevant explanatory 
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dependencies; hence I will respond to the question above by explicating 
this factivity in a way that is compatible with past theorists’ understand-
ing of light being irretrievably entwined with their particular theoretical 
and metaphysical perspectives. Luckily, the counterfactual-dependence 
framework provides a way to do this by virtue of allowing factive expla-
nations to naturally incorporate also non-factive aspects that are broadly 
pragmatic and contextual. 
 From this point of view, theories and models that are false in vari-
ous ways and degrees can provide genuine explanatory understanding by 
underwriting theorists’ ability to make correct what-if-things-had-been-
different inferences. To the extent these inferences are furthermore made 
true by (causal or non-causal) dependence relations in the world, a theory 
or model latches on to reality in a way that fulfills its explanatory func-
tion regardless of its non-veridical aspects. Moreover, these explanatory 
counterfactuals can invoke explanans and explanandum variables that 
relate to unobservable features of reality, giving sufficient substance to 
realist commitment regarding explanatory understanding. 7 So while the 
non-factive, pragmatic dimension of explanations, involving idealizations 
and metaphysical presuppositions, can give rise to different explanatory 
perspectives, one’s realist commitment need only concern explanations’ 
factive dimension and the progress that science de facto makes with 
respect to it (regardless of whether or not scientists  know which aspects 
of their explanations are factive). 
 3  Reflections and Refractions on Explanatory Perspectives 
 Different explanations of the rainbow illustrate well realist commitment 
toward accumulating scientific understanding. From the dawn of sci-
ence, the rainbow has challenged scientists, primarily as an object of 
explanation (as opposed to experimentation or intervention). 8 Various 
explanations of (different aspects of) the rainbow have been provided by 
generations of physicists, including many of the most illustrious minds 
in the history of science. These explanations have been provided from 
varied theoretical and metaphysical perspectives, spanning different sci-
entific paradigms and modeling practices. Nevertheless, we will be able 
discern a steadily accumulating factive backbone of scientific under-
standing that transcends the radical shifts in the changing perspectives, 
from Descartes, through Newton and ether theorists like Fresnel, to 
the modern day. From the viewpoint of the counterfactual-dependence 
account, we can view the radical shifts in the metaphysics of light, which 
have motivated antirealist arguments from the history of science ( Lau-
dan 1981 ), as being part of the non-factive aspects of these explanations. 
This account thus enables the realist to explicate the sense in which there 
has been genuine accumulation of scientific understanding of the rain-
bow from Descartes onward. 9 
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 What does it take to “explain the rainbow”? Like any typical physical 
phenomena, there are various  aspects of the phenomenon that can be 
singled out as the explanandum, as reflected by the following questions. 
 1. Why does a rainbow have the shape it does? 
 2. Why does the (primary) rainbow form an angle of approximately 
42° from the antisolar point? 10 
 3. Why do we see a secondary rainbow at approximately 51° from the 
antisolar point? 
 4. Why is there a darker (Alexander’s) band of sky between the primary 
and the secondary rainbow? 
 5. Why does the primary rainbow have the color pattern it does (red on 
the outside rim, violet on the inside)? 
 6. Why does the secondary rainbow have the color pattern it does (red 
on the inside, violet on the outside)? 
 7. Why are there smaller “supernumerary arcs” occasionally visible 
inside the primary rainbow, with a specific spacing between them? 
 René Descartes conducted a detailed study of the rainbow, and published 
explanations of (1) through (4) in  Discours sur la méthode (1637). Accord-
ing to Descartes, these aspects of the rainbow can be explained in terms 
of the spherical shape of the raindrops in combination with a refraction of 
light (into a raindrop), internal reflection, and a further refraction (out of a 
raindrop). By using a combination of graphical analysis and numerical cal-
culations to trace the geometry of light rays, Descartes discovered that these 
assumptions about light and rain give rise to a higher concentration of light 
at the scattering angle of 138° for a single internal reflection and 129° for 
two internal reflections (corresponding to 42° and 51° angles of the primary 
and secondary bows from the antisolar point, respectively). Furthermore, the 
fact that no ray involving one internal reflection can be deflected less than 
138°, and no ray involving two reflections can be deflected more than 129°, 
can be related to the relative darkness of Alexander’s band. 
 Descartes’s explanations were provided from within his “modifica-
tionist” theory of light, according to which our perception of colors is 
due to the way in which light’s transmission rotates otherwise stationary 
ether particles, the variable spin of which causes our sensation of differ-
ent colors. Needless to say, this metaphysics is radically at odds with our 
physics. For example, since Descartes assumed light’s transmission to be 
 instantaneous , it was not possible for him to think of this transmission 
as unfolding  over time , involving refraction, a subsequent internal reflec-
tion, followed by a further refraction. Another metaphysical presupposi-
tion of Descartes’s theory was that the law of refraction was due to light 
traveling  faster in a denser medium (e.g., water) than it does in air ( Dales 
1973 ). (Many have puzzled over the consistency of this presupposition 
with Descartes’s assumption that the speed of light is not finite!) Such 
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vastly mistaken metaphysical notions and non-referential terms involved 
in Descartes’s theorizing might seem to render his explanation of the 
rainbow wholly surpassed by later theories, and unsuitable as an object 
of realist commitment of any sort. 
 This would be hasty, however. The realist can side with the standard 
historical narrative, according to which Descartes was the first to gain 
understanding of several important features of the rainbow. In essence, 
this is because the features of light relevant for Descartes’s geometrical 
analysis are entirely continuous with high-school-level geometrical ray 
optics, namely, the law of reflection and Snell’s law of refraction. We 
can further explicate Descartes’s understanding and its factivity from the 
viewpoint of the counterfactual-dependence account. Descartes managed 
to explain (1) and (2) by virtue of grasping the way in which the rainbow’s 
apparent location (relative to the location of the light source and the 
observer) depends on the shape of the raindrops and the density of water 
(responsible for the specific angle of refraction). 11 By virtue of getting 
these dependencies right, Descartes gained the ability to correctly answer 
various  what-if questions. For example, he would have been able to work 
out how things would be different if the reflecting drops were made of 
glass instead of water. 12 To the extent he gained this ability, Descartes had 
genuine understanding of the rainbow. The historical fact that he wasn’t 
able to theorize and express the relevant dependencies independently of 
his overarching mechanistic worldview and metaphysics of light rays 
does not nullify this understanding. 
 Notably, Descartes was altogether unable to account for the colors of 
the rainbow. Newton’s advance is standardly taken to consist in realiz-
ing that the index of refraction (e.g., for water) is different for different 
colors, and that white light from the sun is in some sense a “combina-
tion” of many colors. These critical ideas of the color-variability of refrac-
tion allowed Newton to answer questions (5) and (6). These ideas are, of 
course, again embedded in Newton’s broader corpuscular theory of light, 
according to which light is composed of non-spherical particles, with red 
corresponding to the larger and more massive particles than those cor-
responding to blue, for instance. Mechanical laws involving corpuscles’ 
motion through luminiferous ether would account for the law of refrac-
tion in terms of differences of velocity in different media. (In Newton’s 
“emissionist” theory denser media, such as water, “pulled” these corpus-
cles differently depending on their size and mass, resulting in a higher 
velocity component perpendicular to the interface.) Again, the broader 
perspective within which Newton’s explanation was embedded is well 
off the mark on the whole, but a realist can nevertheless maintain the 
standard story according to which Newton genuinely advanced scientific 
understanding of the rainbow. From the viewpoint of the counterfactual-
dependence account this advance can be explicated in terms of the  fur-
ther explanatory dependences that Newton got right, involving a new 
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explanatory variable corresponding to the color of light and a depen-
dence of the angle of refraction upon that variable. 13 The key to Newton’s 
explanatory advance is an approximately correct  quantitative representa-
tion of this dependence. 14 This enabled Newton to calculate the widths 
of the primary and secondary rainbow, for example, and it enabled him 
to answer new  what-if questions about rainbows. For example, unlike 
Descartes, Newton was in a position to consider how these widths would 
be different if the drops were made of more or less dispersive medium. 
Similarly, Newton and his followers explicitly worked out how tertiary 
(and higher-order) rainbows would appear, were the light intense enough 
to give rise to them ( Boyer 1959 , 247). 
 The Newtonian account still leaves some directly observable features 
of the rainbow unexplained. In particular, it says nothing about the  super-
numerary arcs that can occasionally be seen inside the primary rainbow 
(and sometimes also on the outside of the secondary bow). An explanation 
of these supernumeraries requires the introduction of new explanatory 
variables that go beyond geometrical ray optics that Newtonian corpus-
cular theory exemplified. These variables can be found in the wave theory 
of light, which encompasses optical interference phenomena responsible 
for the supernumeraries. Thomas Young first realized that the spherical 
shape of raindrops makes it possible for there to be two ray paths with 
different angles of incidence (into the drop), internally reflected at the 
same point at the drop’s rear surface, such that their final angle of refrac-
tion is the same. For light of an appropriate wavelength this gives rise to 
destructive and constructive interference, resulting in the supernumer-
ary arcs. This theoretical treatment renders the drop size (relative to the 
wavelength of light) a new explanatory variable upon which the spac-
ing of the supernumeraries depends. Furthermore, Young’s interference 
theory of the rainbow explained also a number of other puzzling qualita-
tive features that had been observed. For example, it explained why the 
bow is brighter near the earth and why the supernumerary arcs usually 
only appear near the highest part of the bow: these features depend on 
the relative size of raindrops, which tend to increase in size as they fall. 
 Again, these advances in scientific understanding were embedded within 
a particular broader perspective on the nature of light: Young (at the 
time in question) not only adhered to an optical fluid ether theory but 
also regarded light waves as longitudinal, akin to sound. This early wave 
theory was radically mistaken in many ways and unable to account for, 
for example, the polarization of light, but it nevertheless encompassed 
the right explanatory dependencies between the relevant explanatory 
variables, which are carried over to the later theoretical perspectives of 
the elastic solid ether theory, as well as the electromagnetic theory and 
beyond. 
 The subsequent idea that light waves were transverse was developed 
in a mathematically sophisticated way by Fresnel to explain various 
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polarization phenomena. This now provided understanding of features 
of the rainbow that aren’t visible by the naked eye, such as the fact (first 
noted by Biot in 1811) that the rainbow light is strongly polarized in the 
tangential direction. 15 Again, this explanatory advance was embedded 
within Fresnel’s broader elastic ether theory of light. Since such ether does 
not exist, prominent antirealists have hailed Fresnel’s theory an exem-
plar of a highly successful theory that is not even approximately true, 
undermining (certain kinds of) “convergent” realism ( Laudan 1981 ). 16 
Be the status of Fresnel’s theory as “approximately true” as it may, the 
realist can stand by the standard story that takes Fresnel’s contribution 
to explanatory understanding of the rainbow to be both genuine and 
lasting: the new explanatory variables introduced by Fresnel’s explana-
tions (e.g., light’s wavelength relative to the drop size and the direction 
of light’s polarization) capture further explanatory dependencies in the 
world. The historical fact that Fresnel (and his contemporaries) were 
unable to express and theorize about the relevant explanatory dependen-
cies independently of the metaphysics of elastic ether does not nullify this 
contribution. 
 A realist would, of course, expect the theoretical perspectives on light 
subsequent to Fresnel to also recognize and build upon the explanatory 
dependencies that his theory captures. As far as I can see, this expectation 
is fully borne out in the rich history of accumulating understanding of 
the rainbow that continues still today. For example, over the last couple 
of decades there have been advances in understanding further aspects 
of meteorological rainbows in terms of their dependence on the distri-
bution of  non-spherical (oblate) raindrops (see  Haußmann 2016 for a 
review). 17 The shape of raindrops has thus become an explanans variable 
in a deeper, more concrete way than it was before. 18 Furthermore, typi-
cal rain showers feature a broad variety of different drop sizes. It is an 
outstanding (although already partly met) challenge to work out how dif-
ferent observable features of the rainbow (e.g., colorization or the exact 
shape or brightness distribution) depend on new explanans variables that 
quantify a rain shower’s physical features, such as its drop-size distribu-
tion and the drops’ deviation from perfectly spherical shape. 
 These challenges largely belong to the domain of applied mathematics, 
a solid basis to which is provided by an exact description, in terms of 
Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, of the scattering of plane wave from 
a transparent dielectric homogeneous sphere, provided by Lorentz (in 
1890) and Mie (in 1908). In the next section I will briefly discuss some 
developments in this area of applied mathematics, but I have already said 
enough to outline a realist stance toward the progressive trend that started 
with Descartes and has continued ever since. In the realist spirit we can 
view science as providing genuine understanding of natural phenomena, 
such as the rainbow, in terms of features of reality “behind the appear-
ances.” This presupposes a conception of explanation and understanding 
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that is  factive (albeit in an immediately qualified sense), supported by the 
counterfactual-dependence account of explanation. This account allows 
us to explicate the accumulating understanding in terms of scientists’ 
increasing ability to answer counterfactual  what-if questions regarding 
various explanatory variables. Our theories and models capture better 
and better how different explanandum variables depend on different 
explanans variables. These variables capture the dependence of differ-
ent aspects of the rainbow on physical features of the world that are not 
observable, such as the raindrops’ shape and their size relative to light’s 
wavelength, and the direction of light’s propagation and polarization. 
The accumulation of this factive content is fully compatible with the fact 
that different explanatory theories and models also have non-factive ele-
ments that give rise to mutually incompatible perspectives on light, due 
to, for example, the different ontological and metaphysical presupposi-
tions that were an inextricable part of Descartes’s, Newton’s, and Fres-
nel’s theorizing about light. 
 4 Which Explanation Is the “Best”? 
 So far, I have looked at the accumulation of understanding over the his-
tory of changing “paradigms” in optics. Let’s now consider the (minimal) 
realist outlook in relation to mutually incompatible models employed in 
the current state of the art. The classic Lorentz-Mie theory of scattering 
can be regarded as the “complete and fundamental” theory of rainbow 
scattering. It is taken to deductively entail all the optical properties of 
an “ideal” rainbow. 19 Since this model of Maxwell’s theory contains all 
the answers to different  what-if questions about the (ideal) rainbow, one 
might think that we have reached the explanatory bedrock (regarding 
“ideal” rainbows)—the ultimate explanatory framework. Yet understand-
ing of the rainbow has progressed much further since the inception of the 
Lorentz-Mie theory. Since scientists regard the subsequent development 
of, for example, idealized “semi-classical” explanatory models to provide 
deeper understanding, a realist must acknowledge the indispensability of 
further explanatory perspectives beyond the “complete and fundamen-
tal” theory. Hence, in some sense the fundamental theory only provides 
a limited explanatory perspective, which needs to be complemented by 
other vantage points to yield more comprehensive understanding. How 
should a realist interpret this plurality of explanatory models? 
 Different explanatory perspectives at stake here can again be under-
stood from the viewpoint of the counterfactual-dependence account. In 
order to explicate the explanatory value of the idealized “semi-classical” 
models, I first need to say a few words about these further advances on 
the Lorentz-Mie theory. 20 These advances primarily turn on approxi-
mation schemes, such as the Complex-Angular-Momentum (CAM) 
method, which aim to extract the key features of the dynamics of the 
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electromagnetic wave in a way that makes them transparent to us. As 
Nussenzveig puts it: 
 A vast amount of information on the diffraction effects that we want 
to study lies buried within the Mie solution. In order to understand 
and to obtain physical insight into these effects . . . it is necessary to 
extract this information in a “sufficiently simple form.” 
 ( Nussenzveig 1992 , 45) 
 This simplicity, which is “to some extent . . . in the eye of the beholder” 
( Nussenzveig 1992 , 210), can be achieved by suitable “semi-classical” 
approximations, occupying the rich theoretical borderland between 
geometrical ray theory and the wave theory. By working with idealized 
ray-theoretic concepts, while simultaneously making sufficient room for 
interference and diffraction effects, these approximations yield theoreti-
cal representations that render the relevant explanatory dependencies 
cognitively more transparent. 
 Although the Lorentz-Mie theory provides an exact solution of plane 
wave scattering by ideal spherical drops, it has the pragmatic downside 
of leading to a mathematical series that converges very slowly for par-
ticles of the size of raindrops. Thus, this theory is  oracular : a power-
ful enough computer can crunch through a sufficient number of terms 
(typically several thousands) to yield however precise values of scatter-
ing amplitudes one desires, against which approximate solutions can be 
compared. However, due to the high number of terms and the series’ lack 
of further physically interpretable structure, it provides no insight into 
aspects of the scattering process upon which the spacing of supernumer-
ary bows depends. (A Laplacean demon might disagree, of course!) The 
first step beyond the Lorentz-Mie theory is to shift to the Debye series, 
which mathematically decomposes the wave front into “partial” waves, 
some of which are externally reflected, some transmitted directly through 
the drop, and some transmitted after  n internal reflections. This series, 
which also provides an exact solution (equivalent to the Mie series), cap-
tures at the level of the wave theory the idea that the overall scattering 
dynamics can be represented as a sum of different processes, involving, 
for example, light that undergoes one internal reflection before transmis-
sion (responsible for the primary bow), light that undergoes two internal 
reflections (responsible for the secondary bow), and so on, with some 
of the light being “trapped” inside the drop for a number of revolutions 
before transmitting. However, the Debye series by itself does not allow 
us to identify which aspects of the scattering dynamics thus represented 
critically contribute to the features of the supernumerary bow. 
 Enter the CAM method. This approach allows the slowly converging 
partial wave series to be transformed into an approximate, rapidly converg-
ing expression in terms of “poles” and “saddle-points” in a complex-valued 
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angular momentum space, representing the main contributions to the scat-
tering amplitude at the primary rainbow angle. An interpretation of these 
poles and saddle-points in terms of both wave theoretic concepts (e.g., 
“tunneling” and “evanescent waves” near the drop’s surface),  as well as 
ray-theoretic concepts, provides the best means to bring out those aspects 
of the overall scattering process upon which the explanandum depends. By 
doing so it improves our explanatory understanding of the supernumerar-
ies. Thus our best understanding of the rainbow involves representing light 
both as a wave and as a ray. How should a realist understand this plural-
ity of incompatible perspectives? On the face of it, the explanatory indis-
pensability of ray concepts could be taken to suggest that the ray-theoretic 
perspective is revealing features of light scattering that the wave theoretic 
perspective somehow misses. 
 I think the counterfactual-dependence account nicely captures the 
explanatory power of the semi-classical CAM perspective, even if we 
take Maxwell’s theory to provide the “fundamental” story. 21 This is due 
to the  importance of explanations’ cognitive salience (cf. section 3). To 
illustrate this, consider a specific explanandum: why is the spacing  S of 
the supernumeraries of a given rainbow 1.65°? From the counterfactual-
dependence viewpoint, an agent understands the spacing if she is in a 
position to answer  what-if questions of the sort “how would  S be different 
if . . .” with respect to explanans variables, that is, wavelength and drop 
size, over some range of possibilities. Using the Lorentz-Mie theory the 
agent is capable of answering these questions, but only if assisted by a suf-
ficiently powerful computer. The way in which the explanandum depends 
on the explanans is cognitively opaque to her. 22 The CAM approach pro-
vides deeper understanding by virtue of enhancing the agent’s ability to 
answer such questions by revealing a much simpler explanatory depen-
dence of the scattering amplitude on the explanans variables, without 
compromising the level of accuracy required for answering the explanan-
dum at stake. This simplicity is not just an increase in computational 
efficiency but also a matter of representationally breaking down, in an 
idealized way, the overall Mie scattering into distinct processes, only some 
of which effectively contribute to the rainbow by largely determining  S 
as a function of the explanans variables. This explanatory dependence 
is cognitively more transparent to us, and hence a theory that captures it 
provides (in a sense) a better explanation. In this way the counterfactual-
dependence framework explicates the progress in the understanding of the 
rainbow achieved by moving from the  exact Lorentz-Mie theory to the 
CAM  approximation , the less fundamental explanatory notions of which 
(such as light rays and evanescent “surface” waves) can thus feature in 
our “best” explanation of the rainbow. This improvement is not a matter 
of introducing new explanatory variables that ontologically transcend the 
Lorentz-Mie theory ( Pincock 2011 ), nor is it a matter of providing more 
fine-grained information about the explanatory dependence. Rather, the 
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improvement has to do with the way in which the CAM approach identi-
fies critical explanans variables upon which the explanandum depends  in 
a simple way . These variables and the explanatory dependencies are fully 
grounded in the wavelike nature of light and its dynamics; they are not 
indicative of properties that somehow transcend Maxwell’s theory. 
 What counts as the “best” explanation partly depends on the context 
that determines how the different dimensions of explanatory depth are 
weighed. The CAM approach can be taken to provide the most power-
ful explanation in the context of “pen and paper” mathematical physics, 
while in the context of a computer-assisted study of actual (non-ideal) 
meteorological rainbows, with variable-sized hamburger-bun-shaped 
drops, the generalized Lorentz-Mie theory backs the most powerful 
explanatory understanding. 23 There is no objective answer as to which 
explanation is the “best” independently of such contextual factors. By the 
same token, even though the earlier explanatory accounts from Descartes 
onward are all strictly speaking false (even if we ignore their supereroga-
tory metaphysical content), these accounts can still be valuable sources 
of understanding, and they can indeed be viewed as providing the “best” 
explanation of certain aspects of the rainbow in suitable explanatory 
contexts. For example, in the context of high school physics the gist of 
Descartes’s account (sans Cartesian metaphysics) provides the best expla-
nation, simply because it provides the cognitively most transparent way 
to capture the dependence of the approximate angles of primary and sec-
ondary bows upon the spherical geometry of raindrops given the laws of 
reflection and refraction. Overall, the indispensable plurality of (strictly 
speaking) incompatible explanatory perspectives can thus be accommo-
dated in terms of the pragmatic dimension of understanding, in a way that 
is compatible with the basic factivity requirement of (minimal) realism. 
 5 Implications for Scientific Realism 
 The case of the rainbow typifies the way in which scientific understanding 
is situated in and colored by radically different ways of thinking about 
what there is in the world and what laws of nature describe. Our current 
science provides one set of perspectives, and we should be open to yet 
different, further theoretical perspectives that may be conceived in the 
fullness of time. In so far as scientific realism involves a commitment to 
genuine scientific understanding and progress thereof, it must embrace 
and make sense of such explanatory perspectives. 
 Notwithstanding the plurality of explanatory perspectives, there is a 
standard story of the accumulating understanding of the rainbow due 
to Descartes, Newton, Young, Fresnel, and many others. I have argued 
that a well-motivated philosophical account of explanatory understand-
ing vindicates and further explicates this story. The realist dimension 
of this account is due to the assumption that genuine explanations are 
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underwritten by explanatory dependencies in the world. This is the basic 
factivity requirement of the counterfactual-dependence account. Explan-
atory understanding, in turn, can be construed as an agent’s ability to 
make correct counterfactual  what-if inferences. Thus construed, under-
standing has several distinctly pragmatic aspects, which can be associ-
ated with the non-factive elements of explanatory theories and models, 
such as idealizations and mistaken metaphysical presuppositions, that are 
involved in different explanatory perspectives. From the viewpoint of this 
account, a realist can make sense of the steady accumulation of genuine 
understanding of various optical phenomena, including the paradigmatic 
rainbow, regardless of the fact that all explanations are situated in one or 
another theoretical perspective. 
 Clearly, this realist account is rather minimal in its commitments to 
what the unobservable world is like. In particular, it does not incorporate 
the (“standard” realist) notion that our current best theories are “approx-
imately true,” or that they approach some kind of “ultimate” (God’s-eye) 
perspective. And it neither supports nor presupposes inference to (the 
approximate truth of) the best explanation. (Indeed, as we have seen, 
what counts as “best” partly depends on the context in which explana-
tions are given and assessed.) At the same time, the kind of understanding 
that we can attribute to scientists satisfies (suitably minimal) realist ambi-
tions given the factivity assumption, and it certainly goes beyond antireal-
ism according to which theories of light are merely effective instruments 
for making predictions of observable phenomena and guiding practical 
applications and interventions. 24 The factivity assumption requires that 
genuine understanding is underwritten by objective worldly facts about 
how the explanandum really depends on the explanans. Understand-
ing accumulates when our explanatory theories and models give us the 
ability to make more  what-if inferences, the correctness of which cor-
responds to worldly dependence facts. This accumulation can be partly 
a matter of new explanations containing explanatory information in a 
cognitively more salient form, given our cognitive makeup, inferential 
abilities, and training. And, more importantly for the realist, the accumu-
lation of understanding is often a matter of introducing new explanatory 
variables that represent further explanatory dependencies, typically in the 
form of functional equations linking the explanans and the explanan-
dum. These variables capture physical features of the world that need not 
be observable. In a given theoretical perspective, these variables can be 
given a rich metaphysical interpretation, which the realist should not be 
committed to. Or, these variables can be presented in an idealized way, 
which the realist should not be committed to either. Rather, she should 
only be committed to the most minimal interpretation of the explanatory 
variables that allows her to speak of the explanatory dependencies. 
 In the case of the rainbow, this commits the realist to explanatory 
variables that capture properties of light and rain, such as the shape of 
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the raindrops, their size relative to light’s wavelength, and the direction 
of light’s propagation and polarization. The fact that there are various 
perspectives in which such explanatory variables have been embedded is 
an essential part of the way  human beings understand the world, involv-
ing also non-factive aspects of our explanatory theories and models. 
Exactly which aspects are non-factive? We do not know. Some aspects of 
explanations are justifiably regarded as non-factive idealizations, given 
their discord with our theoretical beliefs and (typically) the prospects 
of de-idealization. But on the whole we are not reliably able to sharply 
demarcate between our current explanations’ factive and non-factive 
aspects, especially when it comes to the interpretation of the variables 
that feature in functional relationships that support explanations in the 
counterfactual-dependence mode. This is a lesson we have to learn from 
the history of science, as some of the more minimally inclined (for exam-
ple, structural) realists have acknowledged ( Saatsi 201 9). At the same 
time, nothing in the history of science speaks against the broader realist 
notion that steady and genuine explanatory progress is being made with 
understanding-providing theories and models that de facto latch on to 
reality better and better (in the sense of the basic factivity requirement). 
This progress in scientific understanding of the world does not amount 
to accumulating knowledge, however, since understanding is not fac-
tive in the way knowledge is, and non-factive aspects of theoretical rep-
resentations can increase our understanding without us knowing their 
non-factive status. Thus while I agree with the self-proclaimed “perspec-
tival realists” that a notion of “perspective” helps in articulating scientific 
realism, I do not think we should necessarily associate this notion with 
knowledge the way they do. 
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 Notes 
 1. See, e.g.,  Giere (2006 ),  Massimi (2018a ), and  Teller (2018 ).  Massimi (2018b ) 
offers a review. 
 2 . This account of progressive scientific understanding dovetails with my view 
that theoretical progress in science in general does not reduce to accumula-
tion of knowledge. See  Saatsi (201 9). 
 3 . See, e.g.,  Hitchcock and Woodward (2003 ),  Woodward (2003b ),  Woodward 
and Hitchcock (2003 ),  Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010 ), and  Jansson and 
Saatsi (2017 ). 
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 4 . See, e.g.,  Saatsi and Pexton (2013 ),  Reutlinger (2016 ),  Saatsi (2018a ),  Jansson 
and Saatsi (2017 ), and  French and Saatsi (2018 ). 
 5.  Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010 ) also present “factual accuracy” as an aspect 
of explanatory power. In my presentation this is built into the characteriza-
tion of explaining being a matter of  correctly answering  what-if questions . 
 6 . See  Bokulich (2016 ) for related, more general discussion of the usability of 
the Newtonian gravitational theory in oceanographical explanations, in the 
context of which “the classical Newtonian force picture does [the best] job 
of making transparent the relevant patterns of counterfactual dependence” 
( Bokulich 2016 , 273). 
 7 . Woodward (2003a ) has called a position along these lines “instrumental 
realism.” 
 8 . Experiments with prisms and such have of course been central to the scien-
tific study of the rainbow from the Middle Ages onwards. 
 9 . Such accumulation is recognized in the standard history of this area of sci-
ence, as told by both historians of science and scientists themselves. See, for 
example,  Boyer (1959 );  Haußmann (2016 ). 
 10 . The antisolar point is the point on the celestial sphere that is directly oppo-
site the sun from an observer’s perspective. 
 11 . Clearly Descartes was not in a position to answer correctly any appreciable 
range of  what-if questions regarding these variables; for example, what if 
raindrops were oblate thus and so, as opposed to being spherical? Thus, his 
explanation should be considered quite shallow. But for a realist it marks a 
genuine explanatory advance nevertheless. 
 12 . This is indeed something that Christiaan Huygens explicitly calculated in 
1652. The answer is that the bow angle would be approximately 25° instead 
of 41° ( Boyer 1959 ). 
 13 . In due course this variable comes to be associated with light’s wavelength. 
 14 . As Newton put it: “the Science of Colors becomes a speculation as truly 
mathematical as any other part of  Opticks ” ( Boyer 1959 , 241). 
 15 . For the primary rainbow, the single internal reflection angle near the caustic 
is very close to Brewster’s angle, at which no p-polarized light (corresponding 
to the radial direction as seen from the observer) is reflected. 
 16 . See  Saatsi (2015 ) for further discussion of Laudan’s reasoning and its limita-
tions as an argument against realism. 
 17 . A natural raindrop typically resembles an asymmetrically squashed sphere 
due to air resistance (the bottom part being flatter than the dome-like top, 
like a hamburger bun), so the optical scattering properties for real-life rain 
showers differ from those of a collection of perfect spheres. 
 18 . See note 10. 
 19 . The generalized Lorentz-Mie theory goes beyond plane waves and spherical 
drops ( Gouesbet and Gréhan 2011 ). 
 20 . The details that I must brush over here are well summarized in  Pincock (2011 ) 
and reviewed in more detail in, for example,  Adam (2002 ) and  Nussenzveig 
(1992 ). I broadly agree with Pincock’s assessment of the explanatory virtues 
of these models, which he however expresses independently of any particular 
way of understanding explanation or explanatory understanding. A further 
important part of the scientific understanding of the rainbow, which I do 
not even touch here, concerns the universality of rainbow phenomena over 
variation in, for example, drop shapes. See  Batterman (2001 ,  2005 ) and  Belot 
(2005 ). 
 21 . Of course, Maxwell’s theory does not provide a truly fundamental theory of 
light, since it is not a quantum theory. 
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 22 . In this tune, an epigraph in Nussenzveig’s classic exposition of the CAM 
approach reads: “it is nice to know that the computer understands the prob-
lem, but I would like to understand it too” ( Nussenzveig 1992 , 37). 
 23 . The Debye approximation, upon which the CAM approach builds, is not 
valid for non-spherical drops. 
 24 . Here I differ from  de Regt (2017 ), whose account of understanding also 
emphasizes the contextual nature of understanding, but articulates it in a 
way that is empty of any realist commitment. See also  de Regt and Gijs-
bers (2017 ). Unfortunately, I don’t have space to engage here with de Regt’s 
account, which I regard as insufficient for making sense of the intertheoretic 
relations between different theories and models of light. See also  Khalifa 
(2017 ) and  Woodward (2003a ). 
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 1 Introduction 
 Most attempts to justify the explanatory use of idealized models 
appeal to the irrelevance of the features distorted and to the accuracy 
of the model with respect to relevant (e.g., difference-making) features 
( Craver 2006 ;  Potochnik 2017 ;  Strevens 2008 ;  Weisberg 2013 ;  Wood-
ward 2003 ). This approach requires that there be a single set of rel-
evant features or difference makers for the explanandum that a model 
accurately represents when it explains. However, this approach con-
flicts with the widespread use of  multiple conflicting idealized mod-
els to explain and understand the same phenomenon ( Longino 2013 ; 
 Mitchell 2009 ;  Morrison 2011 ,  2015 ;  Weisberg 2007 ,  2013 ). Indeed, 
the accurate representation of relevant features approach is difficult 
to square with the use of a plurality of models that make conflicting 
assumptions and purport to represent incompatible causal structures, 
difference makers, and ontologies. Even if we adopt the perspectival-
ist’s idea that model  M only represents system  S in a particular way 
from the perspective of theory  T , the problem of multiple inconsistent 
models does not go away, since multiple perspectival models will often 
make incompatible ontological claims about the same target system(s) 
( Giere 2006 ;  Massimi 2018 ;  Morrison 2015 , chap. 5). In response, in 
this chapter I argue for an alternative way to think about the model-
world relation that appeals to  universality classes to justify the use 
of multiple conflicting models to explain and understand the same 
phenomenon. The term ‘universality’ comes from mathematical phys-
ics, but in its most general form it is just an expression of the fact 
that many systems that are (perhaps extremely) heterogeneous in their 
physical features will nonetheless display similar patterns of behavior 
that are largely independent of their physical details ( Kadanoff 2000 , 
 2013 ). The systems that display similar patterns of behavior despite 
differences in their physical features are said to be in the same uni-
versality class. Using examples from biology and physics, I illustrate 
how universality classes can link multiple conflicting (perspectival) 
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models to their target system(s) in ways that allow for the develop-
ment of explanations and understanding. In addition, I argue that this 
universality approach is compatible with a factive conception of sci-
entific understanding that is based on grasping true modal informa-
tion. Maintaining a factive conception of understanding allows for 
a version of scientific realism to be preserved despite the plurality 
of explanations and understanding scientists acquire from conflicting 
idealized models. 
 Section 2 of this chapter lays out the problem of inconsistent models 
and shows how it raises a challenge to several accounts of how to justify 
the use of idealized models to explain—including perspectivalism. Then 
section 3 presents my alternative account that appeals to universality 
classes to justify the use of idealized models to explain (and understand). 
Section 4 shows how the universality account can provide a solution to 
the problem of inconsistent models for perspectivalism and applies the 
account to cases from biology and physics. Finally, section 5 shows how 
the universality account allows the use of inconsistent idealized models 
to be compatible with a version of scientific realism based on grasping 
true modal information. 
 2 The Problem of Inconsistent Models 
 Idealized models are widespread in science, which raises a philosophical 
puzzle: how can we extract reliable information from representations we 
know to contain false assumptions, which often distort relevant features 
of the target system? An additional layer is added when we consider the 
fact that, in many instances, multiple idealized models with conflicting 
assumptions are used to study the same phenomenon ( Longino 2013 ; 
 Morrison 2015 ;  Mitchell 2009 ;  Weisberg 2007 ,  2013 ). Rather than sim-
ply modeling different features (or aspects) of the target system in comple-
mentary ways, genuinely inconsistent models often make contradictory 
assumptions about the target system (e.g., the nucleus), yield incompati-
ble causal claims, and represent the system’s basic ontology in fundamen-
tally inconsistent ways ( Morrison 2011 ,  2015 ). Indeed, Michael Weisberg 
characterizes the common practice of  multiple model idealization as “the 
practice of building multiple related but incompatible models, each of 
which makes distinct claims about the nature and causal structure giving 
rise to a phenomenon” ( Weisberg 2007 , 645). While Weisberg focuses on 
the need for these different models to satisfy various competing repre-
sentational goals, the most pressing challenge for the realist comes from 
attempts to use multiple inconsistent models  to explain and understand 
the same phenomenon because both explanation and understanding are 
typically thought to be  factive —that is, they are both thought to have 
truth or accuracy requirements. 
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 2.1  The Problem of Inconsistent Models and Accurate 
Representation Requirements 
 Among philosophers of science, it is widely accepted that a necessary con-
dition for something to explain is that it be, at least in some sense, true 
( Hempel 1965 ). This intuition is based on examples such as explaining 
the weather by citing Greek gods. Intuitively, although this would explain 
 if it were true , there is a sense in which it fails to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the weather. Hempel’s original Deductive-Nomological 
(DN) account builds this in due to the fact that, in order to be sound (or 
cogent), an argument must have all true premises. Hempel distinguished 
between genuine explanations, where the explanans is true, and potential 
explanations, which would be adequate if they were true. In modeling 
terms, this truth requirement claims that in order for a model to explain, 
it must  accurately represent the explanatorily relevant features of the tar-
get system(s) . 1 
 Many contemporary accounts of how models explain make this truth 
requirement explicit. For example, mechanistic accounts of explanation 
typically include particularly strong accurate representation requirements 
in order for a mechanistic model to explain, as is illustrated by David Kaplan 
and Carl Craver’s model-to-mechanism-mapping (3M) requirement: 
 (3M) A model of a target phenomenon explains that phenomenon to 
the extent that (a) the variables in the model correspond to identifiable 
components, activities, and organizational features of the target 
mechanism that produces, maintains, or underlies the phenomenon, 
and (b) the (perhaps mathematical) dependencies posited among these 
(perhaps mathematical) variables in the model correspond to causal 
relations among the components of the target mechanism. 
 ( Kaplan 2011 , 347) 
 The 3M requirement involves various kinds of “correspondence” between 
the model and the actual causal mechanisms in the target system. Kaplan 
adds that “3M aligns with the highly plausible assumption that the more 
accurate and detailed the model is for a target system or phenomenon 
the better it explains that phenomenon” ( Kaplan 2011 , 347). In general, 
mechanistic accounts typically require models to provide an accurate 
representation of the relevant components and interactions involved in 
the causal mechanisms that actually produced the explanandum ( Craver 
2006 ;  Kaplan and Craver 2011 ). 
 Accurate representation is also built into most causal accounts of expla-
nation. As Michael Strevens puts it, “no causal account of explanation—
certainly not the kairetic account—allows non-veridical models to explain” 
( Strevens 2008 , 297). On Strevens’s account, “a standalone explanation 
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of an event  e is a causal model for  e containing only difference-makers 
for  e ” in which, “the derivation of  e , mirrors a part of the causal pro-
cess by which  e was produced” ( Strevens 2008 , 71–72). While Strevens’s 
account does allow some idealized models to explain when they only 
distort causal factors that do not make a difference, accurate representa-
tion continues to play a key role, since “the overlap between an idealized 
model and reality .  .  . is a standalone set of difference-makers for the 
target” ( Strevens 2008 , 318). In addition, James Woodward suggests that 
causal models explain when they “correctly describe,” “trace or mirror,” 
or are “true or approximately so” with respect to the difference-making 
causal relations that hold between the explanans and the explanandum 
( Woodward 2003 , 201–203). More generally, for causal accounts, in 
order for a model to explain, it must provide an accurate representation 
of the difference-making causal relationships (or causal processes) within 
the model’s target system(s). Indeed, Michael Weisberg describes a wide 
range of accounts of minimalist idealization, which claim that models 
that explain are those that “accurately capture the core causal factors,” 
since “[t]he key to explanation is a special set of explanatorily privileged 
causal factors. Minimalist idealization is what isolates these causes and 
thus plays a crucial role for explanation” ( Weisberg 2007 , 643–645). 
 Some causal accounts involve less demanding accurate representation 
requirements. For example, Angela  Potochnik’s (2015 ,  2017 ) recent causal 
account allows idealized models that explain to distort some causal differ-
ence makers. However, while Potochnik’s view does allow for some causal 
difference makers to be left out or idealized, her account still requires 
models that explain to accurately represent the causal factors that had a 
significant impact on the causal pattern of interest to the current research 
program. She argues that “posits central to representing a focal causal 
pattern in some phenomenon must accurately represent the causal factors 
contributing to this pattern. . . . Idealizations, in contrast, must . . . repre-
sent as-if [such that . . .] none of its neglected features interferes dramati-
cally with that pattern” ( Potochnik 2017 , 157). Therefore, while the set 
of causal factors is delimited somewhat differently, there is still a specific 
set of significant causal factors that needs to be accurately represented in 
order for an idealized model to explain. Moreover, similar to Strevens’s 
view, idealizations are justified in these explanations when they distort 
features that are irrelevant to the causal pattern of interest. 
 In addition to these accurate representation requirements for models 
to explain, philosophers of science have long recognized a strong con-
nection between explanation and understanding ( de Regt 2009 ;  Grimm 
2008 ;  Strevens 2013 ). For example, Wesley Salmon writes: “understand-
ing results from our ability to fashion scientific explanations” ( Salmon 
1984 , 259). An even stronger position is adopted by J. D. Trout, who 
claims that “scientific understanding is the state produced, and  only pro-
duced, by grasping a true explanation” ( Trout 2007 , 585–586, emphasis 
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added). Michael Strevens also argues that an individual has scientific 
understanding of a phenomenon only if they grasp the correct scien-
tific explanation of that phenomenon ( Strevens 2008 ,  2013 ). The link 
between explanation and understanding is also echoed by epistemol-
ogists: “understanding why some fact obtains .  .  . seems to us to be 
knowing propositions that state an explanation of the fact” ( Conee and 
Feldman 2011 , 316). While I think there are good reasons for believing 
that understanding is possible without having an explanation ( Lipton 
2009 ;  Rohwer and Rice 2013 ,  2016 ), the fact that much of our scien-
tific understanding comes from providing explanations that are thought 
to be accurate representations of relevant features lends support to the 
idea that scientific understanding is typically thought to be factive in 
some sense as well (at least in cases of understanding why). Indeed, like 
the intuition that knowledge of a proposition requires that the proposi-
tion be true, most epistemological accounts of understanding maintain 
that genuine understanding must be factive in some way ( Grimm 2006 ; 
 Khalifa 2012 ,  2013 ;  Mizrahi 2012 ;  Kvanvig 2003 ,  2009 ;  Rice 2016 ; 
 Strevens 2013 ). 2 
 In general, most philosophical accounts claim that for idealized mod-
els to provide explanations and understanding, the accurate representa-
tion relation must hold between the idealized model and the important, 
significant, or difference-making causes (or mechanisms) that actually 
produced the explanandum. Given these factive requirements for expla-
nation and understanding, many philosophers have noted that the use 
of multiple inconsistent models for the same phenomenon raises serious 
challenges for scientific realism. Indeed, if the above accounts are right, 
then when multiple conflicting models are used to explain and under-
stand the same phenomenon, they ought to be interpreted as making con-
flicting claims about the causal interactions among the relevant features 
of the models’ target system(s). In other words, multiple conflicting mod-
els that are used to explain and understand the same phenomenon ought 
to be interpreted as each aiming to provide an accurate representation of 
the difference-making causes (or mechanisms) for the explanandum. This 
is problematic given that the idealized models used in science often make 
conflicting assumptions ( Morrison 2011 ,  2015 ), represent incompatible 
causal structures ( Longino 2013 ), and distort difference-making causes 
in a variety of ways ( Batterman and Rice 2014 ; Rice  2018 , 2019). The 
problem of inconsistent models, then, is to show how such a situation 
can result in genuine explanations and understanding of the target phe-
nomenon, despite the inconsistency of the representations appealed to by 
scientific modelers. In light of the above discussion, I argue that the prob-
lem of inconsistent models has largely resulted from the fact that most 
accounts of how to justify the use of idealized models to explain and 
understand are exclusively focused on  accurate representation of relevant 
features of the target system. 
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 2.2 The Problem of Inconsistent Models and Perspectivalism 
 One possible response to the challenge of inconsistent models comes from 
perspectivalism ( Giere 2006 ;  Massimi 2018 ). Giere’s original perspectiv-
alism suggests that we should not directly interpret models as making 
claims about their target systems. Instead, we should interpret models as 
contextually constructed representations of a system from the perspective 
of a particular theory. Models constructed within different theoretical 
perspectives will thus make different and sometimes contradictory claims 
about the same target system(s). In short, perspectivalism suggests that 
we need to recast claims about how models represent in the following 
form: from the perspective of theory  T , model  M represents system  S in a 
particular way ( Giere 2006 ). 
 While this perspectival move is somewhat helpful in showing how 
multiple models might represent the system in different context-sensitive 
ways, I agree with  Morrison (2011 ,  2015 ) and  Massimi (2018 ) that per-
spectivalism on its own does little to solve the problem of inconsistent 
models for realism. For one thing, even if we can only interpret how (or 
what) models represent from within the perspective of a particular theory 
or context, this doesn’t tell us how sets of inconsistent models from differ-
ent perspectives are able to yield genuine explanations and understanding 
of the same phenomenon. Several epistemological and methodological 
questions remain about how to interpret the inconsistent claims made 
by multiple perspectival models. But more than just failing to provide a 
clear solution, I contend that perspectivalism (as well as appeals to partial 
structures or structural realism) will continue to fall prey to the prob-
lem of inconsistent models as long as philosophical accounts of modeling 
continue to conflate the following two questions: 
 1. How does the idealized model allow scientists to  explain and under-
stand the phenomenon? 
 2. Which of the relevant features (e.g., difference-making causes) for 
the occurrence of the phenomenon are  accurately represented by the 
idealized model? 
 In short, the problem lies with equating explanation and understanding 
with accurate representation of relevant features, due to the truth and 
accuracy requirements maintained by most accounts of explanation and 
understanding outlined above. As long as these accurate representation 
requirements are central to how philosophers conceive of explanation 
and understanding, appealing to only a limited set of difference mak-
ers ( Potochnik 2017 ), partially accurate representations ( Wimsatt 2007 ; 
 Worrall 1989 ), or perspectivalism ( Giere 2006 ) will not be able to offer a 
solution to the problem of inconsistent models for realism. After all, if the 
models are still intended to accurately represent (or map on to) relevant 
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features of the target system, multiple conflicting idealized models will 
lead to inconsistent metaphysical claims about the components and inter-
actions of the target system. 
 In support of this suggestion, Michela  Massimi (2018 ) has shown how 
the main argument used to conclude that the use of multiple inconsistent 
perspectival models is incompatible with realism depends on what she 
calls the “representationalist assumption,” namely that scientific models 
(partially) represent relevant aspects of a given target system. Further-
more, this representationalist assumption implicitly depends on the idea 
that “representation means to establish a one-to-one mapping between 
relevant (partial) features of the model and relevant (partial)—actual or 
fictional—states of affairs about the target system” ( Massimi 2018 , 342). 
This kind of accurate representation (or mapping) assumption results in 
inconsistent models making inconsistent metaphysical claims about the 
target system even if we allow that models represent the target system 
from different perspectives. In short, the reason perspectival modeling 
is similarly challenged by the problem of inconsistent models is that it 
is typically taken to include the same kinds of assumptions regarding 
accurate representation of (or mapping on to) relevant features of the 
target system. This again shows that the problem of inconsistent models 
derives largely from the assumption that models that are used to explain 
and understand a phenomenon must accurately represent the relevant 
features of the target system. 3 
 As additional motivation for moving away from accurate representa-
tion assumptions, Morrison notes that, in cases of inconsistent models, 
“we usually have no way to determine which of the many contradictory 
models is the more faithful representation, especially if each is able to 
generate accurate predictions for a certain class of phenomena” ( Morrison 
2011 , 343). Therefore, not only is accurate representation the source of 
the challenge from inconsistent models, but in many cases we simply can-
not answer the question of which of the plethora of idealized models accu-
rately represents the relevant features of the models’ target system(s). As 
a result, I contend that we ought to consider alternative ways of justifying 
the use of multiple inconsistent models to explain and understand the 
same phenomenon that do not depend on the accurate representation 
relations that are central to most accounts of how models provide expla-
nations and understanding. 
 3  Using Universality Classes to Justify the Use 
of Idealized Models 
 Instead of focusing on accurate representation relations, I argue that a 
better way to justify the use of (multiple conflicting) idealized models 
to explain and understand is to appeal to  universality classes ( Batter-
man 2000 ,  2002 ;  Batterman and Rice 2014 ;  Rice  2018 , 2019). The term 
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‘universality’ comes from mathematical physics, but in its most general 
form it is just an expression of the fact that many systems that are per-
haps extremely heterogeneous in their physical features will nonetheless 
display similar patterns of behavior (typically at some macroscale) 
( Batterman 2000 ,  2002 ;  Kadanoff 2013 ). The systems that display simi-
lar behaviors despite differences in their physical features are said to be 
in the same universality class ( Kadanoff 2013 ). While most instances of 
universality have focused on patterns that are stable across real systems—
for example, the universality of critical exponents across a wide range 
of fluids—a more general conception of universality can be used to find 
classes of real, possible,  and model systems that display similar behaviors 
despite differences in their features. 4 I contend that this link of being in 
the same universality class can justify the use of idealized models to 
explain and understand the behaviors of their target systems even when 
the models fail to accurately represent the relevant features of those 
systems. 
 Given that many idealized model systems are in the same universality 
class as their target systems, they will display similar patterns of behavior 
despite the fact that the model may drastically distort the causes, mecha-
nisms, or other features responsible for the explanandum in any real-
world system. Indeed, just like cases of universality that show stability 
across perturbations of the features of extremely different real systems 
(e.g., fluids and magnets), universality can also link stable behaviors 
across perturbations of the features of different models systems and their 
real (or possible) target systems. According to what I will call the ‘uni-
versality account,’ it is precisely this stability of various behaviors across 
perturbations of most of the system’s features that can enable scientists to 
justifiably use idealized models that drastically distort difference-making 
features to explain and understand the behaviors of their target system(s) 
( Batterman and Rice 2014 ;  Rice  2018 , 2019). 
 There are several important things to note about this universality account. 
First, idealized models that accurately represent difference-making fea-
tures can clearly be justifiably used to explain and understand on the univer-
sality account. After all, if those difference-making features are sufficient 
to produce the phenomenon in some real-world systems, then those fea-
tures will likely be sufficient for producing the phenomenon in the model 
system as well (although a few additional assumptions may be required). 
Thus, those models will be in the same universality class as their target 
system(s). Consequently, the universality account can easily accommo-
date the cases used to motive accounts that focus on accurate representa-
tion relations. Importantly, however, the universality account shows that 
accurate representation is not what is doing the important justificatory 
work in using these idealized models to explain and understand—rather 
it is the fact that the idealized model produces the universal patterns of 
behavior that are of interest to the modeler and are stable across a class 
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of real, possible, and model systems. Indeed, the universality account 
allows scientists to justifiably use idealized models to explain and under-
stand even in cases where the same universal patterns of behavior are 
produced by extremely  different sets of features across the real, possible, 
and model systems within the universality class. This allows the account 
to justify using idealized models to explain and understand a phenom-
enon even when we cannot identify which parts of the model are accurate 
and which parts are distorted representations of the target system. This is 
quite useful since in many cases the accurate parts of the model cannot be 
isolated from the idealizing assumptions used in constructing the model; 
that is, it is often difficult (or impossible) to decompose scientific mod-
els into their accurate and inaccurate parts ( Rice 2019 ). The universality 
account also provides a way around the problem posed by Morrison, 
that “we usually have no way to determine which of the many contradic-
tory models is the more faithful representation” ( Morrison 2011 , 343). 
Since idealized models within the same universality class as their target 
system(s) need not accurately represent the features of their target sys-
tem, scientists can still be justified in using those models to explain and 
understand even when they are unable to determine which model is the 
most accurate or which features are being accurately represented by indi-
vidual models. In short, universality classes provide a way of linking the 
behaviors of idealized models with the behaviors of their target systems 
without relying on the accurate representation relations required by most 
accounts of how idealized models can be used to explain and understand. 
 3.1 Modal Information, Explanation, and Understanding 
 Before going further, it is important to say a bit about why the informa-
tion scientists obtain from idealized models within a universality class can 
be used to explain and understand the behaviors of real systems. Indeed, 
simply “reproducing a pattern of behavior” might sound like these are 
merely phenomenological models that produce the desired results but 
fail to explain why the phenomenon occurs. In what follows, I focus on 
the explanations and understanding produced by  providing true modal 
information about the phenomenon . I argue that idealized models can be 
used to provide explanations and understanding because they not only 
produce the behaviors of interest but also enable scientists to identify 
which features are important for the occurrence of the explanandum, and 
how various changes in those relevant (and irrelevant) features would 
result in changes in the explanandum (or not). That is, these idealized 
models provide extensive modal information about the phenomenon of 
interest concerning counterfactual dependencies and independencies that 
hold in the model’s target system(s). For example, an optimization model 
that is within the same universality class as a real population can show 
biologists how changes in the tradeoffs between various fitness-enhancing 
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features within a system will result in changes in the expected equilib-
rium outcome—even if the model represents those features and the rela-
tionships between them and the explanandum in a highly idealized (i.e., 
distorted) way ( Rice 2013 ). Moreover, by showing that a class of real, 
possible, and model systems all display similar patterns of behaviors 
despite differences in their features, scientists can come to understand 
that many of the features of the system are counterfactually irrelevant to 
the explanandum. For example, by investigating an optimization model 
a biologist can determine that the equilibrium point of the population is 
independent of the starting point, trajectory, or method of inheritance in 
the population ( Potochnik 2007 ,  2017 ;  Rice 2013 ,  2016 ). 
 Accordingly, on the account I present here, idealized models within 
the same universality class as their target system(s) can be used to pro-
vide explanations by revealing a plethora of modal information about the 
counterfactual dependencies (and independencies) between features of 
real system(s) and the explanandum. 5 My appeal to modal information is 
not meant to provide a complete or exhaustive account of explanation—
that is, there are certainly additional criteria required of explanations, 
and there may be explanations that do not involve modal information—
but it is worth noting that modal information is central to many causal 
and non-causal accounts of explanation ( Batterman and Rice 2014 ; 
 Bokulich 2011 ,  2012 ;  Kim 1994 ;  Rice 2013 ;  Woodward 2003 ). Indeed, 
many accounts of explanation agree with Woodward that “[an] explana-
tion must enable us to see what sort of difference it would have made for 
the explanandum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different 
in various possible ways” ( Woodward 2003 , 11). That is, explanations 
are provided by giving counterfactual (i.e., modal) information about 
how changes in certain features in the explanans result in changes in the 
explanandum. This is precisely the kind of information that scientists are 
able to extract from model systems within the same universality class 
as their target system(s). The key feature of models that can be used to 
develop explanations is that they provide a set of modal information that 
captures how various changes in the explanatorily relevant features of 
the target system would result in changes in the explanandum. 
 In addition, I argue that  understanding is also provided by grasping 
modal information. For example, understanding can be produced by ide-
alized models that investigate other (perhaps very distant) scenarios in 
the network of possibilities, that is, the range of possible states of the 
system. By providing modal information about possible systems, mod-
els that fail to explain may still be able to produce understanding of a 
phenomenon ( Lipton 2009 ;  Rohwer and Rice 2013 ;  Rice 2016 ). This 
approach builds on a proposal by Robert Nozick: 
 I am tempted to say that explanation locates something in actuality, 
showing its actual connections with other things, while  understanding 
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locates it in a network of possibility showing the connections it 
would have to other nonfactual things or processes. (Explanation 
increases understanding too, since the actual connections it exhibits 
are also possible.) 
 ( Nozick 1981 , 12) 
 Nozick’s suggestion nicely links the understanding produced by explana-
tions with the understanding produced by models that fail to explain 
( Lipton 2009 ;  Rice 2016 ). In both cases, understanding is produced by 
providing true modal information about the phenomenon of interest—in 
Nozick’s terminology, it “locates it in a network of possibility.” How-
ever, I argue that in the case of understanding produced by an explana-
tion, a particular and more expansive set of modal information about 
the explanandum must be provided that identifies a set of relevant fea-
tures responsible for the explanandum and how changes in those features 
would result in changes in the explanandum ( Bokulich 2011 ,  2012 ;  Rice 
2013 ;  Woodward 2003 ). This modal information improves understand-
ing by telling scientists about the range of possible states of the system 
that would (and would not) produce the explanandum. Still, modal infor-
mation not included in an explanation can also improve understanding 
of the possible states of the system(s) of interest, for example, by iden-
tifying which features are not necessary for the phenomenon to occur 
( Rohwer and Rice 2013 ). 
 What is crucial to notice is that the modal information involved in 
explanation and understanding can be provided in ways  other than 
accurately representing relevant features . An idealized model can tell a 
scientist quite a lot about how things would be in various counterfac-
tual scenarios without having to accurately represent the features of any 
actual system(s). In other words, idealized models can provide modal 
information about changes in features of the system even when they fail 
to accurately represent those features or the actual processes that link 
those features to the target explanandum. I argue that in many cases this 
is possible because universality guarantees that the model system’s pat-
terns of counterfactual dependence and independence will be similar to 
those of the target system(s), even if the entities, causes, and processes 
of those systems are extremely different. Therefore, even if the model 
drastically distorts the relevant features of its target system(s), it can still 
be used to explain or understand the phenomenon because many of the 
modal patterns that hold in the idealized model system will be similar 
to those of the real-world system(s). For example, in the case of criti-
cal behaviors in physics, investigation of the universality class reveals 
that the explanandum counterfactually depends on the dimensionality of 
the system and the symmetry of the order parameter ( Batterman forth-
coming ). Furthermore, by using renormalization techniques to explicitly 
delimit the universality class, scientists can demonstrate that most of the 
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other physical features of the systems in the class are counterfactually 
irrelevant to the explanandum ( Batterman 2002 ). Generalizing the con-
cept of universality allows us to capture this stability of various patterns 
of behavior that are largely independent of the physical components, 
interactions, and features of a heterogeneous class of real, possible, and 
model systems. Moreover, by focusing on modal information we can 
see how highly idealized models (and various modeling techniques) can 
allow scientists to extract a plethora of modal information that can be 
used to explain and understand a phenomenon. 
 In summary, suppose that we could show that: 
 1. Certain (modal) patterns of behavior are universal across classes of 
real, possible, and model systems. 
 2. The idealized models used by scientists are within the same universal-
ity classes as the real systems whose behaviors they want to explain 
and understand. 
 If this were the case, we could provide an epistemic justification for why 
those idealized models can be used to generate explanations and under-
standing of phenomena in real-world systems, despite providing dras-
tically distorted representations of their target system(s). 6 Importantly, 
this justification does not require the accurate representation relations 
involved in most other accounts of how to justify the use of idealized 
models to explain and understand. 
 4 Universality and Multiple Conflicting Models 
 Having now presented the universality account, it is time to return to the 
problem of inconsistent models. While I do not intend to present the univer-
sality account as a univocal account of how models relate to their target sys-
tems (I suggest a more pluralistic approach to model-world relations), I do 
argue that one reason to favor the universality account is that it provides a 
way of seeing how conflicting sets of idealized models can be used to explain 
and understand the same phenomenon. The solution appeals to  overlap-
ping universality classes that each include the target system(s) in which the 
phenomenon occurs. Sets of universality classes can link sets of inconsistent 
models with the same real-world phenomenon without having to have each 
model within the same universality class ( Figure 5.1 ). 
 Moreover, since universality classes link models with their target sys-
tems without requiring accurate representation of (or mapping onto) 
relevant features, this account need not result in the inconsistent metaphys-
ical claims that plague other accounts of how idealized models connect 
with their target systems. Specifically, universality classes show that cer-
tain counterfactual dependencies and independencies will be stable across 
a class of real, possible, and model systems that are perhaps drastically 
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heterogeneous in their features. This allows sets of models to drastically 
distort the features of the target system in inconsistent ways and still 
enables scientists to use those models to extract the modal information 
required to explain and understand various phenomena. Moreover, since 
every target system will involve a myriad of counterfactual dependencies 
and independencies that will be stable  across different classes of systems , 
models in different universality classes can capture different sets of modal 
information about the same phenomenon. That is, because a single target 
system will be a member of multiple universality classes, models in dif-
ferent universality classes can connect with the target system in different 
ways and capture different sets of modal information about the phenom-
enon of interest. Perhaps one of these models will provide sufficient modal 
information to explain or understand the phenomenon on its own, or 
perhaps the modal information provided by multiple models will have 
to be combined by scientific modelers in order to formulate the desired 
explanations and understanding. The key point is that claiming that an 
idealized model provides some true modal information about the target 
system is importantly different from claiming that the model provides 
an accurate representation of any of the system’s features. Consequently, 
because the universality account does not depend on accurate representa-
tion of the relevant features that produced the explanandum, the use of 
multiple inconsistent idealized models to explain and understand the same 
phenomenon need not result in the kinds of metaphysical inconsistencies 
that trouble scientific realists. 
 It is also worth seeing how this solution to the problem of inconsistent 
models helps perspectivalism. As I argued in section 2, the source of the 
 Figure 5.1  Multiple conflicting models (M1, M2, M3, M4, .  .  .) might be 
connected to the same real-world phenomena via multiple overlapping 
universality classes (represented by the ellipses) to which the real-
world system (R) belongs. M1 and M4 show that multiple model 
systems might be within the same universality class as well. 
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problem of inconsistent models—for perspectivalists and others—is the 
assumption that models are intended to accurately represent the relevant 
features of their target system. Indeed, as  Massimi’s (2018 ) deconstruc-
tion of the argument based on inconsistent models makes clear, the argu-
ment against the combination of perspectivalism and realism depends 
on this kind of “representationalist assumption” (among other assump-
tions). While representation is crucial to much of what models do, the 
universality account shows why accurate representation of relevant 
features is not required for models to enable scientists to extract modal 
information that can be used to explain and understand. This allows us 
to maintain the perspectivalist’s claim that models represent the system 
in a particular way from the perspective of a particular theory without 
also claiming that such a representation needs to be characterized as an 
attempt to accurately represent the relevant features of the system. In this 
way, multiple conflicting models constructed within the perspectives of 
different theories can be used to provide different sets of modal informa-
tion involved in scientific explanations and understanding without pro-
ducing the kinds of metaphysical inconsistencies that result from trying 
to interpret perspectival models as intended accurate representations. In 
the rest of this section, I further illustrate how the universality account 
provides a solution to the problem of inconsistent models by looking at 
cases from biology and physics. 
 4.1 An Example From Biology 
 The use of multiple conflicting models to study the same phenomenon 
is widespread in biology, since biological modelers often require vari-
ous kinds of idealized models to describe interactions at different spa-
tial scales ( Green and Batterman 2017 ;  Qu, Garfinkel, Weiss, and Nivala 
2011 ). In addition, biological modelers often face the challenge of mod-
eling processes that operate on very different timescales: seconds, days, 
or years ( Davidson, von Dassow, and Zhou 2009 ). For example, cellular 
phenomena take place across a range of scales and “each scale of cell biol-
ogy not only has its characteristic types of data, but also typical model-
ing and simulation approaches associated with it” ( Meier-Schellersheim, 
Fraser, and Klaushcen 2009 , 4). That is, biologists investigating cellular 
behaviors often require multiple models due to the wide gaps between the 
spatial and timescales of various aspects of the target system(s), such as 
between the timescales of intra-molecular dynamics (10 −2 seconds) and 
chemical aspects of the interactions (10 3 seconds). As a result, multiple 
inconsistent modeling techniques are used at different scales to investigate 
the same biological phenomenon. Moreover, because many biological 
phenomena take place  across multiple scales, biologists often construct a 
variety of conflicting models for the various possible interactions across 
multiple scales ( Green and Batterman 2017 ;  Meier-Schellersheim et al. 
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2009 ). That is, in addition to multiple conflicting models at different 
scales, biologists often build multiple conflicting multiscale models as well 
( Dallon 2010 ). 
 These sets of models often make conflicting assumptions about the 
fundamental ontological components and interactions of the target sys-
tem. For example, “while cellular automata models treat the single ‘cells’ 
in their simulations as entities with fixed shape and size, Potts model 
simulations aim at reproducing the shape changes cells undergo due to 
mechanical contact with neighbor cells or extracellular matrices” ( Meier-
Schellersheim et al. 2009 , 6). Furthermore, these sets of models represent 
the interactions of the target system in contradictory ways, for example, 
modeling the same system dynamics using both individual-based and 
continuum models, which make contradictory assumptions about which 
aspects (and scales) of the system are relevant ( Byrne and Drasdo 2009 ). 
Moreover, some of these models aim to represent dynamical interactions 
of the system with well-defined functions, while others investigate the 
same behaviors by simply assigning (idealized) computational algorithms 
to the elements of the system and studying the emerging behaviors ( Qu 
et al. 2011 ). These models not only represent the fundamental nature of 
the entities in drastically different ways, but they also make very different 
assumptions about which features of the system are relevant and irrel-
evant to the phenomenon. Indeed, when it comes to multiscale modeling 
approaches in biology, “despite the attractiveness of this method, it faces 
many challenges, such as the gaps between models of different scales and 
inconsistencies between different methodologies” ( Qu et al. 2011 , 23). 
 The challenge is to figure out how to use the insights provided by these 
conflicting modeling approaches in order to develop explanations and 
understanding of the same target phenomenon. One approach is to try 
and construct “master models” that integrate the data from multiple 
scales into a single multiscale model ( Meier-Schellersheim et al. 2009 ). 
However, while integrating input data from multiple scales into a single 
model might produce additional insights about the phenomenon, build-
ing a master model does not resolve the contradictions among the various 
assumptions of the multiple models used to study the phenomenon, nor 
does it guarantee that the master model will provide an explanation. 
 Instead of focusing on the construction of master models, I argue that 
a more promising response to these challenges is to consider how these 
various conflicting models can be related to the same target phenomenon 
by multiple overlapping universality classes. That is, these different mod-
els can belong to different (overlapping) universality classes that each 
contains the target system(s) of interest to the biological modelers. For 
example, model  M 1 might be in universality class  U 1 that contains the 
target system, while model  M 2 might be in universality class  U 2 that also 
contains the target system (see  Figure 5.1 again). Some of these ideal-
ized models might also be in the same universality class as other models 
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used to study the phenomenon, but the important point is that they can 
each be in at least one universality class that also contains the target 
system(s). 7 Because these models are in the same universality classes as 
the target system(s) in which the phenomenon of interest occurs, they 
will display some similar patterns of behavior. In addition, since different 
universality classes will focus on different universal patterns, models in 
different universality classes can be used to extract different sets of modal 
information about the biological phenomenon. Importantly, this account 
does not require that the conflicting models be interpreted as accurately 
representing the difference-making (or otherwise relevant) features of the 
target system. Moreover, because the modal information extracted from 
models within different universality classes need not conflict in the ways 
that the representations of the models themselves conflict, scientific mod-
elers can use this plethora of modal information to construct (consistent) 
explanations and understanding of the phenomenon without having to 
build a “master model” intended to accurately represent all of the rel-
evant features across a variety of scales. 
 In sum, every biological system will be a member of many overlapping 
universality classes. Some of these universality classes will involve univer-
sal behaviors that hold only at particular scales, some of them will hold 
across multiple scales, and  many will include the model systems repre-
sented by idealized biological models . Consequently, an idealized biologi-
cal model can provide modal information about those target system(s) 
within the same universality class even if the model conflicts with other 
idealized models used to study the same phenomenon (in other universal-
ity classes). Furthermore, since universality classes do not link their sys-
tems through accurate representation or mapping, we need not interpret 
multiple conflicting models as making conflicting metaphysical claims 
about the features of real systems. As a result, multiple conflicting ideal-
ized models in different universality classes can provide different sets of 
modal information about the target system that can be used to construct 
various explanations and understanding of the phenomenon of interest. 8 
 4.2 An Example From Physics 
 A second example of using multiple inconsistent models to study the same 
phenomenon comes from physicists’ modeling of the nucleus ( Morrison 
2011 ). There are over 30 different nuclear models, each of which provides 
some insight into some aspects of nuclear structure and dynamics. How-
ever, the set of assumptions made by any one of these models is in con-
flict with fundamental claims made by the others ( Morrison 2011 , 347). 
For example, “some models assume that nucleons move approximately 
independently in the nucleus . . . while others characterize the nucleons as 
strongly coupled due to their strong short range interactions” ( Morrison 
2011 , 347). Indeed, widely used models for studying the nucleus, such as 
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the liquid-drop model and the shell model, make contradictory assump-
tions about the fundamental nature of elements and interactions involved 
( Morrison 2011 , 349). In addition, these conflicting assumptions are 
typically necessary for the models to produce the behaviors of interest 
to physicists—that is, without these assumptions the models would be 
unable to provide insights into how the nucleus gives rise to the range 
of observations physicists want to explain and understand. In particular, 
“nuclear spin, size, binding energy, fission and several other properties of 
stable nuclei are all accounted for using models that describe one and the 
same entity (the nucleus) in different and contradictory ways” ( Morrison 
2011 , 349). As before, the problem of inconsistent models is seeing how 
we can interpret these sets of conflicting idealized models as providing 
genuine explanations and understanding of the same phenomenon. 
 The perspectivalist might try to interpret these inconsistent models as 
each only representing the nucleus in different ways from the perspective 
of different theories. That is, the liquid-drop model and the shell model 
simply represent the nucleus in different ways from within different theo-
ries, such as classical physics or quantum mechanics. However, as Mor-
rison points out, this really isn’t much of a solution to the problem of 
inconsistent models, since “none of those ‘perspectives’ can be claimed to 
‘represent’ the nucleus in even a quasi-realistic way since they all contra-
dict each other on fundamental assumptions about dynamics and struc-
ture” ( Morrison 2011 , 350). In other words, it is difficult to see how we 
could make the realist inference from predictive success of these models 
to the accuracy of the models, given that their basic assumptions conflict 
with one another and those assumptions are essential to the limited pre-
dictive successes of each model. 
 As before, I suggest the main reason this use of inconsistent models 
appears problematic for the realist is the (mistaken) assumption that 
accurate representation is essential to interpreting the models as provid-
ing explanations and understanding. It is clear that none of these nuclear 
models ought to be interpreted as providing an accurate representation 
of all the relevant (e.g., difference-making) features for nuclear phenom-
ena. However, the universality account shows us how explanation and 
understanding might be achieved without providing accurate representa-
tions of the relevant features of the system. Accordingly, I suggest that we 
should instead interpret these various nuclear models as relating to their 
target system(s) via different (and sometimes overlapping) universality 
classes that capture different universal nuclear behaviors across a range 
of perturbations to the physical features of the system. For example, the 
liquid-drop model might be within universality class  U 1 that includes real 
nuclei and displays a certain range of universal behaviors, whereas the 
shell model might be in universality class  U 2 that also includes real nuclei 
but displays a different range of universal behaviors, and so on for the 
other models. Because these models are in the same universality classes as 
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real systems that display nuclear phenomena, they will display some simi-
lar patterns of behavior as those real systems. In addition, since different 
universality classes will capture different universal patterns across differ-
ent classes of systems, models in different universality classes can be used 
to extract different sets of modal information about the nucleus without 
having to interpret any one of the models as an accurate representation of 
a single set of relevant or difference-making features for the phenomenon 
of interest. Different models can then provide a plethora of modal infor-
mation about nuclear phenomena even if no single model can provide 
enough information to explain and understand all of those phenomena. 
Indeed, while none of the models provides an accurate representation, 
Morrison does grant that these conflicting nuclear models have “gener-
ated information about nuclear phenomena that can be used in practical 
contexts” ( Morrison 2011 , 350). Moreover, while no single model is able 
to explain all the various features of nuclear phenomena, some mod-
els have provided “an explanatory foundation for understanding certain 
processes” ( Morrison 2011 , 350). I argue that we can understand how 
this can be despite the inaccuracy and inconsistency of the models by 
appealing to different universality classes for the idealized models that 
allow them to provide different sets of modal information about the tar-
get phenomena. Since universality classes do not link systems via accurate 
representation or mapping, we need not interpret these multiple conflict-
ing models as making conflicting metaphysical claims about the features 
of real systems. Instead, multiple conflicting idealized models in different 
universality classes can provide different sets of modal information about 
the target system that can be used to construct various explanations and 
understanding. 
 5  Multiple Conflicting Models, Modal Information, 
and Realism 
 One question remains: how is the universality account compatible with 
(a perspectival version of) scientific realism, if it grants that our models 
and theories are typically inaccurate representations of their target sys-
tems? The key is noting that the explanations and understanding provided 
by multiple idealized models can be separated from the assumptions of the 
models themselves. According to the universality account, explanations 
and understanding are provided by the modal information  extracted from 
idealized models within the same universality classes as their target sys-
tems. However, the modal information included in scientists’ explanations 
and understanding of a phenomenon need not include the inconsistent 
assumptions included in the conflicting idealized models used to study that 
phenomenon. After all, the universal modal patterns of behavior are those 
that are stable across perturbations in many of the features of the sys-
tems within the universality class. Consequently, discovering universality 
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classes can provide confidence that the same patterns of counterfactual 
dependence and independence that occur in the idealized models will be 
realized in the model’s target system(s), even if the model’s assumptions 
drastically distort the difference-making features of the system and con-
flict with the assumptions of other models used to study the same phe-
nomenon. In short, the counterfactual dependencies and independencies 
that are stable across the universality class and are used to explain and 
understand can be separated from the detailed assumptions used to con-
struct the model’s representation of the idealized model system ( Rohwer 
and Rice 2016 ). 
 Distinguishing the understanding provided by models from the assump-
tions of the models themselves allows us to maintain a factive conception 
of scientific understanding despite the use of idealized models in science. 
In contrast with this kind of view, Catherine Elgin has recently argued 
that a non-factive conception of understanding is required to accommo-
date the epistemic successes of science ( Elgin 2007 ,  2017 ). Elgin argues 
that any kind of  veritism that takes truth to be necessary for epistemic 
success is unacceptable, since “if we accept it, we cannot do justice to the 
epistemic achievements of science” ( Elgin 2017 , 9). In particular, Elgin 
argues that “the more serious problem comes with the laws, models, and 
idealizations that are acknowledged not to be true but that are nonethe-
less critical to, indeed at least particularly constitutive of, the understand-
ing that science delivers” ( Elgin 2017 , 14). While I am sympathetic with 
many aspects of Elgin’s views, I disagree with the claim that the under-
standing produced by scientific inquiry must be  partially constituted by 
the idealizations used in science. Although theories, models, and idealiza-
tions are certainly the tools with which scientists produce explanations 
and understanding of various phenomena, it does not directly follow that 
the assumptions involved in those tools must be included in the explana-
tions and understanding  extracted from scientists’ uses of those tools. If 
this separation between the representations used by scientists and the 
understanding provided by scientific inquiry is possible, then recogniz-
ing the role of (multiple conflicting) idealized models in science need 
not force us to adopt a non-factive conception of scientific understand-
ing. Indeed, the universality account maintains the requirement that the 
modal information used in explaining and understanding a phenomenon 
 must be true of the phenomenon without requiring that the models be 
accurate representations of their target system(s). While the details of 
what makes scientific understanding factive will have to be sorted out 
elsewhere, the universality account enables us to see how scientific mod-
els can yield lots of true modal information about a phenomenon without 
having to interpret the assumptions of the model as aiming to provide an 
accurate representation of the target system(s). 
 Consequently, an important implication of the universality account is 
that it shows how the use of multiple conflicting idealized models to study 
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the same phenomenon can be consistent with a more nuanced form of 
scientific realism that focuses on grasping true modal information ( Rice 
2016 ). Specifically, this approach is compatible with a version of realism 
that focuses on science’s ability to provide factive understanding of pat-
terns of counterfactual dependence (and independence) rather than on the 
truth or accuracy of our best theories and models themselves. Despite their 
drastic distortion of the features of real systems, scientific models within 
universality classes can provide a wide range of true modal information 
about the counterfactual relevance and irrelevance of various features of 
real systems ( Batterman and Rice 2014 ;  Massimi 2018 ;  Rice 2013 ,  2016 , 
 2019 ). Moreover, by building multiple models that each provide differ-
ent modal information about the systems in their respective universality 
classes, scientists can extract myriad modal information that can be used 
to explain and understand the phenomenon (in a variety of ways). As a 
result, realists can claim that science is able to achieve the epistemic suc-
cesses of explanation and factive understanding despite the fact that sci-
entific models are typically highly idealized and conflict with one another 
( Potochnik 2017 ;  Rice 2016 ). What is more, a perspectival view of model-
ing can also adopt this version of scientific realism. The key is to focus on 
the modal information that can be extracted from multiple perspectival 
models within different universality classes rather than focusing on the 
accuracy of the models themselves. In doing so, we can see why models 
from different perspectives (and in different universality classes) can pro-
vide a wide range of true modal information about real systems, even if 
the models themselves are inconsistent and highly idealized. 
 6 Conclusion 
 I have argued that the problem of inconsistent models is a consequence 
of the assumption made by most accounts that, in order for an idealized 
model to provide an explanation or understanding, it must accurately 
represent the relevant features of its target system. Discovering that this 
is the root of the problem motivates the exploration of alternative ways 
that models can relate to their target systems that enable for the develop-
ment of explanations and understanding. In response, I have argued that 
an account based on universality classes (and modal information) can 
avoid this kind of accurate representation assumption and the problem of 
inconsistent models that it produces. Finally, I have argued that this uni-
versality account is compatible with a form of realism because the modal 
information extracted from idealized models can be distinguished from 
the assumptions of the models themselves. Going forward, I suggest that 
perspectivalism and other accounts of modeling continue to investigate 
how scientists use idealized models within particular universality classes 
to extract the modal information required to explain and understand 
real-world phenomena. 
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 Notes 
 1. Of course, every model will be accurate with respect to certain features and 
inaccurate with respect to others. However, according to most accounts, the 
partial representation of a model may still be an explanation if the model 
accurately represents the explanatorily relevant features of the target system. 
 2. A non-factive account of understanding has been offered by  Elgin (2017 ), 
which I address in section 5. 
 3. I will not be arguing for perspectivalism here. However, it is worth noting that 
a solution to the problem of inconsistent models that moves us away from 
focusing on accurate representation of relevant features (e.g., difference mak-
ers) would also help to solve the challenge to perspectivalism. 
 4. I refer to a model system as the abstract system represented by a scientific 
model that includes all and only the features specified by the model (within a 
particular modeling context). In a sense then, model systems are just possible 
systems that are picked out by scientific models. 
 5. It is important to distinguish using universality classes to justify the use of an 
idealized model to explain and understand ( Rice  2018 , 2019) from provid-
ing a specific type of explanation that some authors have called a “minimal 
model explanation” ( Batterman and Rice 2014 ). A minimal model explanation 
appeals to a minimal model within a universality class,  and the explanation 
relies heavily on providing a detailed backstory that shows that most of the 
features that distinguish the systems within the universality class are irrelevant 
to their universal behaviors. That is, minimal model explanations focus on 
demonstrating the irrelevance of most of the features of the system and then 
use the minimal features within a highly idealized model to show that certain 
minimal features are necessary for the explanandum to occur. However, not 
all model explanations that appeal to universality classes have this structure. 
Moreover, contrary to Marc  Lange’s (2014 ) objections, according to  Batter-
man and Rice (2014 ) and the view defended here, being in the same universal-
ity class is not sufficient for a model to provide an explanation. Being in the 
same universality class merely justifies appealing to an idealized model within 
the explanation. More is required to extract the modal information required 
to provide an explanation. 
 6. Another objection raised by  Lange (2014 ) to Batterman and Rice’s account 
of minimal model explanations argues that “if our demonstrating that the 
model and the target system are in the same universality class were sufficient 
to allow us to use one to explain the other, then we might just as well use 
the target system to explain why the model exhibits the given behavior” 
( Lange 2014 , 296). Lange then suggests that other accounts have an easier 
time accounting for this explanatory asymmetry because, “unlike the target 
system, the minimal model involves no other features that might make for 
added complications” ( Lange 2014 , 298). However, it is unclear why this 
move is not available to the minimal model explanations account as well. 
Indeed, it seems very close to our appeals to “computational ease” as justi-
fication for using the minimal model to explain, but Lange explicitly rejects 
this kind of response. I fail to see why it is satisfactory to appeal to the lack 
of features that would make for added complications but unsatisfactory to 
appeal to computational ease. In addition, Lange’s claims that we cannot 
simply reject this asymmetry because “scientific practice does not include 
cases where the macrobehavior of some austere, minimal model is explained 
partly by the macrobehavior of some messy, real-world system” ( Lange 2014 , 
296–297). This claim about scientific practice is certainly correct, but there 
are plenty of explanations for this fact that do not require that  in principle 
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it could never happen that way . First, scientists simply do not have access 
to all the features of the real systems of interest (that is why they need the 
model), but they do have access to the minimal model. Moreover, as I noted 
above, I think practical reasons regarding computational ease  are sufficient 
to explain why scientists use models to explain the behaviors of real systems 
in practice even if they do not rule out explanations that appeal to real sys-
tems to explain the behaviors of models in principle. So Lange’s objections 
here seem to miss their mark. Finally, it is again important to distinguish 
between providing a minimal model explanation and only appealing to a 
universality class to justify the use of an idealized model to explain. Those 
processes are related, but importantly different. 
 7. While these universality classes may overlap in that they contain the same 
systems, they need not overlap and can be distinguished by having different 
universal behaviors. For example, in physics different universality classes are 
identified by different critical exponents that govern the universal behaviors of 
the systems in the classes. See  Chen, Toner, and Lee (2015 ), for example. 
 8. Multiple (conflicting) models might also be within the same universality class, but 
those models will typically provide similar sets of modal information about the 
target phenomenon since the universal behaviors they display (and the features 
those behaviors are independent of) will be the same across a universality class. 
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 1 Introduction 
 Paradigm shifts, conceptual revolutions, or even just multiple alternative 
models of ostensibly the same natural phenomenon, system, or entity 
pose a severe challenge to traditional scientific realism. A standard sci-
entific realist expects that our theories and models correspond to the 
relevant features of the natural world they are meant to represent, or that 
they at least aim to do so. As far as the standard realist is concerned, at 
most one such model will correspond to the way the world actually is; 
so how can more than one model enjoy predictive and other empirical 
successes? 
 In this chapter I look at two contemporary forms of scientific realism, 
each of which departs in crucial respects from the standard scientific real-
ist: structural realism and perspectival realism. 1 Both take seriously the 
challenge of a plurality of models and theories, but they wish to retain key 
elements of scientific realism, such as a commitment to a correspondence 
between scientific representations and the world, and to the idea that sci-
ence makes progress. Despite these shared commitments to realism, per-
spectival and structural realism offer substantially different responses to 
the challenges that arise from a plurality of models. After laying out the 
differences between the two views in section 2, I use models of measure-
ment as a type of scientific representation to illustrate the strengths and 
weaknesses of structural and perspectival realism. I conclude that, at least 
for meta-sciences like measurement theory, structural and perspectival 
realism might be complementary. 
 2 Realism: Structural and Perspectival 
 Both structural realists ( Worrall 1989 ;  Ladyman 1998 ;  French 2014 ) and 
perspectival realists ( Giere 2006 ;  Massimi 2012 ;  Teller 2017 ; Teller, this 
volume) want to address challenges arising from the plurality of scientific 
representations of ostensibly the same phenomenon or subject matter 
while maintaining a broadly realist outlook on science. 2 The plurality 
 Representationalism in 
Measurement Theory. 
Structuralism or 
Perspectivalism? 
 J. E. Wolff 
 6 
110 J. E. Wolff
of models is a challenge for the requirement of literalness of scientific 
representation endorsed by traditional scientific realists. The requirement 
of literalness is typically articulated from the syntactic view of theories 
and amounts to the claim that theoretical terms do not in general differ 
in their semantics from observational terms. The debate I focus on here, 
by contrast, is played out against the backdrop of the semantic view of 
theories, which takes  models as paradigmatic scientific representations. 
Whereas a traditional realist would be inclined to hold that a successful 
representation of a phenomenon means that there is a close correspon-
dence between elements of the model and elements of the phenomenon 
represented, both structural and perspectival realists recognize that mod-
els contain features that do not readily correspond to features in the phe-
nomenon represented. The fact that sometimes more than one model can 
be used to represent the same phenomenon provides particularly strong 
evidence for this lack of literal correspondence between model and phe-
nomenon. The question for both structural and perspectival realists is 
how to respond to the plurality of models while retaining a commitment 
to realism. Structural realists focus on the  commonalities among different 
representations and models, whereas perspectivalists emphasize the  dif-
ferences between models. 
 Structural realists suggest that we should focus on what is common 
to competing (successful) representations and that this commonality is 
structural. While each model will differ from the others in some way, 
all models of the phenomenon will have certain structural similarities. 
Our task is to identify these structural similarities, which is often done 
by finding transformations between models that leave particular features 
invariant. According to structural realism, what we learn about the world 
from these different models is confined to the structural similarities they 
share. Some structural realists want to take this epistemic view further 
and conclude that the world itself contains nothing but structure, but for 
present purposes I shall be concerned only with epistemic structural real-
ism, not ontic structural realism (for the distinction, see  Ladyman 1998 ). 
 For a plurality of models of ostensibly the same entity/system, this 
will mean that structuralists will only take features present in  all models 
as  representational , that is, only those features that are shared between 
the different models will count as relevant to the question of truth-qua-
correspondence, whereas features pertaining only to some models will be 
regarded as artifacts of the representation. Structuralists will further add 
that what is shared between the different models are  structural features, 
which are contrasted with haecceitistic or quidditistic differences among 
models. Structural features typically include relations among the elements 
of the model which remain invariant even as we “swap” or “replace” 
particular elements. For example, representations of particles that differ 
only with respect to  which particle in an ensemble of identically prepared 
particles has a given property will be regarded as only having haecceitistic 
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difference. Such haecceitistic differences, according to the structuralists, 
are not up for evaluation with respect to which of them “gets it right”; 
instead they are merely artifacts of representation. Models that differ 
from the original model only in assigning different “labels” to the parti-
cles are structurally similar to the first one, and there is nothing to choose 
between them. 3 Structural realism reduces the plurality of representations 
by treating many representations as equivalent. 
 The relational character of structure is contrasted, on the one hand, 
with haecceitistic and quidditistic differences and, on the other, with 
nature and ontology. In both cases, the idea seems to be that the same 
relational structure may underpin different conceptions of the nature of 
the phenomenon in question, or be instantiated in models with haec-
ceitistic or quidditistic differences. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, structuralists 
have focused much of their attention on the highly mathematized models 
used in the physical sciences. For such models, it is comparatively easy 
to give a characterization of the structure of the representation, and the 
abstraction involved in the mathematical representation makes it easier 
to see how the same relations can be used in otherwise different theories 
and models. The main challenge for structuralism is to develop a notion 
of structure that is both substantive enough to be controversial while also 
being a plausible candidate for what is in fact preserved across different 
theories/models. 
 Perspectivalists take a rather different approach to the plurality of mod-
els. Instead of focusing on the commonality among different models, per-
spectivalists regard each model as a complementary perspective on the 
same phenomenon. Unlike the structuralist, who limits what we should 
take as corresponding to the world in our models to what is (structurally) 
common to them, the perspectivalist takes differences between models as 
(potentially) informative about the world. Perspectivalists reject the idea 
that we ever approach the natural world independent of taking a particu-
lar perspective. Representation is inevitably perspectival; there is no view 
from nowhere ( Giere 2006 ;  van Fraassen 2008 ). 
 Moreover, not all perspectives are easily compatible. Notoriously, water 
is described as a viscous fluid by fluid dynamics and as a collection of 
particles by statistical mechanics. 4 These two descriptions seem to be in 
direct conflict, attributing contradictory properties to the same entity. 
Traditional realists would be inclined to insist that at least one of these 
models must be mistaken: it simply does not correspond to the nature of 
water. Structural realists might try to retreat to merely structural features 
of each model, but it is not obvious how that is going to resolve the dif-
ficulty in this case. Perspectivalists, by contrast, would like to retain both 
models as offering important insights into the nature of water. Neither 
is to be given up in favor of the other. Instead both models say some-
thing true about water, something that would be lost if we chose only one 
perspective as the uniquely true perspective. Whether there is nonetheless 
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room for realism from a perspectivalist standpoint will depend on how 
perspectivalists can characterize the relationship between the two or more 
apparently inconsistent models ( Giere 2009 ;  Massimi 2018b ). 
 Unlike structural and traditional realism, then, perspectivalism seems 
to be committed to a form of unavoidable pluralism. One question for 
perspectivalists is whether this pluralism is confined to our knowledge 
and representation of the world or whether it extends to the world, that 
is, whether the plurality of perspectives reveals that the world itself is 
somehow ontologically pluralistic. Especially the latter view seems to 
be difficult to reconcile with core commitments to realism. Realists are 
typically committed to a realist semantics for scientific representation, 
an optimistic epistemic outlook on scientific success and progress, and 
a picture of the world as uniquely structured in a certain way ( Psillos 
1999 ). This final point matters if we are to make sense of realism as being 
committed to the idea that our scientific theories correspond to what the 
world is like in its own right. If ontology is radically pluralistic, perhaps 
in the sense that entities only exist insofar as they are represented in a 
certain way, then this would seem to undermine a basic commitment 
of scientific realism. Perspectivalists in the philosophy of science do not 
typically wish to embrace this radical ontological departure from stan-
dard scientific realism ( Massimi 2012 ). 
 The main challenge for perspectival realism, then, is to make sense of 
the idea that each perspective captures something true about the phe-
nomenon in question while maintaining that these perspectives shed 
light on the same phenomenon or entity. This claim suggests a notion of 
perspectival truth that requires clarification and defense, since it seems 
difficult to reconcile the pluralism inherent in perspectivalism with the 
idea that claims about the world are either true or false. Some claims, 
it seems, would be true according to one perspective, yet false accord-
ing to another (see  Massimi 2018a for a qualified defense of perspec-
tival truth). Moreover, something needs to be said about why it is that 
the different perspectives contribute something epistemically valuable 
to inquiry, while nonetheless remaining distinct and possibly irreconcil-
able. Even if the pluralism is confined to our knowledge or representation 
of the world, most realists would also be uncomfortable with the idea 
that our knowledge is always confined to perspectival knowledge only 
( Chakravartty 2010 ). 
 Perspectival and structural realism, then, differ in their approach to 
scientific representation. To assess the strength and weaknesses of each as 
realist approaches to scientific representation, I will now turn to measure-
ment theory. Measurement theory addresses the question how numerical 
representations of empirical attributes and phenomena of interest are 
possible. Any form of realism about such representations will want to 
insist that there are some constraints on which representations qualify as 
adequate representations of the relevant attributes. 
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 Measurement theory is of particular interest for the comparison of 
perspectival and structural realism for two reasons. First, measurement 
theory is not a first-order science in the manner of physics or biology; 
its subject matter is not a specific class of phenomena or aspect of the 
natural world. Measurement theory, at least as it is understood today, is 
a meta-science that studies the mathematical formalism used to represent 
measurements. What we can learn from it may hence be quite different 
from the conclusions we draw from case studies of models in particular 
sciences. Second, since measurement theory explicitly deals with a certain 
type of scientific representation, it seems especially appropriate to ask 
what structural and perspectival realists might have to say about it. In the 
next section I will present some problems for a literalist reading of mea-
surement representations, which I interpret as being akin to traditional 
scientific realism. In sections 4 and 5 we will see how structural and per-
spectival realism can be combined to provide a better understanding of 
measurement representations. 
 3  Representationalism and Literalism in 
Measurement Theory 
 Measurement theory was not always a meta-science. Especially in the first 
half of the 20th century, the study of measurement and quantities was 
considered part of physical theorizing. Many important contributions to 
measurement theory were made by physicists, often as part of working 
out the foundations of physics ( Tolman 1917 ;  Campbell 1920 ;  Bridgman 
1927 ). The idea behind these approaches was that measurement theory 
was supposed to give an accurate account of physical quantities. Physical 
quantities were thought to be unique in permitting numerical representa-
tion, and the question was which features of these attributes made them 
numerically representable. 
 Early axiomatizations of measurement focused on the idea that quan-
titative attributes were numerically representable  because they were addi-
tive ( Helmholtz 1887 /2010;  Hölder 1901 ). We can both order objects of 
a domain by length (from shortest to longest) and concatenate objects 
in the domain in such a way that the combined object has the “sum” of 
the lengths of the two concatenated objects. Lengths, masses, and other 
paradigmatic physical magnitudes can be “added” in (almost) the way 
numbers are added. The natural conclusion for many thinkers was that 
quantities can be given numerical representations in virtue of being addi-
tive. Additivity was thereby made into a necessary condition for being 
a quantitative attribute. These early axiomatizations for quantities con-
tained two types of axioms: axioms governing the ordering of objects and 
axioms governing additivity. These axioms were thought to constrain how 
numbers could be assigned to objects, or perhaps they were understood 
as something like conditions for the possibility of numerical assignment. 
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 This approach to the question of how numerical representations of 
attributes are possible is characterized by a form of “literalism”: it is 
possible to represent attributes numerically if and only if there is a direct 
correspondence between features of the attribute and features of the 
numbers. Moreover, one such feature, additivity, was selected as a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for all numerical representation. For physi-
cal attributes, additivity had to be demonstrated empirically, by finding 
suitable concatenation operations for objects instantiating the attribute 
in question. The apparent direct correspondence between the operation 
of placing rods end to end, or placing weights in the same pan of a beam 
balance, and arithmetical addition operations on numbers was under-
stood to be the key to the numerical representation of attributes like 
length and mass. 
 While additivity seems to fit nicely as a criterion for some paradig-
matic physical quantities like mass and length, it does not fit neatly for 
all physical quantities. There are two types of problems. First, not all 
physical attributes seem to be additive in the sense that combining objects 
with different magnitudes of these attributes results in an increased mag-
nitude of the attribute that could be interpreted as the sum of the two 
contributing magnitudes. Density and temperature are typical examples 
of this. Mass density is understood as mass per volume. Both mass and 
volume are additive quantities and hence fall squarely into the physical 
measurement paradigm. But while the masses and volumes of appropri-
ately concatenated objects will increase in such a way as to form the sums 
of the respective masses and volumes, the same is not true for density. 
Fluids of different densities will typically form uniform density layers 
(e.g., when trying to mix honey and milk) instead of combining or pro-
duce a mixture of intermediate density somewhere between the two start-
ing densities. Similarly, if we mix two fluids of different temperature, say 
coffee and milk, the resulting fluid does not have a temperature that is the 
“sum” of the two contributing temperatures but instead an intermediate 
temperature. 5 
 The second type of problem is due to the operationalism built into 
many versions of the additivity paradigm as a result of its commitment 
to literalism. Additivity of an attribute is linked to the availability of a 
concatenation operation for objects instantiating the attribute, which 
means this approach rules out attributes for which no concatenation 
operation is available and attributes for which no  unique concatena-
tion operation is available. 
 Concatenation operations do not seem to be available for temporal 
intervals (except perhaps for the special case of adjacent intervals), yet we 
do think that time is numerically representable and indeed in some sense 
additive. The problem here is simply that we cannot manipulate events and 
intervals as easily as we can manipulate certain kinds of physical objects. 
Even in the case of physical objects, our ability to concatenate them is 
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limited: we assume that the masses of planets behave in a manner compa-
rable to that of pebbles, even though we cannot concatenate the former in 
the same way we concatenate the latter. 
 On the other hand, some quantities seem to have more than one “natu-
ral” concatenation operation. Compare, for example, electrical resistance 
in series and parallel circuits. Resistors connected in series yield additive 
resistance in a straightforward way: the total resistance in the circuit is 
just the sum of the resistance of each resistor. Resistors connected in par-
allel do not yield additive resistance, but yield the reciprocal of resistance: 
the total reciprocal resistance is the sum of the reciprocal resistance of 
each resistor. Neither parallel nor series circuits are more natural than the 
other, yet in both cases we seem to end up with an additive quantity: resis-
tance and its reciprocal. The two quantities seem so closely connected that 
even distinguishing them seems somewhat misleading. Instead it looks like 
there are just two different ways of concatenating resistors, and either 
way of doing it yields a total resistance measure that is additive. There is 
no unique way of combining resistors in a circuit that yields an additive 
representation; instead there are two. 
 A similar sort of problem can be generated for the case of length. While 
we ordinarily assume that the natural way to concatenate lengths is to 
place rods end to end in a straight line, Brian  Ellis (1966 ) showed that 
placing rods at right angles to each other also yields an additive represen-
tation of length, just not the one we find familiar. While Ellis’s example 
might seem contrived, it is very difficult to say why we should prefer 
our standard concatenation of length to his unconventional one, other 
than sheer familiarity. The concern for the additivity paradigm is that the 
straightforward link between a natural concatenation operation and a 
numerical representation of the attribute featuring the addition operation 
breaks down. 
 The additivity paradigm is motivated by a form of  literalism about numeri-
cal representations of quantities: quantitative attributes are numerically rep-
resentable because, under concatenation, objects with that attribute behave 
like numbers with respect to addition. Numbers correspond to objects, and 
addition between numbers corresponds to concatenation between objects. 
If there is either no plausible way of concatenating the relevant objects (e.g., 
temporal intervals or planets) or if there is more than one plausible way 
of doing so (e.g., rods or resistors), then this literal interpretation becomes 
doubtful. There is no longer a unique, natural correspondence between the 
manipulation of objects (and thereby indirectly the magnitudes of quanti-
ties) and the numbers. 
 The literalism of the additivity paradigm is, hence, rather restric-
tive. While there are some physical quantities that satisfy the strict 
requirements of additivity (at least in a limited domain), even among phys-
ical quantities there are problem cases. For sciences other than physics, 
the problem is far more severe: in sciences like psychology, no attributes 
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of interest seem to have additive structure or be amenable to concat-
enation. Unsurprisingly, psychologists like S. S.  Stevens (1946 ) rejected 
the additivity paradigm and proposed instead that measurement sim-
ply meant the numerical representation of attributes according to some 
rule or other. This notion of measurement strikes many as too weak and 
too easily achieved (see  Michell 1999 for a detailed critique of this and 
related notions of measurement in psychology). The question is, there-
fore, whether it is possible to free measurement representations from the 
shackles of literalism without giving up on the idea that numerical rep-
resentations of attributes reflect something about the nature of the attri-
butes thus represented. 
 The radical literalism of the additivity paradigm is akin to the view 
standard scientific realists take with respect to scientific representation 
in general. The standard realist expects that features of the representa-
tion correspond (literally!) to features of the phenomenon or entity rep-
resented and, conversely, they require of a representation that it captures 
the features of the represented entity. A close correspondence between 
features of the representation and features of the represented entity is 
what makes for successful scientific representation. This is the reasoning 
behind the additivity paradigm as well. Numerical representations are 
additive and, hence, we want to be entitled to infer that attributes repre-
sented numerically are also additive. Conversely, if a representation were 
to lack key features of an attribute, such as its additivity, the representa-
tion would be inadequate. For standard realists, this kind of literalism is 
part of what it means to be a realist. 
 In the following section, I will look at the representational theory of 
measurement (RTM), which arose in response to the problems with the 
additivity paradigm. I shall first show that RTM looks like a form of 
structural realism about representation. In section 5, we will see that this 
structural realism needs to be combined with perspectivalism. 
 4  Structural Realism in the Representational 
Theory of Measurement 
 Today measurement theory is a mathematical framework that describes 
the conditions under which numerical (and, more generally, mathemati-
cal) representations of attributes are possible. The most developed 
framework of this kind is the representational theory of measurement, 
which describes measurement as a representation of empirical relational 
structures by numerical relational structures ( Krantz, Suppes, Luce, and 
Tversky 1971 , 9). Even contemporary alternatives to representationalism, 
for example ( Domotor and Batitsky 2008 ), share this highly mathemati-
cal character and do not proceed from within a particular science. A great 
advantage of RTM is that it describes a range of different types of struc-
tures axiomatically and shows what type of numerical representations 
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are possible for these structures. The representationalist theory thereby 
incorporates a key feature of Stevens’s permissive approach to measure-
ment, namely the idea that  different features of numerical structures can 
be used to establish a mapping between an empirical structure and a 
numerical structure. There is no need for such mappings to be confined to 
additive structures. Additive structures become merely a type of empirical 
structure that can be numerically represented. 
 To provide such an axiomatic framework, RTM first provides axi-
oms for various types of structures. 6 A structure is here simply a set 
with relations and operations defined on it. The exact nature of the 
relations and operations is specified by the axioms. Crucially for RTM, 
both numerical structures (e.g., the real numbers, ordering, and addi-
tion) and empirical structures (e.g., a set of weights when ordered and 
concatenated using a beam balance) might satisfy these axioms. By char-
acterizing structures in this abstract, axiomatic fashion, RTM lays the 
foundation for showing how a mapping from the empirical structure 7 to 
the numerical structure is possible. Such a mapping will typically be a 
 homomorphism , that is, a structure-preserving map. As we represent an 
empirical structure using a numerical structure, the numerical structure 
will reflect  structural features of the empirical structure. According to 
RTM, this preservation of structure is the key to understanding mea-
surement representations. Much of RTM then proceeds to show, in a 
mathematically rigorous way, what kinds of representations are possible 
for different types of empirical structures. 
 To do so, first a representation theorem and then a uniqueness theorem 
are proved. The former demonstrates that if an empirical structure satisfies 
the axioms for a particular structure, for example an additive extensive 
structure, then there is a structure-preserving mapping from the empirical 
relational structure to a suitable numerical structure (suitable insofar as 
the numerical structure will also satisfy the axioms for additive extensive 
structures), such that certain conditions are satisfied. For additive exten-
sive structures the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) the mapping 
is such that the ordering of objects in the empirical domain is reflected in 
the order of the numbers assigned to the objects: a ≺ b iff  f (a) <  f (b); and 
(ii) the mapping is such that the concatenated object a ∘ b 8 is mapped to 
the sum of the numerical values for a and b:  f (a ∘ b) =  f (a) +  f (b). 
 The uniqueness theorem then shows how unique this mapping from 
the empirical structure to the numerical structure is by demonstrating 
how other mappings satisfying the same two conditions are related to 
our original mapping  f . It turns out that for additive extensive structures, 
any mapping  f ′ such that  f ′ = α f for some real value α > 0 will satisfy the 
two conditions given above. So once it has been established that one such 
homomorphic mapping from the empirical structure to the numerical 
structure is possible, many more such mappings are also possible, dif-
fering from the first one only by multiplication by a positive factor α. In 
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measurement practice this is often taken to mean that we can change the 
unit of measurement, for example, from centimeters to inches, without 
losing any important information. The representational theory of mea-
surement thereby shows which numerical representations are equivalent 
in the sense of being mere notational variants of each other. 
 While the preceding example illustrates the features of mappings for 
additive extensive structures, the same general method is applicable to 
other structures as well. Indeed, this is what most of the rest of  Founda-
tions of Measurement concerns itself with: various types of structures 
are axiomatically characterized and then shown to be representable by 
numerical structures to varying degrees of uniqueness. Whereas earlier 
axiomatizations of measurement had focused on capturing what was 
necessary for establishing the additive character of an attribute, RTM 
instead begins from the idea that measurement involves an axiomatic 
characterization of a measurement structure but does not put any con-
straints on the features such a structure might have. Once a measurement 
structure has been axiomatically characterized, we can then ask what 
kind of numerical representation of such a structure might be possible 
(the representation theorem) and how unique such a representation will 
turn out to be (the uniqueness theorem). Mass is numerically represent-
able because massive objects stand in empirical relations of ordering 
and concatenation, that is, it satisfies the axioms for additive extensive 
structures. Temperature, on the other hand, is numerically representable 
because relations of congruence and betweenness hold between differ-
ences in temperature; temperature satisfies the axioms for absolute dif-
ference structures. 9 The features that make possible a representation of 
an attribute by numbers are structural features, as is clear from the fact 
that the mapping between them is a homomorphic mapping: a mapping 
that preserves structure. 
 The axiomatic characterizations of RTM are distinctively structural: 
the axioms characterize structures, that is, sets with relations and opera-
tions defined on them. This structural characterization turns out to be 
more abstract than the literalist construal of attributes as additive. An 
additive extensive structure, for example, is characterized by axioms 
describing a set with an ordering relation and a binary operation that sat-
isfy certain conditions. The binary operation does not have to be addition, 
even though numerical addition satisfies the axioms. But other binary 
operations, like multiplication, work just as well. A consequence of this 
axiomatic approach is that even though the numerical structure used to 
represent a particular attribute may be additive in the sense of involving 
the addition operation, the attribute thus represented might lack a con-
catenation operation or might lack a unique concatenation operation. 
RTM can thereby explain some of the anomalies encountered under the 
additivity paradigm. Length and electrical resistance have additive exten-
sive structures because they satisfy the abstract axioms specifying such 
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structures. It turns out that they can do so in different ways depending on 
the empirical set-up chosen, but since the mapping is not thought to hold 
between a particular concatenation operation and numerical addition, 
instead holding in virtue of the satisfaction of the axioms, these cases are 
no longer anomalies under the new paradigm. 
 Moreover, since RTM describes a wide range of different structures, 
only some of which are characterized by axioms involving binary oper-
ations, RTM can allow for the numerical representation of attributes 
like temperature and other “intensive” quantities. RTM thereby avoids 
the constraints placed on numerical representation by the additivity 
paradigm. 
 The resolution of the anomalies and the inclusion of non-additive attri-
butes is made possible by the move to a structural characterization of the 
target of measurement representations. Instead of literalism, which com-
mitted the additivity paradigm to the claim that measurable attributes 
must be additive like numbers, representationalism allows for a variety 
of ways in which attributes can have structures that satisfy specific axi-
oms. Since the representation theorem shows that structures satisfying 
the axioms are representable by certain numerical structures (because 
it is possible to construct a structure-preserving map from the empiri-
cal to the numerical structure), the structural characterization is key to 
the representational theory. RTM assumes that what makes numerical 
representations possible is a structural similarity between numbers (and 
the relations and operations defined on them) and attributes, like mass 
or temperature (and the empirical relations and operations available for 
collections of objects instantiating them). Moreover, to decide when two 
numerical representations should count as notational variants of each 
other, RTM asks whether the two representations preserve the same 
structure. This is done through the uniqueness theorem, which compares 
homomorphic mappings to one another. 10 Structure that is invariant 
across different mappings is considered an objective feature of the attri-
bute in question. 
 RTM can therefore be described as a form of structural realism about 
representation: structural commonalities among representations of the 
same attribute are indicative of objective or genuine features of the attri-
bute, whereas features that vary in different representations (such as a 
change in unit) are to be regarded as conventional artifacts. Like struc-
tural realism, RTM assumes that there is a clear distinction between ele-
ments of the representation that correspond to features of the represented 
attribute and elements of the representation that are due to convention 
only; moreover, the features that correspond to features of the attribute 
are  structural features only. Structural features are here once again  rela-
tions , in contrast to haecceitistic features. Structural correspondence, as 
demonstrated through structure-preserving mappings, makes for success-
ful representation for RTM. 
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 5 Keeping Things in Perspective 
 RTM seems to be committed to a form of structural realism about 
numerical representation, and insofar as RTM is the most developed 
framework for measurement representations, this would suggest that 
structural realism provides an adequate account of numerical representa-
tion. Before drawing that conclusion, however, we must ask how widely 
accepted the representationalist paradigm for measurement theory is. 
Few would argue with the claim that the representationalist theory of 
measurement, especially as presented in  Foundations of Measurement , 
constitutes the most thorough formal treatment of “measurement struc-
tures” and their numerical representation. Nonetheless, representational-
ism is not without critics, with a main line of criticism being whether 
representationalism truly amounts to a theory of  measurement ( Savage 
and Ehrlich 1992 ). This criticism seems even more pertinent given that 
RTM has not had as much of an impact on research practice in fields like 
psychology as might have been expected ( Cliff 1992 ). While there are 
several aspects of measurement practice that seem to receive relatively 
little attention on the representationalist view, for the purposes of per-
spectivalism the most interesting criticism concerns the question of how 
we decide whether a given attribute satisfies the axioms for a particular 
measurement structure. 
 The application of the representationalist framework in any given sci-
entific context requires three steps: one conceptual, the other two math-
ematical ( Luce et al. 1990 , 201). The first step (i) is to determine  whether 
an attribute of interest satisfies the axioms for a given measurement 
structure. Once this has been established, the representationalist frame-
work can then be used to show (ii)  that a numerical representation of the 
attribute is possible and (iii)  how unique that representation is. Steps (ii) 
and (iii) are important for establishing which scale type is appropriate for 
the attribute and which inferences can be drawn from the representation. 
The representationalist theory of measurement provides detailed proofs 
of representation and uniqueness theorems for wide range of axiomati-
cally characterized measurement structures, which ensures that steps (ii) 
and (iii) are clearly justified in setting up a numerical representation. 
However, RTM has very little to say about the very first step. 
 To establish that an attribute of interest can be numerically represented, 
we need to know whether we have reason to believe that the attribute 
satisfies the axioms for some measurement structure. If such reasons can 
be found, then RTM simply provides steps (ii) and (iii). Whether such 
reasons can be found, however, will depend both on empirical observa-
tions and theoretical assumptions. Some of the theoretical assumptions 
are “inductive.” Suppose we have found a means to concatenate objects 
systematically for a finite range of magnitudes for a given quantity and 
that these concatenations do indeed yield “sums.” We might then wish 
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to extend the assumption that magnitudes of this quantity are additive 
beyond the range for which we are able to carry out empirical concat-
enations. This is the type of assumption that leads us to conclude that 
mass satisfies the axioms for additive extensive structures, even though 
we have only concatenated a limited number of massive objects and even 
though some types of massive objects, like planets, eschew concatenation 
altogether. Another type of theoretical assumption concerns the depen-
dence of quantities on other quantities, a situation commonly exploited 
in “indirect” or “non-fundamental” measurement. In these cases, the 
structure of one of the attributes is inferred from its nomic relationship 
to other attributes whose structure is presumed to be known. This situ-
ation is common for many measurements in physics, for example, for 
the measurement of temperature using the relationship between pressure, 
temperature, and volume. But how can we establish that such a nomic 
relationship indeed holds, without being able to measure each quantity 
independently? 11 
 Much of the dispute in sciences like psychology and in other fields 
concerns precisely the question whether we are justified in assuming that 
a particular attribute indeed satisfies the axioms for a particular measure-
ment structure. Reasons to support such a claim are never free from theo-
retical assumptions of the sort mentioned and can hence be contested. 
This theory dependence opens the door for a more perspectivalist reading 
of measurement representations. 
 The perspectivalist reading begins from the observation that an axi-
omatic structure by itself does not represent anything in particular. To 
be a representation of a particular attribute or empirical structure, the 
axiomatic structure needs to be interpreted. This interpretation connects 
aspects of the phenomenon of interest to the axioms characterizing that 
abstract structure. For measurement structures the interpretation will 
involve characterizing the phenomenon or attribute of interest as hav-
ing a certain structure ( van Fraassen 2008 ). Interpretations like these, 
as we have just seen, can be contested because they make theoretical 
assumptions. 
 Philosophers sometimes seem to think of interpretation as the task of 
finding a suitable empirical interpretation for an otherwise unspecified 
axiomatic structure. But while this highlights the way in which axioms 
leave their interpretations unspecified, this is not the way most scientists 
encounter the problem. Quite the reverse. Scientists typically start from an 
attribute or phenomenon they wish to represent numerically. The question 
is,  which structural representation is appropriate? Ostensibly the same 
attribute (e.g., utility or temperature) or phenomenon (e.g., light or water) 
is given different structural characterizations in the context of different 
theories. For example, Bradford Skow has argued that thermodynam-
ics only provides very weak reasons for thinking that temperature has a 
metric structure (either an absolute difference or a ratio scale structure), 
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whereas statistical mechanics provides strong reasons for thinking that 
temperature has metric structure ( Skow 2011 ). Which (measurement) 
structure we are justified in ascribing to temperature, then, depends on 
our theory of temperature. 
 This type of theory dependence looks like the theory dependence of 
other types of scientific representation. Recall the models of water as a 
fluid and as a collection of particles we briefly discussed at the beginning. 
Traditional realists will suggest that at most one of these models correctly 
represents water, whereas perspectivalists suggest that each offers an 
informative perspective on water. Similarly, for the case of temperature, 
a traditional realist will be inclined to suggest that statistical mechanics 
provides the correct account of what temperature is and, hence, the cor-
rect assignment of structure to temperature. By contrast, a perspectivalist 
will insist that we take seriously both the thermodynamic and statistical 
mechanical perspectives on temperature. Either way, the structural real-
ism embedded in RTM does not tell us whether to go with traditional 
realism or perspectivalism on this point, since RTM does not deal with 
the question of how to decide which structure to ascribe to particular 
attributes. 
 Perspectival realists differ in their responses to the problem of incon-
sistent models (compare, for example, the difference between  Giere 2006 
and  Massimi 2018b ). In the case of different measurement structures 
ascribed to temperature, it is tempting to conclude that, since statisti-
cal mechanics is a more fundamental theory than thermodynamics, we 
should simply go with the structure ascribed to temperature by statistical 
mechanics. This reading seems even more compelling when we remember 
that in this case the two structures ascribed to temperature are not strictly 
speaking incompatible. After all, the metric structure ascribed to tem-
perature by statistical mechanics is simply stronger than the mere ordinal 
structure implied by thermodynamics: an attribute that possesses metric 
structure also possesses ordinal structure. Semantically, then, we should 
accept the structural realists’ claim that the structure of the numerical 
representation corresponds to the structure of the attribute. Which rep-
resentation is adequate is then a question of what structure the attribute 
actually has. Structural realism here looks very much like traditional 
realism in its commitment to a correspondence between features of the 
representation and features of the represented attribute. The only differ-
ence between structural realism and traditional realism is that structural 
realism restricts this correspondence to structure only. 
 Perspectival realism has a different contribution to make, however. 
As  Massimi (2012 ) has argued, perspectivalism contributes to the realist 
quest by supplying the relevant notion of justification. To be realists, not 
only do we need to have a realist semantics of the relevant representa-
tions, but we also need a realist epistemology that distinguishes justified 
from unjustified beliefs about the phenomena and entities in question. 
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The justification (as opposed to the aptness) of a belief, according to 
Massimi, is a matter of coherence with a given scientific perspective. 
 This notion of perspectival justification is relevant for the case of the 
attribution of measurement structures. The literalist additivity paradigm 
proceeded from the assumption that the availability of an empirical con-
catenation operation was both necessary and sufficient for an attribute to 
qualify as a quantity. No other justification could be given for represent-
ing an attribute numerically. The additivity paradigm thereby provided a 
universal criterion for quantitativeness, with no room for different theo-
retical approaches. On the representational theory, this requirement has 
been given up, but at the cost of leaving open how we should justify 
ascribing a specific structure to an attribute. Perspectival realism (of the 
epistemic variety) fills in the gap. Measurement structure is ascribed to 
an attribute from within a scientific perspective, such as thermodynam-
ics or statistical mechanics. The ascription of a particular measurement 
structure to a given attribute has to cohere with the relevant theoretical 
background commitments and beliefs. While many scientists speculated 
that temperature might have a metric structure even before the advent of 
statistical mechanics (see  Skow 2011 for discussion), it is only from the 
perspective of statistical mechanics that such an ascription is justified. 
 Since RTM is silent on the question of how to justify the attribution 
of measurement structures to attributes, the structural realism at work 
in RTM is insufficient to satisfy the realist quest for measurement rep-
resentations. Structural realism only provides the realist semantics for 
measurement representations, since it specifies which features of the 
numerical representation correspond to features of the attribute. Per-
spectival realism is needed to complement this picture, since perspectival 
realism provides a notion of epistemic justification for attributions of 
measurement structures that makes sense of the different attributions of 
measurement structures by different theories. 
 6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I looked at structural realism and perspectival realism 
initially as two competing responses to the plurality of scientific rep-
resentations. My focus has been on representations of measurement. I 
argued that literalism about measurement representations, which corre-
sponds to a traditional form of realism about representation, is inad-
equate. The representational theory of measurement, which provides a 
thoroughgoing account of numerical representations, implies structural 
realism about measurement representations. While RTM avoids some of 
the difficulties with the literalist reading, it needs to be supplemented 
with epistemic perspectival realism to account for the theory dependence 
of our justifications for ascribing particular measurement structures to 
attributes of interest. 
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 There is a broader, more speculative lesson we might learn from this 
case. At least in some cases, structural realism and perspectival realism are 
not competing realist accounts of representation but instead offer comple-
mentary pieces in the realist quest. Structural realists do well in supplying 
a more appropriate notion of correspondence between representation and 
represented phenomenon by freeing representation from literalism. Per-
spectival realists, on the other hand, provide an account of the justifica-
tion of using different representations of ostensibly the same phenomenon 
or attribute. This is important since, even after all equivalent (numerical) 
representations have been explained by structural realism, different scien-
tific theories still ascribe different structures to the same attribute. 
 Notes 
  1 . There are non-realist versions of both structuralism and perspectivalism, 
which I do not have room to discuss explicitly in this chapter. These views 
share the respective structural and perspectival outlook on scientific repre-
sentation (discussed in the next section) but without any commitment to a 
form of scientific realism. 
 2 . As with any view in philosophy, there are in-house disputes among structural 
realists and perspectival realists. Since my main purpose here is to contrast 
the two different approaches, I shall set aside the finer points of disagreement 
in each camp. 
 3 . The question of whether haecceitistic differences matter in the context of quan-
tum particles is discussed in, for example,  French (1989 ) and  Huggett (1999 ). 
 4 . For discussions of this example, see  Morrison (1999 ) and  Teller (2001 ). 
  5 . Quantities that behave like density and temperature have sometimes been 
called “intensive quantities,” in contrast to extensive quantities like mass and 
volume. The distinction between intensive and extensive quantities is not 
always clearly defined, nor is it uncontested.  Tolman (1917 , 239) defined 
intensive quantities to be non-additive;  Suppes (1951 ), by contrast, replaces 
the additivity demand with the idea that extensive quantities are quantities 
that can be represented on ratio scales, whereas intensive quantities are only 
representable on weaker scales. 
 6 . For example, RTM describes a structure as a (closed) additive extensive 
structure, by providing a set of characteristic axioms ( Krantz et al. 1971 , 73): 
 Let A  be a nonempty set, ≿  a binary relation on A , and ∘  a closed binary 
operation on A.  The triple ⟨A, ≿, ∘⟩  is a closed extensive structure  iff the 
following four axioms are satisfied for all a, b, c, d, ∈ A: 
 1. Weak order: ⟨A, ≿⟩  is a weak order, i.e., ≿  is a transitive and con-
nected relation . 
 2. Weak associativity: a ∘ (b ∘ c) ∼ (a ∘ b) ∘ c. 
 3. Monotonicity: a ≿ b iff a ∘ c ≿ b ∘ c iff c ∘ a ≿ c ∘ b 
 4. Archimedean: If a ≻ b , then for any c, d ∈ A , there exists a positive 
integer n  such that na ∘ c ≿ nb ∘ d , where na  is defined inductively as: 
1a = a, (n + 1)a = na ∘ a. 
 7 . Traditionally these structures are understood as domains of concrete objects 
and “empirical,” that is, observable qualitative relations among them. This 
interpretation reflects the empiricist and operationalist commitments of the 
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founders of RTM, but it is not the only available interpretation. Instead the 
structures can be understood, for example, as sets of space-time points with 
relations among them ( Field 1980 ). 
  8 . As before, the concatenated object might be understood as two physical 
objects combined operationally (e.g., by placing two rods end to end). Cru-
cially, it is a mapping between an empirical or physical domain and a numeri-
cal (or mathematical) domain. 
  9 . I will return to the question of how we are justified in ascribing a particular 
structure to an attribute in section 5. 
 10 . The technical details of this comparison are a bit too elaborate to be included 
in the discussion here. For relevant literature, see  Luce, Krantz, Suppes, and 
Tversky (1990 ), especially chap. 20. 
 11 . For a detailed discussion of this problem in the case of temperature, see  Chang 
(2004 ). 
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 1 Bases for Perspectival Models 
 Recent years have witnessed a renaissance in “other-than-realist” approaches 
in the philosophy of science, whether pragmatist, instrumentalist, or one 
of many other -ists. Many of these approaches can be broadly understood 
as advocating some kind of perspectivism: roughly, the idea that scientific 
theories, models, knowledge, and claims are from a perspective, rather 
than necessarily expressing objective, universal truths. The idea that sci-
entific claims are perspectival does not automatically imply any kind of 
strong relativism about science, but it does imply that there are problems 
with naïve realism. Of course, this high-level characterization subsumes 
an enormous diversity of accounts, depending on the nature of a “per-
spective,” the reasons why science employs perspectives, the implications 
for scientific practice, and more. For example, a pragmatist philosophy of 
science might emphasize the necessary role of practical goals in our scien-
tific theories, while an instrumentalist philosophy of science might focus 
on the role of measurement methods and instruments. Nonetheless, both 
agree that science necessarily instantiates various perspectives, rather than 
consisting of universal truths. Overall, much of this other-than-realist phi-
losophy of science has emphasized either the nature of these perspectives 
in science or the methodological implications of such perspectives (though 
not always using the language of “perspectives”). 
 In this chapter, I aim to provide a detailed account of two reasons for 
perspectives in science. In general, perspectivist approaches in the philos-
ophy of science face a significant challenge, as these scientific perspectives 
must arguably be grounded in sources that are neither specific to the indi-
vidual nor high-level banalities. If the relevant perspectives are individual 
specific—that is, the relevant aspects of some scientific perspective are 
based on particular features of particular scientists or particular research 
groups—then we have an “unsafe” perspectivism. Such a view implies 
that science itself is dependent on local, contingent properties of specific 
people, and so we have as many sciences as we have scientists. Hyperlo-
cal perspectivism means that science does not provide us with a shared 
view of the world but rather personalized, individualized accounts. One 
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of the hallmarks of science, however, is supposed to be exactly its ability 
to produce objective accounts of the world (or, at least, more objective 
than ordinary cognition). At the same time, if we instead ground the per-
spectival nature of science in high-level claims about humans and our 
practices, then we risk having an “insubstantial” perspectivism. While it 
is true that science is done by bounded humans, this observation provides 
no insight or guidance into the nature of scientific perspectives. If we 
want our philosophical frameworks to be helpful in some way, then we 
should insist that any such account, including perspectivist ones, should 
consist of more than obvious truisms. 
 In contrast with both of these extremes, I argue here that the influences 
of scientific concepts and scientific goals imply that science is necessar-
ily, but also unproblematically, perspectival. My arguments will focus on 
the causes of perspectivism, and thus will not provide a definition of 
exactly what constitutes a perspective. Instead, this type of analysis aims 
to reveal some (though obviously not all) key perspectival features of 
science, which jointly imply that standard realist views cannot be cor-
rect. The resulting perspectivism provides specificity about the nature 
and impact of these factors and thereby provides substantive constraints 
and methodological implications for scientific practice. At the same time, 
this approach blurs the lines between scientific and everyday perspec-
tives, thereby implying that perspectivism in the philosophy of science 
is no more problematic than perspectivism about everyday perception. 
More precisely, these sources of perspectivism are not unique to scientific 
theories, knowledge, and beliefs but rather apply to their everyday coun-
terparts. That is, there is nothing special (with respect to these arguments) 
about science, and so the resulting perspectivism about science does not 
threaten a collapse into complete relativism (or at least, poses no more 
threat than we face about  all of our beliefs and knowledge). 
 I begin by examining these two sources of (scientific) perspectives in 
more detail: concepts in section 2 and goals in section 3. For both types 
of influences, I focus on the ways in which particular scientists’ concepts 
and goals impact their scientific theories, models, and knowledge. That 
is, my approach here employs (mostly) methodological individualism, 
as I largely focus on the influences of concepts and goals of particular 
scientists rather than the concepts and goals of scientific communities. 
In particular, notions such as paradigms, research programs, or similar 
group-level frameworks enter into this analysis through the cognition and 
activities of particular scientists rather than through some independent 
social existence. 1 Section 4 then takes up a more general discussion of the 
resulting scientific perspectivism, both characterizing it and showing that 
it blurs smoothly into more everyday, prosaic perspectivism. Thus, there 
is nothing to fear from (this kind of) scientific perspectivism: science does 
not provide an objective, universal mirror of the world, but its distortions 
are no more problematic than those of our ordinary, everyday perception 
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and cognition about the world. Yes, science is perspectival, but in a safe-
and-substantive way. 
 2 Sources of Perspectives: Concepts 
 Our scientific and everyday cognition is thoroughly conceptualized: our 
understanding of the world is almost entirely in terms of concepts 2 rather 
than some kind of unconceptualized, direct access to the world. There are, 
of course, numerous debates about whether  some aspect of (early) percep-
tion is perhaps nonconceptual (e.g.,  Dretske 1981 ;  Evans 1982 ;  Crane 
1992 ;  Peacocke 1992 , and many other papers in subsequent years), but 
there is no debate about whether our thinking inevitably involves con-
cepts and conceptualized content at some point. We acquire concepts from 
a very young age, and those concepts and conceptual frameworks are 
essentially ubiquitous in our cognition. These observations are no less true 
for scientific cognition, though scientific concepts are often more clearly 
articulated and more widely shared (in some sense) within the scientific 
community. 
 A common belief about concepts, at least those of the everyday sort, is 
that they simply provide a compact encoding of information about the 
world. On this view, concepts enable us to efficiently and quickly encode 
relevant information about the state and structure of our environment. 
For example, much of the psychological literature on concept acquisition 
emphasizes the tight connection between environmental statistics and 
learned concepts for those environments. This line of research empha-
sizes the ways in which concepts encode environmental regularities and 
thereby help to identify what is relevant, anomalous, and so forth. The 
underlying intuition is that one major function of concepts is to convert 
a messy, complex external world into cleaner, relatively more tractable 
cognitive representations. 
 This way of thinking about concepts suggests that they largely play 
a filtering role. In general, more compact representations will almost 
always involve a loss of information relative to the original, but the talk 
of statistical encoding (among other features) suggests that the loss might 
involve only irrelevant information. If that were correct, then concepts 
could be understood as a non-distorting information filter that provide 
a “mirror” of the world (at least, for all of the information that made 
it through the encoding process). Unfortunately, this line of thinking is 
mistaken: concepts do not simply filter information about the world but 
rather actively influence and transform that information. That is, con-
cepts distort the world (when compared to a mirror) and so constitute a 
substantive element of a perspective. Although there are many phenom-
ena to which one could point, I focus here on only three. 
 First, consider the phenomenon of categorical perception ( Harnad 
1987 ; Goldstone and Hendrickson 2010): at a high level, instances that 
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are close to a category boundary are perceived (in conscious cognition) 
as further from that boundary than they actually are. More precisely, 
when some instance  X is understood as falling under the concept  C , then 
the perception of  X is shifted toward the centroid (in the relevant feature 
space) of  C . Perhaps the best-known instance of categorical perception 
arises in phonemic discrimination. Many pairs of phonemes in a language 
will differ on only one acoustic dimension; for example, the phonemes /r/ 
and /l/ form such a pair. Individuals who learn at a sufficiently young age 
( Eimas, Siqueland, Jusczyk, and Vigorito 1971 ) a language in which these 
are distinct phonemes lose the ability to “hear” sounds that are interme-
diate between these phonemes. Instead, they hear intermediate sounds as 
something much closer to the central phoneme sound. Moreover, these 
unconscious discriminations are resistant (though not immune) to altera-
tion through training ( Strange and Dittmann 1984 ). More importantly 
for our present purposes, “hearing” a sound as a particular phoneme 
involves a distortion of the world: the experienced sound is simply not 
a mirror of the acoustic properties of (that part of) the world. Rather, 
categorical perception involves changes to the closeness relations of vari-
ous stimuli and, more generally, a shift in the perceived “location” in 
perceptual space ( Goldstone 1994 ;  Livingston, Andrews, and Harnad 
1998 ). This type of categorical perception is not limited to phonemic 
discrimination but rather arises for a very wide range of concepts, argu-
ably every concept that has a perceptual component. Our concepts and 
categories have been shown to (directly) influence our experience of the 
world in perceptual modalities such as visual perception ( Livingston et al. 
1998 ), as well as more complex, not purely perceptual concepts ( Etcoff 
and Magee 1992 ). 
 This focus on “distortions” due to primarily perceptual concepts might 
seem irrelevant to most of our scientific cognition. As the second exam-
ple shows, however, expertise can play a significant role in the concepts 
we form and therefore the ways that the world appears to us. As just 
one example,  Medin, Lynch, Coley, and Atran (1997 ) showed that the 
plant-related concepts of park maintenance workers are quite different 
from the plant-related concepts of taxonomists. That is, people whose 
job required a focus on the ecological niche of park trees had significantly 
different concepts than people whose job required a focus on genetic 
or biological relationships. Moreover, those different concepts made a 
behavioral difference in reasoning, inference, and descriptions, and are 
not intertranslatable in any straightforward way; they carve up the world 
in different terms. Of course, while concepts do more than just repre-
sent summary statistics, they also do have that representational function. 
Thus, as someone gains more experience and expertise in a domain, her 
concepts can significantly shift as she learns more about the relevant sum-
mary statistics. This conceptual change would not necessarily be an issue, 
except that those same concepts influence both basic perceptions (see the 
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previous paragraph) and more complex, conscious cognitions ( Cohen, 
Dennett, and Kanwisher 2016 ). Thus, conceptual change can have quite 
wide-ranging and hard-to-predict impacts on other concepts. Of course, 
all of these observations do not mean that concepts are somehow non-
veridical ( Cohen 2015 ), but rather that the content of the concepts—both 
perceptual and cognitive content—is not what we might expect. In par-
ticular, that content does not provide a simple mirror of the world in the 
way assumed by simple realist models, whether of perception, cognition, 
or even science. 
 As a third demonstration of the perspectival nature of concepts, con-
sider our episodic memories of particular experiences, such as my memory 
of eating breakfast this morning. A common view of episodic memories 
(at least, within people who do not study memory) is that they involve 
relatively direct recall of the earlier events. Of course, that recall is subject 
to many types of noise and error, and so our memories need not be par-
ticularly accurate. However, this noise is (on the common view) largely 
independent of the content of the memories, though it can depend on the 
circumstances in which the memory is initially encoded (e.g., emotionally 
laden events are often thought to be more likely to be correctly encoded 
and recalled). However, there is now substantial research demonstrating 
that episodic memories involve a process of reconstruction, not simply 
one of recall. For example, our memory of an event at some past time 
is “recalled” using the concepts that we have now ( Schacter, Norman, 
and Koutstaal 1998 ;  Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000 ). Hence, if our 
concepts change between the time of the events and the recall time, then 
the memory will shift along with the conceptual change. Alternately, if 
we are asked to recall whether we have previously seen particular images, 
then we will make more errors on previously unseen images that are 
close to actual prior images when both are not too far from the concept 
centroid ( Koutstaal and Schacter 1997 ). The distortions in our episodic 
memories are not ubiquitous or uniform but rather depend on relatively 
fine-grained details of our concepts at that later moment in time. 
 One might object that these roles of concepts fall under ordinary, garden-
variety theory-ladenness of observation. Philosophers of science long ago 
became used to the idea that our theories, including our concepts, influence 
our observations ( Hanson 1958 ;  Kuhn 1962 ). For example, we look at a 
needle deflection and instead “see” an atom undergoing radioactive decay, 
or we look through a microscope at some squiggles and “see” a cancer cell. 
The observations that we qua scientists record and use in our scientific 
practices are themselves conceptualized by the scientific concepts in our 
theories. Hence, this section might appear to be much ado about nothing. 
In response, we should first note that at least one conception of theory-
ladenness of observation does not fit with the phenomena described in 
this section: namely, scientific concepts (and the theories from which they 
are built) cannot simply act as a “filter” that identifies certain features or 
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properties as bundled together in a concept and thereby ignores the oth-
ers. In the examples above, the act of “seeing” a cancer cell is not simply a 
categorization judgment; rather, as with other kinds of concepts, we should 
expect that this act will also distort (relative to more objective measures) 
the perceptions of the squiggles in a top-down way. 
 Observations are not merely theory-laden but rather are theory- shaped 
or theory- distorted . Our understanding of human concepts implies that 
our scientific observations should be pulled toward the centroid of the 
relevant concepts; shaped by the functions for which we use those con-
cepts; and potentially, even unknowingly, revised over time as the sci-
entific concepts shift. More generally, the role of concepts that I have 
outlined in this section is significantly more active than one often finds 
in discussions of the theory-ladenness of observations. At the same time, 
I grant that everything I have written to this point is consistent with a 
philosophical account of theory-ladenness that is based on the fact that 
we humans perceive the world in ways that are distorted (depending on 
our concepts), and so scientific perception is distorted. However, such 
philosophical accounts are often used to argue for a broader type of rela-
tivism or incommensurability ( Kuhn 1962 ;  Feyerabend 1975 ;  Longino 
1990 ) and so contrast with the larger, non-relativist view that I develop 
here (see section 4). 
 3 Sources of Perspectives: Goals 
 A second set of causes of the perspectival nature of science—again not 
constitutive of those perspectives—is the goals and intended functions 
or tasks of scientists. That is, I contend in this section that our cognition 
about the world is deeply shaped, and arguably distorted in key ways, 
by the goals that we have or the tasks that we believe we will need to 
perform in the future. One might immediately object that this proposal 
cannot be right, as goals should only enter into our cognition (whether 
scientific or not) when we are engaged in reasoning and decision-making. 
This “standard view” holds that our learning and conceptualization of 
the world aim solely to reflect the structure, both causal and statisti-
cal, of the learning environments. Of course, as we saw in the previous 
section, concept learning can lead to perceptions that are distorted in 
various ways, but the standard view holds that those distortions are not 
driven by goals. That is, the core content of our concepts should, on this 
view, be goal-free. Many standard cognitive models of learning embody 
this standard view: Bayesian learning algorithms, neural networks, and 
most computational models of learning all mirror environmental statis-
tics without regard to goals. 3 On this view, goals enter into cognition only 
after we have learned concepts that roughly mirror the world. 
 While this standard view is appealing in many ways, it is arguably not 
normatively justified. If a cognitive system, whether human or other, has 
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to interact with its world, then the ultimate measure of its learning will 
be whether the learned content enables the system to succeed. For exam-
ple, if the system should select option  A anytime the perceived object is 
between 0 cm and 2 cm long, then there is no extra value to encoding 
the precise length, rather than only the fact that the object falls into the 
relevant interval ( Danks 2014 ;  Wellen and Danks 2016 ). Moreover, if 
the system exhibits any noise in its decision-making processes, then there 
can actually be an incentive to “misperceive” the object as being further 
from the decision boundary than it actually occurs, as that misperception 
will increase the likelihood of the system answering correctly ( Hoffman, 
Singh, and Prakash 2015 ;  O’Connor 2014 ). For example, an object that 
is 1.9 cm ought to be perceived as closer to 1.5 cm if the decision bound-
ary is set at 2 cm, though that same shift ought not occur (to a noticeable 
degree) if the decision boundary is set at 10 cm. More generally, there is a 
normative argument that cognitive systems ought to sometimes be indif-
ferent to believing falsehoods and sometimes ought positively to believe 
falsehoods. For example, if some false belief fits more cleanly with our 
other knowledge (perhaps because of a shared structure or analogy) and 
that falsehood does not impair our ability to succeed at various goals, 
then we ought to go ahead and believe the falsehood. Of course, false-
hoods or inaccuracies that impair our ability to achieve our goals (what-
ever those might be) ought to be rejected during learning. Nonetheless, 
the door is open for goals possibly having a significant impact on our 
 learning , not solely our reasoning and decision-making. 
 In fact, the descriptive data reveal that people often do have these 
kinds of inaccurate or false beliefs, exactly when they do not impact our 
ability to achieve our goals. For example, if people are shown multiple 
sequences of numbers and asked to estimate which sequence has the larg-
est (or, alternately, smallest) average value, then they learn relatively little 
about the sequences that are clearly goal-irrelevant (e.g., low-magnitude 
sequences when the goal is to learn which has the largest mean), to the 
point of failing to distinguish between sequences that are easily distin-
guishable when they are goal-relevant ( Wellen and Danks 2014 ;  Wellen 
2015 ). In these studies the only variation between people is what goal 
they were provided in the experimental cover story, and so that is the 
only available explanatory factor for the significant differences in  learn-
ing , not simply reasoning. Alternately, if people have the goal of “learn 
to control a dynamical system,” then they learn relatively little about 
the underlying causal structure governing the system, even though they 
have no trouble with that given the goal of “learn the causal structure” 
( Hagmayer, Meder, Osman, Mangold, and Lagnado 2010 ). Many more 
examples of this type can be found in the empirical literature ( Ross 1997 , 
 1999 ,  2000 ;  Markman and Ross 2003 ). 
 Moreover, there are also cases of goal-determined learning of false-
hoods, not just failures to learn. For example,  Feltovich, Spiro, and Coulson 
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(1989 ) showed that many medical doctors (at that time) had incorrect 
beliefs about the causal direction between  heart size and  heart strength 
in congestive heart failure: the doctors believed that the causal connec-
tion was  size →  strength , but the actual physiology is  size ←  strength . 
Moreover, the true causal direction was known at the time of Feltovich, 
Spiro, and Coulson’s study; the relevant information was readily available 
to the medical doctors. However, the false belief had no practical impact 
given the medical technologies and interventions available to doctors at 
the time. And there were positive reasons for doctors to believe the false-
hood, as it fit cleanly with their knowledge about other muscles in the 
human body. Hence, if doctors have the goals of diagnosis and treatment 
while minimizing or reducing cognitive effort (given the complexity of the 
domain), then they ought and do learn a falsehood. Alternately, if people 
are charged with manipulating the world to bring about an outcome, then 
they will often systematically mislearn the causal structure of the world, 
though in exactly the right way to minimize the probability of incorrect 
action ( Nichols and Danks 2007 ). Again, we have a case in which the 
goals influence the learning in deep ways. 
 If all of this is correct, then we should expect our  scientific goals to 
impact our  scientific learning, whether to yield various inaccuracies 
(which are goal-irrelevant) or perhaps even justifiable falsehoods. One 
response would be to argue that scientists share a single goal—namely, 
to discover the truth—and so these observations about everyday learning 
are unproblematic: there will be no variation in what is learned (since we 
all have the same goal), and we ought not learn falsehoods (since that 
would fail to satisfy the goal). However, this single goal cannot actually 
be the guide to scientific learning, as we have no way of directly assessing 
whether we are moving closer or further from it; we have no Archime-
dean point from which to assess the truth or truth-aptness (or what-
ever concept one prefers) of our scientific theories ( Kitcher 1993 ;  Danks 
2015 ). Of course, the scientific community could perhaps have a single 
goal guiding all of their inquiries, though that goal cannot be “discover 
the truth.” Once we rule out this overarching truth-centric goal, though, 
then it is hard to imagine what that single goal might be. 
 Science instead arguably proceeds through convergence, as we employ 
multiple methodologies in the hope that they will imply the same theory, 
the same concepts, or the same representations of the world. When our 
multiple methods seemingly lead to the same answer, then we conclude 
that we must be tracking  something truthful about the structure of the 
world. Hence, our ability to “objectify” our measurements and conclu-
sions might be taken as evidence that goals are not actually playing a 
significant role in our scientific learning. As noted earlier, of course, the 
empirical phenomena discussed in this section do not imply that we should 
 always be learning falsehoods; sometimes, the best thing to learn might be 
the truth (at least, in experimental settings where we can talk sensibly 
about knowing the truth). The challenge is that we do not know a priori 
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whether we are in such a circumstance. Perhaps our goals either should 
or do instead lead us toward biased or distorted learning. Our mixture of 
scientific goals—prediction, explanation, discovery of unobservables, and 
so on—might be best satisfied by learning the truth (whatever that exactly 
means for the world), but we have no particular reason to expect that at 
the outset, nor do we have any way to test it. Moreover, the existence of 
a single best (scientific) theory is not informative in this regard: for any 
given goal or mixture of goals, there will typically be a unique theory that 
optimizes performance relative to that goal or goals ( Danks 2015 ). We 
know in advance that there will be a best theory relative to our scientific 
goal(s); we just do not know whether it will be the correct (or true) one. 
 These considerations seem to point, though, toward a reductio against 
my conclusion: (1) scientists clearly exhibit a diversity of goals in terms of 
what they are trying to explain or predict, even within a scientific domain; 
thus, if (2) different goals imply different concepts and theories, then we 
should expect diversity of scientific concepts; but (3) we are able to com-
municate and debate with one another in scientific contexts, and so we 
must not have this kind of conceptual diversity (and hence, proposition 
(2) must be incorrect). However, when we look at scientific practice, we do 
sometimes see exactly the kinds of diversity that proposition (3) denies. For 
example, consider the goal of explaining how people perform certain kinds 
of key cognitive operations, whether concept learning, decision-making, 
various predictions, or other cognition. This goal is actually ambiguous 
between explanations that are grounded in rational justifications about 
the limited nature of human cognition—so-called rational process theories 
( Denison, Bonawitz, Gopnik, and Griffiths 2013 ;  Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, 
and Tenenbaum 2014 )—and those based on descriptive, empirical observa-
tions and constraints—the process models traditionally developed by psy-
chologists to model the actual mechanisms of the mind. Crucially, scientists 
pursuing these two different subgoals have demonstrated exactly the pre-
dicted difficulties in communication, such as debates that seem to involve 
all parties talking past one another. Moreover, the core problem in the dis-
cussions between researchers with these two different goals is precisely that 
they do not agree about the standards for evaluating the proposals. Both 
sides are trying to answer questions about “how the mind actually does 
what it does,” but one side (rational process theorists) requires normative 
justification for the theory and the other (traditional process or mechanism 
modelers) requires precise empirical validation of the model. The different 
goals translate directly into different learnings and therefore into different 
understandings of the human mind. 
 4 Everyday Perspectivism 
 Given these observations, I propose that a perspective should include 
(though not necessarily be constituted by) the particular concepts, goals, 
and thus accompanying distortions. Importantly, this characterization 
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implies that every individual has a perspective, but perspectives are 
not relative to specific individuals. Two different people could have the 
same perspective, as long as they have the same (up to relevant noise, 
error, or change) concepts and goals. For example, we might plausibly 
think that members of a research group would likely share concepts 
and goals, as they work closely and presumably discuss what is meant 
by their terminology, and what standards or goals are relevant for their 
research. Since perspectives are individual-independent objects, they can 
be shared across many people; in fact, some measure of shared perspec-
tive is almost certainly required for certain types of debates. Moreover, 
perspectives can be judged against various standards, whether the goals 
that they contain or some other goal. If one thinks, for instance, that 
empirical prediction is a goal that should be part of every legitimate 
scientific perspective, then we can assess various putative perspectives 
according to that standard, even if the perspective is developed with 
emphases on other goals (e.g., explanatory power). In addition, this 
conception of a perspective implies that an individual’s history, relevant 
sociocultural factors, measurement methods, and so forth should all be 
rendered irrelevant once we know their concepts and goals. 4 Of course, 
an individual’s history matters, but on this account only inasmuch as 
that history leads to the individual having a particular set of concepts or 
because of the goals that the individual had at some earlier point in time. 
In particular, multiple individuals might share relevant aspects of their 
histories and so share some concepts and goals. 
 The concept- and goal-based perspectivism that I have outlined here is 
thus “safe” in the sense that it does not automatically lead to a descent 
into hopeless relativism. For most interesting scientific domains and research 
challenges, the practices of scientific training (which arguably homogenize 
the community along the lines of concepts and goals) and also people’s 
shared cognitive architectures (by virtue of being human beings) should 
lead to most scientists having, in practice, relatively similar perspectives. 
There is little reason to think that multiple scientists’ concepts or goals 
are so different as to imply that there are substantively distinct perspec-
tives. Moreover, the world “gets a say” in the perspectives, as there will 
typically be a normatively unique (or close to unique) set of concepts and 
theories for a set of goals in a scientific domain, though we might not, 
in practice, be able to determine that set. Relatedly, our concepts are not 
arbitrary or ungrounded in experience but rather are learned from expe-
rience. We cannot simply invent and use whatever perspective we might 
want. Rather, we are significantly constrained by the world in terms of 
the acceptable perspectives, at least once we have specified the relevant 
goals (and sometimes some auxiliary concepts). 
 At the same time, this type of perspectivism is substantive, as it is not 
simply the banality that “humans do science” (and so science is done 
from the “human” perspective). Rather, this perspectivism is grounded in 
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features of human cognitive processing and representations: the details 
of our shared cognitive architecture matter and can ground predictions 
about the types of scientific perspectives that we ought to have given our 
scientific goals and experiences. Moreover, as noted above, different sci-
entific goals can lead to substantively different (normative) perspectives, 
along with the very real possibility of non-unifiability of the correspond-
ing scientific theories. That is, this perspectivism can potentially lead to 
pluralism, though the details matter in terms of predicting whether and 
when pluralism might arise. 5 More generally, this perspectivism implies 
that “mirror realism” should not necessarily be correct in many cases, but 
rather we should expect—particularly for sciences that are more focused 
on measuring and controlling rather than explaining—to find theories 
that turn out to have various (defensible) misconceptions or falsehoods. 
There are thus multiple ways in which this type of perspectivism makes 
substantive claims (that could potentially have turned out to be wrong). 
 The careful reader will have noticed that nothing I said in the preceding 
few paragraphs was actually specific to scientific learning and theorizing. 
Exactly the same points could be made about everyday learning and the-
orizing. The perspectivism that I defend here results naturally for almost 
any cognitive agent that must learn about its world and then reason to try 
to achieve particular goals. For example, our “theories” about the spatial 
environments in which we move ought, on this account, to be expected 
to be perspectival in various ways in light of the goals we typically have 
when navigating those environments ( Maguire et al. 2000 ;  Maguire, 
Woollett, and Spiers 2006 ). More generally, I contend that we should 
embrace the type of perspectivism that I defend here, partly because we 
are all already (or should be) perspectivists about our engagement with 
the everyday world. Our perspectivism about everyday experiences is (or 
should be) similarly safe-and-substantive: we are not forced into strong 
relativism or skepticism about the world, since the world “gets a say” in 
our perceptions; but we are also not left with vacuous claims about our 
“contributions” to our understanding of the world. 
 In this regard, this perspectivism fits closely with the type of view advanced 
by  Chirimuuta (2016 ). She argues that advocates of scientific perspectiv-
ism should base their metaphors and analogies on haptic perception, or 
perception by touch, rather than visual perception. Haptic perception is 
clearly mediated by the particular sense organs, rather than purporting to 
give a “mirror” (perhaps with a subset filter) of the world. We are not 
under any illusions that our touch-based understanding of the world pro-
vides some kind of direct access. Moreover, haptic perception is clearly 
action-driven: our touch perception is intimately connected with our 
abilities to influence, move, and manipulate objects in our environment. 
That is,  Chirimuuta’s (2016 ) argument depends on perspectives having 
exactly the same components that I have discussed here—concepts (so no 
mirroring) and goals (so actions). More generally, our arguments share 
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the high-level idea that scientific perspectivism is a special case of the 
perspectivism that arises in our everyday lives. And just like our everyday 
perspectivism, our scientific perspectivism is as safe-and-substantive as 
our views about people, penguins, and puppies. 
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 Notes 
 1 . Where appropriate, I will note places that this methodological individualism is 
potentially limiting or distorting. 
 2 . For the purposes of this chapter, I will not worry about the distinctions and 
relationships between concepts and categories. 
 3 . Importantly, this generalization only holds for models that do not incorporate 
a decision-theoretic action component into the learning system. 
 4 . Note that my assumption of methodological individualism is doing substan-
tive work here. To the extent that we want to talk about the perspective of a 
community, then we plausibly have to include external factors of the sort that 
are often lumped together under terms like “paradigm” or “research program.” 
 5 . It is also unclear whether this “non-unifiability” is problematic, at least if we 
adopt a thoroughgoing goal-based perspectivism about scientific theories. I 
have elsewhere ( Danks forthcoming ) argued that the pragmatic perspectivist 
will almost always have exactly as much unifiability as she wants or needs, 
even if that falls short of the realist’s demands. 
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 1 Perspectivism and the Demands of Simplification 
 It is a frequently stated fact that the human brain is the most complicated 
object in the known universe; yet it is unclear whether or not this “fact” 
is a by-product of human vanity or hype drummed up by neuroscientists. 
To the neurologist Kurt Goldstein, it was not obvious that an inverte-
brate is more simple than a man, and for that reason he saw no obstacle 
to selecting the human being as his model organism ( Goldstein 1939 , 2). 1 
 The point is that, since everything in nature is in its own way compli-
cated, claims for complexity need to be made specific. Here I will argue 
that an important respect in which the brain is complex is that it is  Hera-
clitean . By this I mean that the brain, like the Heraclitean river, is the 
kind of thing that can only maintain its identity by undergoing continual 
change. John  Dupré (2012 ) has argued that all living organisms should be 
characterized in this way, that is, as processes rather than entities. In addi-
tion, Peter  Godfrey-Smith (2016 ) proposes that the Heraclitean nature 
of biological cells has important implications for how we understand 
cognition: it is the important difference between the nervous system and 
man-made computers. 
 The fact that the brain is made of living tissue such as neurons (an 
electrically excitable type of biological cell) means that its constitution is 
constantly changing with metabolism. As  Marder and Goaillard (2006 , 
563) describe it, “each neuron is constantly rebuilding itself from its con-
stituent proteins, using all of the molecular and biochemical machinery 
of the cell.” Godfrey-Smith’s idea is that the inherent changeability of 
biological tissue was leveraged during the evolution of the nervous sys-
tem as a means for learning and coping with the challenge of staying alive 
in an unstable world, and is an important factor in making biological 
“computation” what it is. This, he argues, puts limits on the functional 
equivalence between brains and artificial computers. 
 Looking outside the cranium, John  Haugeland (1996 ) has argued that 
the fact that the brain is densely interconnected with a mobile body, itself 
operating in an ever-changing environment, means that the mappings 
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between “inner” neural states and “external” consequences may be con-
stantly evolving. This is more contentious than the biological argument 
because, as we will see, the empirical evidence for the presence or lack of 
stable mappings is not conclusive. 
 What is uncontroversial, however, is that science thrives when com-
plex things can be made to seem simple. Various authors have made 
the case that complex systems, especially those studied in the biological 
and behavioral sciences, afford modeling from a variety of perspectives 
because no one set of theoretical or experimental practices gives the sci-
entist access to all of the relevant phenomena in the domain of interest. 2 
Here I build on this work by emphasizing not only the way that scientific 
perspectives “passively” filter out details not relevant to their own theory 
and practice but also the way that they “actively” impose simplifying 
assumptions onto the target system. 3 
 My case study in section 2 presents the ongoing controversy between 
two perspectives on the motor cortex as amounting to a difference in 
choice of methods selected to cope with the brain’s Heraclitean nature. 
The assumptions embedded in each modeling perspective are effective 
ways to simplify the brain, but they lead to views about the function of 
the motor cortex that are apparently contradictory. In section 3 I discuss 
the philosophical implications of this clash of perspectives. Does it fol-
low that there are non-perspectival truths about the motor cortex (and 
by extension, the primate brain) that are unknowable to science? In sec-
tion 4, I voice some support for this Kantian conclusion by presenting 
a general framework for thinking about the operation of abstraction in 
science. 
 2 Two Perspectives on the Motor Cortex 
 Since everything in nature is complicated in its own way, it is important to 
recognize simplicity for what it is: something manufactured by means of 
the scientific method, both materially (in the setting up of laboratory con-
dition) and conceptually (by devising abstract and idealized mathematical 
representations;  Cartwright 1999 ). Take the proverbial Heraclitean flux: 
“on those stepping into rivers staying the same other and other waters 
flow” ( Graham 2015 ). The scientist dipping her toe in the waters finds, 
indeed, that in a global sense the river stays the same and there is a regu-
larity to its undulations; yet, the constituents of the river in terms of which 
she would wish to explain its global properties and regularities are them-
selves ever changing. This poses a challenge which can be met with various 
strategies, two of which I will discuss here because they are analogs to the 
two perspectives on the motor cortex that form my case studies. 
 The first strategy is to approximate to stasis. One constructs a model 
of the river at a snapshot in time, ignoring its dynamics and changes in 
composition. The other strategy is to find simple flow patterns. In this 
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case the dynamics are the target of the model, but rather than attempting 
to represent every tiny current and eddy, one seeks a compact representa-
tion of only the major currents that may be repeatedly observed (such as 
the one parallel to the bank) and any due to large features (such as islets 
in the stream). 
 Likewise, when neuroscientists take on the challenge of modeling 
the Heraclitean brain, a popular strategy is to assume that the response 
properties of neurons are approximately fixed—that the neural system 
is one with stable input-output relationships, which can be represented 
as a mathematical function. In essence, the proposal is that each neuron 
represents or codes for some state of affairs in the extra-cranial world. 
This is the  intentional perspective . An alternative is to model the dynami-
cal evolution of the neural system but to seek a relatively simple set of 
equations governing it. This is the  dynamical perspective , and it often 
(but not always) comes with the denial that neurons code for or represent 
anything. The neuroscience of the motor cortex is a particularly apt topic 
here, because there has been a long-standing and often heated dispute 
over what the function of this brain area is, leading the scientists them-
selves to be explicit in stating and arguing for their different theoretical 
perspectives. 4 
 2.1 The Intentional 5 Perspective 
 Near the start of his lecture arguing that the basis of the success of the 
exact sciences is their ability to find “economical” representations of phe-
nomena, Ernst  Mach (1895 , 186) tells us 
 “Life understands not death, nor death life.” . . . Yet in his unceasing 
desire to diminish the boundaries of the incomprehensible, man has 
always been engaged in attempts to understand death by life and life 
by death. 
 With these words, Mach foresaw why the information-processing and 
intentional approach would be such a dominant force in the neuroscience 
of the future. The point is that even though the living brain is inherently 
Heraclitean, treating it as functionally equivalent to a non-living sym-
bolic system (a computer) has been an effective way to abstract away 
from the fluid details of neural hardware. 
 Some of the founders of computational neuroscience, such as Rashevsky, 
McCulloch, and Pitts, were quite self-aware about the purpose of this kind 
of abstraction and idealization ( Abraham 2002 ). 6 On the other hand, neu-
roscientists and philosophers under the influence of functionalist theories 
of mind have had more of a tendency to interpret the brain-computer 
analogy in a literal way: to treat even rough functional equivalence as 
an indicator of sameness at a higher level of description, namely, at the 
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level of the coding scheme or algorithm that both systems are said to 
implement. 
 The intentional perspective on the motor cortex is comparable to the 
“fixed filters” model of the visual system. 7 The core assumption is that 
individual neurons represent or code some parameters relevant to move-
ments in specific body parts. These may be individual muscle activations, 
sequences of muscle activations, or higher-order parameters such as the 
velocity of an arm movement. For example, the cosine tuning model of 
( Georgopoulos, Schwartz, and Kettner 1986 ) treats each motor cortical 
neuron controlling arm movement as firing maximally at its preferred 
direction of movement, with firing rate dropping away as a cosine func-
tion for non-preferred directions. One of the major difficulties for this 
perspective has been that neurophysiological recordings have yielded 
partial evidence for each of these hypotheses (and more) about what the 
motor cortex codes, leading to a lack of consensus within the intentional 
camp ( Omrani, Kaufman, Hatsopoulos, and Cheney 2017 ). Within the 
intentional tradition, trial-to-trial variability in neuronal responses is 
classified as  noise rather than as variance to be modeled and explained. 
This is in part for practical reasons (see section 2.2) and in part because a 
common assumption is that the neurons’ tuning properties are fixed, and 
so variability in responses is not coding anything. 
 The assumption that motor cortical neurons code for intended move-
ments has found a practical application in brain-computer interface 
(BCI) technologies that record from this brain region and employ decod-
ing algorithms on the data to derive signals for controlling a robot or 
cursor. However, it does not follow from the fact that neural data can be 
decoded in these experiments that the intentional models are realistic or 
even approximately true of the brain. Certain assumptions made by the 
decoding algorithms have been shown to be false with respect to neu-
rophysiology of the motor cortex, but during the experiments the brain 
adapts to biases introduced by the models ( Koyama et al. 2010 ). 
 2.2 The Dynamical Perspective 
 The dynamical perspective is the more recent arrival, though its advocates 
credit Thomas Graham Brown (1882–1965), an associate of Charles 
Sherrington, with having anticipated their central claim. Speaking of the 
spinal cord,  Brown (1914 , 40) writes, “the fundamental activity of this 
system is the rhythmic.” On the current view we are told that the motor 
cortex is a “pattern-generation machine” (Kaufman, quoted in  Omrani et 
al. 2017 , 1835). 
 One way to summarize the difference between the dynamical and the 
informational perspective is to say that the relationship of  causation 
(between neurons and bodily movements) replaces the intentional rela-
tion. While all agree that motor cortical activity is causally upstream of 
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movement, proponents of the dynamical view do not give this an inten-
tional spin (namely, positing that causal interactions between neurons and 
muscles are merely the medium of information transmission). Instead, 
they treat the cortex and muscles as coupled oscillatory systems and ask 
how the cortex orchestrates its sequence of oscillations (of neural popula-
tion firing) such that they eventually cause an intended sequence of muscle 
contractions. A basic intuition here is that the oscillations in populations 
of cortical neurons, at different frequencies and phases, are analogous to a 
Fourier basis set of sine waves, with which any irregular waveform can be 
approximated. Likewise, firing patterns in the motor cortex constitute a 
basis set that, when appropriately deployed, leads to the execution of the 
range of bodily movements. 
 Whereas the empirical support for the intentional perspective comes 
in the form of single neuron tuning curves for movement parameters, 
the dynamical view has relied on neural population data, processed 
to show low-dimensional structure. These kinds of data analyses have 
become common elsewhere in neuroscience with the increase in number 
of neurons simultaneously recorded; they are the characteristic meth-
ods of abstraction within the dynamical perspective. 8 If 100 neurons are 
recorded during one experimental trial (e.g., an arm reach), the resulting 
dataset has 100 dimensions (one neuron per dimension). But given the 
correlations between individual neurons, dimensionality reduction tech-
niques such as principle components analysis (PCA) or factor analysis 
can typically fit the data into a c.10 dimensional space. The dynamics are 
represented by plotting the activity of the neural population as a trajec-
tory through a low-dimensional state space. 
 One feature of the dynamical perspective is that single neurons lose 
their privileged status when neuroscientists set about trying to interpret 
cortical function. It is a prediction of this approach that the firing pat-
terns of many of the individual neurons will not be interpretable in terms 
of external parameters (Kaufman, quoted in  Omrani et al. 2017 , 1835). 
Furthermore,  Cunningham and Yu (2014 , 1501) make the important 
point that the shift to simultaneous population recordings makes it pos-
sible to investigate the causes of trial-to-trial variability, a component of 
the data that in single-neuron studies is bracketed as noise and dealt with 
by averaging across multiple trials. This is unavoidable due to the lack of 
the statistical power in single neuron data that would be needed to sup-
port any conclusions as to the source of variability. 
 Given that the alliance of population data and dynamical modeling 9 
has the potential to embrace and explain (rather than average away) some 
of the trial-to-trial variability in the brain’s responses, it may well seem 
that this perspective takes us closer to the truth of the Heraclitean brain. 
Indeed,  Haugeland (1996 , 123), in his recounting of Hubert Dreyfus’s 
challenge to the entire information-processing framework, tells us that a 
scenario in which there are no stable mappings between brain states and 
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motor outputs (such as letters typed on a keyboard) would completely 
undermine the notion of a neural code. The resulting picture of embod-
ied, embedded intelligence is one that has been promoted by some practi-
tioners of dynamical modeling in cognitive science. 10 However, it would 
be far too quick to argue from the existence of trial-to-trial variability in 
data recorded during repeated movements to the conclusion that there 
are no roughly stable mappings between patterns of motor cortex activ-
ity and resulting bodily movements, that the “content” of the activity 
patterns is entirely context dependent. For one thing, there are many neu-
rons for which the mappings are reliable enough so that averaging across 
trials reveals a preference for a particular direction of movement; this is 
the core result that undergirds the intentional perspective. Also, the cog-
nitive and body context is not the only source of variability; neurophysi-
ological recording techniques are also noisy, and so it is an open question 
how much trial-to-trial variability is due to behavioral context or due to 
the recording methods. 
 Now, a defender of Haugeland or Dreyfus may reply that if it were 
possible to observe the motor cortex during naturalistic movement con-
ditions, where cognitive and bodily context is uncontrolled—where 
attention wanders freely, and the posture of the rest of the body is not con-
strained by harnesses (as happens during experiments on arm-reaching in 
monkeys)—then the roughly stable mappings would dissipate and be seen 
for what they are: an artifact of laboratory conditions. This is an inter-
esting conjecture, because if the way that motor cortex activity maps to 
movement in naturalistic conditions is genuinely Heraclitean, while stabil-
ity is generated by the constraints of laboratory conditions, then it turns 
out that the dynamical perspective is not much better placed to represent 
the Heraclitean motor cortex, in all of its changeable glory, than the inten-
tional one. 
 The reasons are as follows. First, one aim of the population analyses 
performed by the dynamical camp is to identify reliable correlations 
between population (as opposed to single neuron) activity and move-
ments. Even though these correlations are interpreted causally rather than 
intentionally, and such mappings do not require that  individual neurons 
behave in the same way on each trial, so long as some global pattern 
of activity is maintained (e.g., a certain number of neurons oscillating in 
a particular way), the research program would be a non-starter if there 
were absolutely no consistent relationships between movements and neu-
ral activity, at any level of description. (This is perfectly consistent with 
the point made above, that given the statistical power afforded by multi-
neuron simultaneous recording, this approach makes it possible to explain 
some trial-to-trial variation in terms of behavioral or cognitive context.) 
 Second, just as the core findings of the intentional perspective (i.e., con-
sistent neuron-movement mappings) may be dependent on the fact that 
the neural responses are generated in controlled laboratory conditions, 
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the core findings of the dynamical perspective, that the population data 
can be represented in a low-dimensional state space, which yield hypoth-
eses about the relationship between global state and movement, may 
themselves be dependent on the same simplifications introduced in the 
laboratory. Surya Ganguli and colleagues have presented some formal 
results that, they argue, show that the low-dimensional structure revealed 
in neural population studies so far is due to the simplicity of tasks used 
in experiments (Gao and Ganguli 2015;  Gao et al. 2017 ; but see  Golub 
et al. 2018 ). The upshot is that even if the brain outside of the laboratory 
is truly Heraclitean in the way that Haugeland and Dreyfus propose, the 
very techniques used by neuroscientists, in order to observe its workings, 
tend to make its behavior less complex than this. The Heraclitean brain, 
one might say, is not an observable object of science. 
 3 Relating the Perspectives 
 Table 8.1 summarizes the main points of difference between the two per-
spectives. These concern kinds of experimental protocol and data analy-
sis as well as the original sources (beyond neuroscience) of the theoretical 
frameworks. The final line of the table states the two divergent claims 
about the function of the motor cortex that are made on the basis of these 
avenues of research: either that this brain area is specialized for coding 
movements or that it is a pattern generator. 
 One way to understand the lesson of perspectivism is that the picture of 
the world offered by science is like a cubist painting: a handful of different 
 Table 8.1 Comparison of Intentional and Dynamical Perspectives 
 Intentional Perspective  Dynamical perspective 
 Single neuron physiology  Simultaneous population recording 
 Represent responses with tuning curve  Represent responses with state space 
 trajectory 
 Intentional relationship between 
neurons and  movement 
 Causal relationship between neurons 
and  movement b 
 Computer science origin  Physics origin c 
 Formalism in information theory  Formalism in dynamical systems theory 
 Simplification via abstraction to 
coding  scheme 
 Simplification via dimensionality 
reduction 
 Inherently atemporal a  Inherently temporal 
 Motor cortex  codes movements  Motor cortex is a  pattern generator 
 a See  Beer and Williams (2015 , 5). They present a modified version of information theory 
that encompasses such temporal changes.
 b NB: in themselves the data only indicate that there are correlations between neuronal 
activity and movements. These relationships are then interpreted as intentional or causal 
ones.
 c  Fairhall (2014 , x). 
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points of view are employed at once, and reality comes through to us only 
as fragmented and distorted. We have no access to a God’s-eye view of 
nature, and science is not a clear, accurate depiction of reality. One might 
conclude, therefore, that from the dynamical perspective the motor cor-
tex is a pattern generator, and from the intentional one it is a system for 
coding movements, and that is the end of the story. 11 
 However, many would be dissatisfied if matters were left just there. 
There are unanswered questions about the relationship between the per-
spectives: Are they competitors or complementary to one another? Could 
one perspective ultimately subsume the other? Furthermore, an objection 
to the perspectivist conclusion, as just stated, is that it is just a version of 
relativism. Thus, it seems, we are owed a more rigorous notion of per-
spectival truth in order to avoid this outcome. In section 3.2, I will bring 
some options to the table here. Before that, I will examine the relation-
ship between the two perspectives. 
 3.1 Rivals or Allies? 
 A theme of Sandra  Mitchell’s (2003 ) account of integrative pluralism 
in science is that different perspectives are often complementary to one 
another, with one view compensating for the deficiencies of another, and 
cooperation across perspectives occurs when there is a practical challenge 
that cannot be addressed with one approach alone. Integration does not 
entail subsumption of one perspective by another; the various models, 
methods, and representations that constitute a perspective will retain 
their distinct identities. 12 In keeping with the claims of integrative plu-
ralism, neuroscientist Adrienne Fairhall has argued that an integration 
between dynamical and informational approaches is a crucial step in the 
progress of neuroscience: 
 Ultimately, the development of methods to map the dynamics of the 
physical substrate onto the computational is the bottleneck in our 
ability to truly comprehend the biological mechanisms of intelligence. 
 ( Fairhall 2014 , xi) 
 A condition of integrative pluralism is that there are pros and cons asso-
ciated with each perspective, and for that reason they mutually support 
one another. This raises the question of what the strengths and weak-
nesses of each of the motor cortex perspectives are. I argued above that 
the dynamical approach cannot be claimed to give us the unvarnished 
truth about the Heraclitean brain because of its reliance on finding low-
dimensional structures. That said, it is more faithful to the ever-flowing 
nature of brain processes than the intentional perspective, with its static 
way of conceptualizing neural functions. So why retain the intentional 
perspective now that the dynamical one has come of age? 
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 There is something important about the brain that the intentional per-
spective captures but which eludes the dynamical one. This is the fact that 
brain states really do seem to be directed to (not merely correlated with or 
caused by) external states of affairs. These states persist in memory, absent 
the external stimulus, and are robust to perturbations in the brain. For 
instance, BCI experiments have shown that if the mappings between neural 
activity and motor output are perturbed, the motor cortex will adjust its 
activity patterns to achieve a new set of stable mappings ( Jarosiewicz et al. 
2008 ). There is no obvious way to describe the apparent purposefulness 
of this reorganization within the dynamical framework. More generally, 
directed relationships between neural states, past events, goals, and future 
expectations do seem to be critical to explaining what makes a system intel-
ligent, hence they have often been taken to be a “mark of the cognitive.” 
 The dynamical perspective takes the same correlations between neu-
ral activity and external states of affairs that undergird the intentional 
account but lends them no more than causal significance. So it is open 
to a proponent of the intentional framework to  label the neural popula-
tion patterns found using the dynamical methods as  representations of 
movements . 13 In the motor cortex case, there is nothing to prevent an 
intentionalist doing this, but there are not the grounds to insist on this 
relabeling either. 
 In the debates that have gone on between proponents of the two per-
spectives on the motor cortex, the tone has not been particularly concilia-
tory. The background assumption, it seems, is that the two approaches 
are natural rivals and not allies—that ultimately one view must be right 
and the other wrong. In particular, advocates of each side have taken 
pains to show that the core phenomena stated by their opponents are 
recoverable within their own modeling framework (e.g., Kaufman in 
 Omrani et al. 2017 ). The title of a comparison study by  Michaels, Dann, 
and Scherberger (2016 ) is telling: “Neural Population Dynamics During 
Reaching Are Better Explained by a Dynamical System Than Represen-
tational Tuning.” 
 In contrast, one prominent figure in the field of dynamical modeling, 
Randall Beer, has made the case for an alliance between dynamical and 
informational approaches. Beer and Williams (2015) show that the behav-
ior of one extremely simple, simulated cognitive agent can be explained 
either using the formalism of information theory (IT) or dynamical sys-
tems theory (DST). They write: 
 As mathematical theories, IT and DST can be applied to any system 
that takes the proper form to meet their defining requirements; they 
intrinsically make no scientific claim as to “what’s really going on.” 
Instead, they are best viewed as distinct mathematical lenses through 
which we can examine the operation of a system of interest. 
 (Beer and Williams 2015, 2) 
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 These authors go on to say that “the mathematical languages themselves 
are merely more or less useful to a given purpose” (Beer and Williams 
2015, 23). Inspired by these remarks, one might attempt a reconciliation 
between the two perspectives via an instrumentalism which denies that 
mathematical models afford any view of underlying nature beyond the 
empirical predictions. As such, the use of these mathematical tools tells us 
nothing about what the brain is really like. 
 3.2 On Perspectival Truth 
 Embracing this conclusion, for the perspectives on the motor cortex, 
would invite the objection that perspectivism is nothing more than 
instrumentalism rebranded ( Morrison 2011 ). Michela Massimi is one 
philosopher of science who has taken pains to show that perspectivism 
is actually a version of scientific realism, by developing a substantial 
and non-relativistic notion of perspectival truth. In this section I will 
examine whether or not her account is applicable to the motor cortex 
example. 
 One version of perspectival truth that  Massimi (2018 , 349) considers 
is a contextualist one: 
 (P 3 )  Perspective-dependence 3 . Knowledge claims in science are per-
spective-dependent 3 when their truth-conditions depend on the scien-
tific perspective in which such claims are made. 
 Here, scientific perspectives provide the context in which truth condi-
tions are defined for the knowledge claims of science. For example, on 
this account 
 <M1 neurons code movement parameters> 
 would be true in the context of the intentional/informational perspec-
tive and false in the dynamical one. The stated benefits of P 3 are that it 
upholds the realist intuition that science gets things (partially) right but at 
the same time rejects a monistic view of scientific knowledge in favor of 
plurality of perspectives that offer “idealized, inaccurate, and yet still true 
perspectival images of an independent world” ( Massimi 2018 , 353). The 
downside, Massimi contends, is that if P 3 is all we aim for, we must also 
concede that nature-in-itself is an unknowable, noumenal reality. Mas-
simi’s more ambitious notion of perspectival truth employs a distinction 
between context-of-use and context-of-assessment: 
 (P 4 )  Perspective-dependence 4 . Knowledge claims in science are per-
spective-dependent 4 when their truth-conditions .  .  . depend on 
the scientific perspective in which such claims are made. Yet such 
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knowledge claims must also be assessable from the point of view of 
other . . . scientific perspectives. 
 ( Massimi 2018 , 254) 
 This idea is fleshed out with the example of the claim 
 <Water is a liquid with viscosity> 
 which is true from the perspective of hydrodynamics but false accord-
ing to statistical mechanics. However, if statistical mechanics is deployed 
as a “context of assessment” for hydrodynamics, it can be shown that 
the property of viscosity is still recoverable in statistical mechanics “as a 
derivative property” ( Massimi 2018 , 354). Thus, the knowledge claim of 
one perspective is validated by the other perspective after all. 
 There is a parallel to Massimi’s account of viscosity in the motor cor-
tex case: proponents of each perspective do claim to be able to recover 
the core phenomena of the alternative perspective using their own models 
and assumptions. That is, advocates of the dynamical view have empha-
sized that the correlations between movements and neural activity, which 
are taken by intentionalists to be the signature of coding, are also pre-
dicted by the dynamical account. Likewise, neuroscientists defending the 
intentionalist framework hastened to show that curved trajectories in the 
low-dimensional jPC space, argued by  Churchland et al. (2012 ) to be evi-
dence for the dynamical view, were consistent with cosine tuning in the 
motor cortex (see also  Michaels et al. 2016 ). Yet the conclusion that each 
 Figure 8.1  Illustration of cross-validation of quantitative models and divergence of 
qualitative interpretations of those models. Beer and Williams (2015) 
provide a demonstration of cross-perspective validation for their very 
simple, minimally cognitive agent. 
Informational Formalism
rn(t)=fn(param1(t), param2(t),….)
Dynamical Formalism
τ dr/dt = h(r(t)) + u(t)cross-validation
Motor cortex
codes movements
Brain/Mind is an
Information Processor
Motor cortex is a
pattern generator
Brain is a dynamical
system
Radical embedded,
embodied cognition!Functionalism!
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side draws from any instances of cross-validation between perspectives is 
not the conciliatory or pluralist one; rather, such findings are claimed to 
 undercut the other perspective. The logic is that if an alternative perspec-
tive is not needed to explain a portion of the observed findings, then only 
one perspective should be employed. 
 I should emphasize that there may well be sociological and psychologi-
cal reasons why the debate over motor cortex perspectives has more of 
the look of a turf war than a display of polite recognition of the need 
for diversity of theories and methods in science. But one philosophical 
explanation for why diversity is not met with tolerance here is that there 
is no big picture of neural and cognitive function that the different per-
spectives are converging on. From each individual perspective you get an 
“interpretable” picture of what the motor cortex fundamentally is, but 
when placed together, with the pluralist claim that both are in some sense 
true, the picture becomes incoherent. 
 The situation is illustrated in  Figure 8.1 . At the level of mathematical 
formalism, the intentional and DST perspectives do cross-validate one 
another in the way that Massimi requires for her robust notion of per-
spectival truth. As Beer and Williams (2015) show for their minimal cog-
nitive agent, some of the phenomena isolated by dynamical modeling also 
show up in the informational model and vice versa. However, when one 
moves beyond the pure formalism, to the level of interpretation of the 
models, 14 the perspectives diverge.  Figure 8.1 presents additional layers 
of interpretation, which end ultimately with different philosophical views 
about what the brain/mind fundamentally is. 
 Each perspective provides mathematical formalisms for describing neu-
ral activity. At this purely quantitative level, the perspectives can be shown 
to be consistent with one another, satisfying P 4 . When one considers the 
qualitative descriptions of the neural systems associated with each per-
spective (the claims about what the cortex “is like”), over and above the 
mathematical formalism, inconsistency appears. Note that  functionalism 
is a philosophical theory of the mind-body relationship which often pre-
supposes internal representations; in contrast, the  embodied-embedded 
cognition theory denies that representations are needed in order to explain 
mental capacities. I do not suppose that many neuroscientists employing 
these models also commit themselves to these philosophical theories, but 
it is relevant that the models do lend themselves to these higher levels of 
interpretation. 
 Since the clash of perspectives only comes with the interpretation of 
the mathematical models, one response to this difficulty is to strongly 
discourage interpretation. The task of the neuroscientist is to shut up and 
calculate, and leave speculation about the nature of the brain/mind to the 
philosophers. This response is in keeping with Beer and William’s recom-
mendation that the mathematical theories of IT and DST by themselves 
make no claims about “what’s really going on.” 
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 A pluralism that blends into instrumentalism by putting restrictions 
on extra-empirical interpretation is not an option for Massimi, since a 
non-negotiable claim of scientific realism is that the successful theories 
and models employed by scientists can also be interpreted in order to 
tell us something about the underlying nature of things. Massimi argues 
that for perspectivism to be made compatible with realism, the different 
perspectives must be shown to endorse each other’s knowledge claims; 
but in our case the mutual reinforcement is only possible at the level of 
uninterpreted mathematical formalism. Once interpretation is lent to the 
models, the clash of perspectives is jarring. 
 This amounts to a dilemma for the ambitious perspectival realism 
advocated by Massimi. P 4 requires the knowledge claims of each perspec-
tive to be endorsed by the other perspectives. In the IT/DST example 
the endorsement is granted only if the cross-perspective assessment is 
restricted to the quantitative predictions of the mathematical models, 
while no cross-perspective endorsement is granted to the qualitative inter-
pretations associated with those models—the bigger picture they offer as 
to “what’s really going on” in the motor cortex, and the brain more gen-
erally. So  either P 4 knowledge claims must be restricted to the quantita-
tive predictions of the mathematical models, leading to instrumentalism 
 or , if not so restricted, it is clear that convergence of knowledge claims 
across perspectives does not obtain; this implies that one of the perspec-
tives is the truer one and pluralism must be abandoned. 15 Thus, it seems, 
the ambitious notion of perspectival truth, P 4 , is not applicable to our 
case. I will conclude the chapter with some thoughts on why the more 
modest P 3 is not such a bad notion to settle for. 
 4  Conclusion: Two Philosophical Perspectives on 
Abstraction 
 It is interesting that the word “abstraction” bears two different meanings 
in contemporary philosophy: one lofty, the other mundane. In the lofty 
sense, an abstraction is an abstract entity, not spatially and temporally 
located and so possibly residing in Plato’s heaven. Speaking mundanely 
(the use more common among philosophers of science), abstraction is syn-
onymous with simplification and, paired with idealization, an important 
model-building strategy employed by scientists. These two conceptions 
of abstraction animate two very different explanations for the “unrea-
sonable effectiveness of mathematics”; that is, they provide two different 
answers to the question of why mathematics is such a useful tool in sci-
ence. The lofty explanation is that the underlying reality of nature consists 
in mathematical structure, and the task of the exact sciences is to discover 
these. The mundane one is that science progresses when humans find inge-
nious ways to simplify complex phenomena, and mathematics is the pre-
eminent tool for doing this. Adherents to the lofty way of thinking about 
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abstraction and the role of mathematics in science are in good company—
not only Plato but Galileo (stating that the book of nature is written in the 
language of mathematics), Descartes (and other rationalist philosophers), 
and contemporary ontic structural realists have intellectual kinship here. 
However, this Platonic tradition meets difficulty with the existence of plu-
ralities of different kinds of mathematical representation of natural phe-
nomena. If the construction of a predictively powerful model of natural 
phenomena is also, in some sense, a revelation of the mathematical laws 
that underlie observable phenomena, then how can it be that the book of 
nature seems to be written by multiple authors? 16 
 Kant is a figurehead for the mundane approach. Instead of taking the 
content of the abstract mathematical representation to be somehow more 
fundamental than the concrete, observable events, on this account one 
regards the mathematical representations as a set of structures employed 
by the human mind as a means to order the observable phenomena. 17 
When confronted with the varying, multifaceted, and disordered events 
in nature, mathematics offers a useful set of structures for imposing rep-
resentational order on them, especially by means of leaving out details—
the process of abstraction. Once one makes the Kantian move of looking 
“inwards” for the explanation of how mathematical representations yield 
knowledge of nature, it is not jarring or surprising that there are multiple 
ways to achieve order and abstract, hence there may be a plurality of 
kinds of mathematical model for the same piece of nature. 
 This way of thinking about abstraction and the scientific method was 
popular in the philosophy of science a century ago, even if neglected 
now. 18 I believe it offers significant benefits for thinking about per-
spectival pluralism. Not only does it welcome the existence of multiple 
perspectives, but it also permits a relaxed response to the possibility of 
there being unknowable, non-perspectival truths. In our case we can say 
that the brain-in-itself is not knowable in its full, Heraclitean complex-
ity because no human scientist (with limited, human cognitive powers) 
would be able to theorize it completely and accurately as such. The brain-
in-itself is not mysteriously unthinkable; it is just very complicated. At the 
same time, the Heraclitean brain provides constraints on what counts as 
an acceptable representation of it, and this means that contextual knowl-
edge claims about it—as in P 3 —are not fictitious or relativistic ones. To 
see as through a glass darkly is still to see something. 19 
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 Notes 
  1 . In the case of  Caenorhabditis elegans , a tiny worm, it seems that Goldstein is 
vindicated by current neuroscience: 
 a counterintuitive finding in  C. elegans is that there is no such thing as 
“simplicity” despite the reduced connectome (302 neurons, 6963 syn-
apses, 890 gap junctions), even at the earliest stage of sensory processing. 
 ( Fré gnac 2017 , 473) 
 2 . See, e.g.,  Mitchell (2003 ) and  Longino (2013 ). 
 3 . Philosophers of science typically refer to the former process as “abstraction” 
and the latter as “idealization.” I think that the distinction between the two is 
less clear-cut than is normally supposed, so the abstractions I discuss below 
should not be thought of as  pure simplifications. 
 4. Omrani et al. (2017 ) is a very helpful review of the current approaches to 
motor cortex. There are more options than the two perspectives I present 
here, but space does not permit discussion of these. See also  Scott (2008 ). 
 5 . I use the word “intentional” instead of “representational” to avoid confusion 
with the scientific representations (models, maps, etc.) that come up in the 
discussion of scientific perspectives.  Shenoy, Sahani, and Churchland (2013 ) 
and  Churchland et al. (2012 ) refer to it as the “representational perspective.” 
 6 . Rashevsky, for example, says: 
 Following the fundamental method of physicomathematical sciences, 
we do not attempt a mathematical description of a concrete cell, in all 
its complexity. We start with a study of highly idealized systems, which 
at first may not even have any counterpart in real nature. 
 (quoted in  Abraham 2002 , 16) 
 7 . That is, the idea that individual neurons in the visual system selectively respond 
to a particular kind of stimulus and that these tunings are stable across time—
independent of task and stimulus context. See  Chirimuuta and Gold (2009 ) for 
discussion. 
 8 . It bears emphasis that the existence of low-dimensional structure in high-
dimensional neural population data is a precondition of the dynamical 
approach. This is how  Cunningham and Yu (2014 , 1507) compare the inten-
tional and dynamical perspective in terms of their different strategies for 
simplifying the brain: 
 One of the major pursuits of science is to explain complex phenomena 
in simple terms. Systems neuroscience is no exception, and decades of 
research have attempted to find simplicity at the level of individual neu-
rons. Standard analysis procedures include constructing simple paramet-
ric tuning curves and response fields, analyzing only a select subset of the 
recorded neurons, and creating population averages. . . . Recently, studies 
have begun to embrace single-neuron heterogeneity and seek simplicity 
at the level of the population as enabled by dimensionality reduction. 
 Cunningham and Yu provide a clear review of the methods described in this 
paragraph. 
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 9 . This is not to imply that dynamical systems theory cannot be applied to 
single-neuron data, as many studies attest. 
 10 . E.g.,  van Gelder (1995 ) and  Chemero (2009 ). 
 11 . Cf. Giere (2006, 5–6): “the strongest claims a scientist can legitimately make 
are of a qualified, conditional form: ‘According to this highly confirmed the-
ory (or reliable instrument), the world seems to be roughly such and such.’” 
 12 . See  Mitchell 2003 ; Mitchell, this volume. 
 13 . I thank David Bain, Fiona MacPherson, and Scott Sturgeon for pressing this 
point. 
 14 . By “interpretation” here I mean, roughly, what is implied by the model over 
and above its quantitative predictions; cf. the semantic content that scientific 
realists—but not instrumentalists—would associate with scientific theories. 
Interpretation can be thought of as an informal representation of the system. 
Note that for the scientific realist—but not the instrumentalist—the mathemati-
cal formalism can also be taken to provide a representation of the neural system. 
 15 . That is not to imply that anyone knows which perspective is the truer one. 
Furthermore, it could also be that all of the current perspectives are equally 
far from the truth. 
 16 . Given Beer and Williams’s finding of the compatibility of the two formal-
isms, someone sympathetic to the Platonic view might respond here that, yes, 
the brain partakes of these two different formalisms and we should desist 
from trying to interpret them and reconcile the interpretations. My response 
would again be that imposing any such ban on interpretation leads you into 
instrumentalism. As Robert Briscoe and Will Davies have pointed out to me, 
more problematic cases for my arguments are ones where scientists have 
endeavored to merge the perspectives both in terms of formalism and inter-
pretation. In the case of dynamical and intentional models of the motor cor-
tex, I have not yet come across work of this kind. 
 17 . NB: my characterization of a Kantian view is not aiming at accurate exegesis 
of Kant’s thought on mathematical science, nor does it come with any com-
mitment to Kantianism regarding the ontology of numbers or epistemology 
of mathematics. For instance, one could think that mathematics is learned 
by the mind’s apprehension of Platonic Forms but still be a “Kantian” in the 
sense relevant here, i.e., by denying that mathematical structures are the truer 
reality underlying the appearances in nature and asserting that the utility 
of mathematics in science comes from the mind’s ability to employ certain 
simple structures in its apprehension of nature. However, there is a connec-
tion between the Platonic tradition I characterize here and Platonism regard-
ing the ontology of numbers, in that the indispensability arguments for the 
existence of numbers presuppose the lofty explanation for the success of 
mathematical science. I thank Alastair Wilson for this point. 
 18 . I am thinking here of  Duhem (1954 ),  Cassirer (1957 ),  Husserl (1970 ), and 
 Whitehead (1938 ). In particular, the pluralism advocated here is more in 
the spirit of neo-Kantians such as Cassirer than Kant himself.  Cassirer 
(1957 , 409) makes a point highly relevant to my study, that the exact sci-
ences are only concerned with events “under the aspect of [their] repeat-
ability.” We can say that the Heraclitean brain in its never-exactly-repeating 
richness is simply not a concern to the mathematical neuroscientist; the 
brain must be presumed, qua object of mathematical neuroscience, to be 
non-Heraclitean. 
 19 . We might also think of these as two theological outlooks. On the Platonic 
side, God is conceived of as a mathematically informed creator, and the struc-
ture of his creation is revealed through functions and number. Creation is 
intelligible to human reason to the extent that we understand mathematics. 
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On the other side we have a negative theology, where God and his ways are 
somewhat inscrutable to the finite human mind: 
 He [the scientist] will choose a certain formula because it is simpler 
than the others; the weakness of our minds constrains us to attach great 
importance to considerations of this sort. There was a time when physi-
cists supposed the intelligence of the Creator to be tainted with the same 
debility. 
 ( Duhem 1954 , 171) 
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 This dialectical tension, as it may be called, between a realist and an 
instrumentalist attitude, existing together without contradiction, seems 
to me characteristic of the deepest scientists. 
 ( Stein 1989 , 64) 
 1 Introduction 
 In his  Structure of Scientific Revolutions , Thomas Kuhn offered up a con-
troversial account of scientific change. According to this picture, compet-
ing paradigms in the history of science are incommensurable. Scientific 
revolutions are revolutionary exactly because they involve a radical shift 
in worldview, or a “Gestalt” shift. Kuhn claimed that scientists operat-
ing under different paradigms quite literally “see” the world differently: 
“after Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different world” ( Kuhn 2012 , 
117). This picture of scientific change has been enormously influential—
particularly in the context of the realism/antirealism debate in the phi-
losophy of science. 
 Kuhn is typically read as a “constructivist” and an “antirealist.” 1 Kuhn 
resisted the view that the aim of science is “a permanent fixed scientific 
truth, of which each stage in the development of scientific knowledge is a 
better exemplar” ( Kuhn 2012 , 172–173). Instead, he compared scientific 
change to evolution by natural selection. Just as evolution is not directed 
at a fixed goal, so too our best scientific theories are at best good enough 
to survive the trials they face, at least relative to the going alternatives, 
at this particular time and place. Success in science is not a view from 
nowhere, but the best possible view from here. 
 On the one hand, many historically and naturalistically inclined philos-
ophers of science have been sympathetic with Kuhn. Scientists are not in 
the business of gaining, as Giere puts it, a “view from nowhere or every-
where at once” ( Giere 1999 , 80), but with solving much more circum-
scribed problems or addressing very specific questions, in service of which 
they often generate models that are intended to represent the world in 
some respects, and to a greater or lesser degree of accuracy ( Giere 1999 ). 
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Fit of a model to the world is a matter of meeting standards that are 
to some extent conventional and contingent upon historically available 
tools. The methodological standards and, indeed, the conceptual frame-
works of a given disciplinary specialty are to a large extent socially and 
historically “situated” ( Massimi 2018 a, 345). Moreover, one often finds 
that, as Massimi explains, “both across historical periods, and in any 
given historical period, science witnesses a plurality of models, theories, 
experimental techniques, and measurement apparatuses—all designed to 
investigate the very same target system” ( Massimi 2018 a, 344). That is, 
even within a particular period, scientists may deploy a variety of dif-
ferent and sometimes apparently inconsistent models, all in service of 
investigating the same general phenomena. 
 How can scientists consistently deploy models making different and 
apparently incompatible assumptions? One answer to this question is to 
suggest that any incompatibilities will or should ultimately be jettisoned. 
Another answer is that we ought to view models at best as tools for 
prediction. The former view is favored by realists; the latter view might 
be favored by antirealists or instrumentalists. The debate has now raged 
for decades. Is there a middle ground in this debate? 2  Giere (1999 ) pro-
posed a view he called “perspectival realism” as a sort of middle ground 
between extremes on this continuum: 3 
 Rather than thinking of the world as packaged in sets of objects shar-
ing definite properties, think of it as indefinitely complex, exhibiting 
many qualities that at least appear to vary continuously. One might 
then construct maps that depict this world from various perspec-
tives.  .  . . Here we have a way of combining what is valuable in 
both constructivism and realism.  .  . . We can agree that scientific 
representations are socially constructed, but then we must also agree 
that some socially constructed representations can be discovered to 
provide a good picture of aspects of the world. 
 ( Giere 1999 , 26) 
 Giere’s proposal has two parts: one metaphysical and another epistemic. 
The metaphysical thesis is that the world itself is “complex”; or, objects 
are not fixed and easily demarcated, and their properties often vary con-
tinuously. 4 The epistemic claim is that, given the complexity of the world 
as we find it, our scientific representations of the world are (inevitably) 
partial, or in some sense “perspectival.” Giere’s appeal to mapmaking 
is central to his argument; scientists build models on the same sorts of 
principles that mapmakers build maps. Like maps, models represent the 
world only partially, or represent the world only in some aspect, and 
with some degree of accuracy. Indeed, some aspects of models may be 
deliberately fictional or involve misrepresentations. Just as maps require 
interpretation, scientific models must be interpreted in part by appeal 
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to the intentions or interests of the modeler. One needs to know which 
aspects of the model are intended to represent which parts of the world 
in order to determine if a model is a good one. Giere thus sums up two 
main features of perspectivism: 
 First, there is no total or universal perspective, or, alternatively, there 
is no perspective from nowhere or from everywhere at once. All per-
spectives are partial relative to their objects. Second, there is some-
thing real that each perspective is a perspective of. 
 ( Giere 1999 , 80) 
 Giere’s perspectivism is thus “realist” in the sense that our scientific per-
spectives are of the world: we can and should interpret models as rep-
resenting the world more or less accurately. Yet, like Kuhn, Giere grants 
that what and how scientists come to know is shaped in part by scientists’ 
historical context and particular interests. 
 Recently, several philosophers of science have either critiqued or 
refined Giere’s perspectival realism ( Chakravartty 2010 ;  Morrison 2011 ; 
 Chirimuuta 2016 ;  Massimi 2018 a). All these authors wish to defend a 
form of realism; however, they disagree about what to make of the fact 
that scientists often deploy diverse, sometimes apparently incompatible 
models of the same systems. For instance, some argue that seemingly 
incompatible models are, as a matter of fact, not incompatible, because 
each describe the actual dispositions of a real-world target, but differen-
tially revealed by different methods of detection ( Chakravartty 2010 ). 
Others contend that while in some cases inconsistent models are simply 
incompatible, in that they ascribe inconsistent “fundamental properties” 
to the target of inquiry ( Morrison 2011 , 351), in other cases apparently 
inconsistent models are simply different ways of elaborating the same set 
of basic principles. A unified treatment based on shared basic principles 
is possible, once the falsely attributed properties are jettisoned. Others 
still argue that the relationships between models and the world are “hap-
tic” rather than “perspectival”: interactive, interested, and historically 
situated ( Chirimuuta 2016 ). Similarly, some claim that across perspec-
tives successful claims of scientific knowledge from one perspective may 
also meet standards of adequacy when assessed from other perspectives 
( Massimi 2018 a). 
 In my view, each of these authors provides insight into scientific mod-
els and modeling. The key to reconciling them is to recognize that model-
ers use models for different purposes. Sometimes unity and assimilation 
is the goal, for the reasons Chakravartty and Morrison suggest; however, 
sometimes apparent disunity and inconsistency are not only tolerated but 
also, indeed, maintained (apparently) indefinitely. In part, this may be 
because scientists often do not know which of the two is the likely out-
come ahead of time! As Stein has argued, the very best scientists straddle 
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the “dialectical tension” between realism and instrumentalism. By way of 
example, Stein points to Maxwell’s treatment of the ether: 
 If something is transmitted from one particle to another at a distance, 
what is its condition after it has left the one particle and before it has 
reached the other? . . . In fact, whenever energy is transmitted from 
one body to another in time, there must be a medium or substance in 
which the energy exists after it leaves one body and before it reaches 
the other, for energy, as Torricelli remarked, “is a quintessence of 
so subtle a nature that it cannot be contained in any vessel except 
the Inmost substance of material things.” Hence all these theories 
lead to the conception of a medium in which the propagation takes 
place. . . . If we admit this medium as an hypothesis, I think it ought 
to occupy a prominent place in our investigations, and that we ought 
to endeavour to construct a mental representation of all the details of 
its action, and this has been my constant aim in this treatise. 
 ( Maxwell 1881 , 438) 
 Like Maxwell, many scientists seem to be capable of holding in mind 
simultaneously both realist and instrumentalist stances: holding that a 
theoretical posit is real “enough” to exhibit regularities that can be inves-
tigated, but granting at the same time that their role in one’s theory or 
model may at best be instrumentally useful in inspiring further inquiry. 
Or so I will argue below. 
 It is also true, of course, that scientific models are constructed in service 
of performing different functions. All models are in some sense a repre-
sentation of the world, but representations may be intentionally sketchy, 
contain deliberate misrepresentations of some part or feature of a system, 
or be intended (for now) as simply predictive tools. If we grant this, the 
realist and antirealist need not part ways. Moreover, while some models 
are general, many treat only a subclass of cases of phenomena that meet 
specific (restricted) conditions. In such cases, there is no direct contradic-
tion between models; a unified picture that incorporates all such models 
is not the ultimate aim.  Fagan (2017 ) has recently drawn upon the lit-
erature on modeling and perspectival realism to generate a taxonomy of 
different sorts of relations that might obtain between models: 
 • Direct conflict 
 • Simple additivity 
 • Subsumption 
 • Interactive process 
 • Cross-perspective translation 
 • No cumulative interaction 
 • Non-interaction 
 • Complementarity. 
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 She explains and describes these relations as follows: 
 Direct conflict is the objectivist view, such that we select the best 
model among alternatives. Simple additivity is the bare conjunction 
of statements from different models associated with different meth-
ods. Subsumption by more basic principles (traditional unification) is 
an indirect relation between models—each is subsumed by the shared 
basic principles. The idea of an interactive process is not a relation 
per se, but part of a more general framework for thinking about 
these relations (see below). Cross-perspective translation is a kind of 
interactive process, but with distinctive features. . . . Non-interaction 
is a limit case: absence of a relation between models in practice. . . . 
 . . . Simple additivity involves no substantive connection between 
models from different perspectives; their contributions are simply 
strung together in a conjunction. The “unification” of simple additiv-
ity is bare logical consistency. . . . 
 . . . Complementarity is a familiar relation . . . models from dif-
ferent perspectives can complement one another through differences 
that do not converge on a common core .  .  . models in different 
perspectives are, at some point in their construction, fitted together 
like jigsaw puzzle pieces. I therefore term this category of relation 
“complementary.” Cross-checking and mutual constraint on possibil-
ity space are examples. 
 ( Fagan 2017 , 27–28) 
 This taxonomy will be useful in our consideration of the varieties of 
model-relation in the context of cancer research. In my view, there is a 
patchwork of kinds of relation between models in cancer research. Some-
times, apparently competing or inconsistent models of cancer initiation 
or progression are simply concerned with different questions, or different 
targets, at different scales of analysis. Ultimately, however, I will argue 
that complementarity, not conflict, is the proper view of the relation-
ship between purportedly competing perspectives on carcinogenesis that 
I consider in some detail below. 
 First, however, it is important to note briefly that there are many kinds 
of things referred to as “models” in cancer science, some of which are 
“concrete” and some of which are more “abstract.” For instance, model 
organisms and cancer cells in culture are often treated as “models” or 
experimental systems for investigating various features or aspects of 
cancer. In contrast, more abstract models include mathematical repre-
sentations of cancer’s dynamics using ordinary differential equations, 
agent-based computer simulations of changes in cancer cells over time, 
network models of signaling pathways, or “box and arrow” diagrams 
of core causal pathways in the cell associated with tumorigenesis. The 
aims of these more abstract models are diverse. Sometimes they serve 
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as a starting point for developing and testing causal hypotheses; some-
times they are used to make very specific predictions, suggest avenues for 
intervention, or simply for pedagogical purposes. Scientists may wish to 
investigate the conditions on or features of a kind of dynamic process; 
such investigations are more theoretical in character. However, much of 
modeling in cancer research is concerned with practical matters, such as 
predicting the course of a cancer type or subtype, or estimating the age of 
onset, likely response to chemotherapy, or threat to mortality of different 
cancers. Some of the models are very general; some are highly specific. 
Given the variety of functions they are intended to serve, and the variety 
of things scientists characterize as “models,” it would be difficult at best, 
and foolish at worst, to attempt to offer a general account of the relations 
between and functions of models in cancer science. 
 Nonetheless, Giere’s picture of the relationship between “theories” and 
“models” is helpful as a first pass when considering the construction and 
roles of formal models of cancer. Formal models of cancer’s dynamics 
or progression are in large part informed by or built on the principles of 
“theories” (or, as I prefer, research traditions), 5 though such principles 
are often consistent with a variety of different modeling strategies. For 
instance, some mathematical models built on the principle that cancer is 
a multistage process driven largely by acquisition of mutations represent 
cancer initiation and progression as akin to a dynamic, evolving popu-
lation; others take populations of cells in a tumor as engaged in a pro-
cess of “competition” akin to competitive exclusion modeling in ecology. 
Models built on the principle that cancer is shaped by epigenetic factors 
that affect developmental pathways may represent cancer as a shift from 
one stable or equilibrium state of organization or developmental homeo-
stasis to another, where stable states are equilibria points on an epigenetic 
landscape. Other formal models built on the same principle might repre-
sent the relationship between gene products and signaling molecules in 
the tissue microenvironment as vast signaling networks, reorganized by 
cancer. These modeling strategies are affiliated (very roughly) with some 
overlapping commitments or theories of carcinogenesis, broadly under-
stood. None, however, relies exclusively on one “theory” to the exclusion 
of others. Rather, each draws upon various presuppositions about what 
sorts of causes are significant in cancer initiation and progression: muta-
tion, epigenetics, or organization or dynamics of developmental path-
ways. That said, all such models more or less accept some fundamental 
assumptions: that cancer cells are phenotypically different from normal 
cells, in part due to their genetic or epigenetic changes, and in part due to 
many other factors at work in the tissue microenvironment. Indeed, we 
can identify (and in many cases have identified) the “driver” mutations 
and epigenetic factors responsible for these particular phenotypes. 
 The so-called oncogene paradigm, according to which mutations to 
specific genes play essential roles in the generation of a cancer phenotype 
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at the cellular level, has dominated at least the last 30 years of cancer 
research. More peripheral research programs have focused attention on 
the role of the tissue microenvironment ( Sonnenschein and Soto 1999 ), 
cellular metabolism ( Warburg 1926 ;  Seyfried and Shelton 2010 ), the role 
of structural or developmental organizing factors ( Bissell et al. 1999 ), or 
stem cells ( Clarke et al. 2006 ) in cancer initiation and progression. These 
focuses on different kinds of causes or causal pathways may prima facie 
appear inconsistent. It is my view, however, that these are not incommen-
surable. Instead, they are research programs focused on simply different 
causal pathways, all of which are indeed relevant to cancer, and they can 
be integrated into a more comprehensive view of cancer’s origins. Mod-
els of carcinogenesis that focus on one particular local causal pathway 
are not fundamentally in tension with models of broader networks of 
pathways. For, as a matter of fact, cancer is a complex, dynamic process, 
requiring attention to multiple temporal and spatial scales, from short-
term molecular interactions, to mid-term developmental processes shap-
ing tissue organization, to the history of life on earth and the emergence 
of multicellularity. 
 To situate my views, then, namely the views discussed above, I do not 
take theoretical unification as the exclusive goal of scientific inquiry. 
Sometimes perspectival models are complementary; other times they are 
simply taken to be competitors for heuristic or exploratory purposes 
( Massimi 2018b ). Indeed, the hope for a unified theory of cancer, if by 
this one understands a set of necessary and sufficient causal conditions 
on all cancers or universal laws of carcinogenesis, is simply misguided. 
Rather, there are many useful perspectives on cancer, or research pro-
grams that focus on one type of cause or on one temporal or spatial scale. 
Models that may appear inconsistent can be reconciled once one situates 
them in a larger context or interprets them appropriately. There are two 
components of my argument for this claim: one historical and one philo-
sophical. These will correspond, roughly, with two parts of the paper. 
 First the historical: in her recent book  Cancer Stem Cells: Philosophy 
and Theory , Laplane argues that cancer stem cell theory is a “revolution-
ary” new theory of cancer initiation and progression that offers to “break 
the stalemate in the war on cancer” ( Laplane 2016 , 2). She contrasts 
cancer stem cell (CSC) theory with what she calls the “classical concep-
tion” of cancer initiation and progression. She claims that the classical 
approach cannot explain and did not predict many important features of 
cancer. In particular, the classical view cannot explain and did not pre-
dict the genetic and phenotypic heterogeneity of cancer cells in a tumor, 
nor the causes of resilience to chemotherapy. This book echoes similar 
books claiming “revolutionary” approaches to cancer. In 1999, Soto and 
Sonnenschein argued in  The Society of Cells: Cancer and Control of 
Cell Proliferation for a “new paradigm” of cancer research: the “tissue 
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organization field theory” (TOFT), which they contrast with the somatic 
mutation theory (SMT). Sonnenschein and Soto contest what they take 
to be the universally held “dogma” that somatic mutation is the cause 
of cellular proliferation. In their view, cancer results from a breakdown 
of tissue organization that disrupts the normal inhibitions of prolifera-
tion that are inherent in the tissue architecture of a multicellular society 
of cells. In each of these cases a new paradigm is contrasted with the 
old, and promises are made on behalf of the new for both understand-
ing and treatment of cancer. Are these alternatives genuine “paradigm” 
shifts, involving incommensurable views about the causes of cancer? 
Is the choice between purportedly competing views so stark? Some 
( Malaterre 2007 ;  Bertolaso 2011 ) have argued that this is a mistaken way 
of thinking about the SMT versus TOFT debate. In this chapter, I make 
a similar argument in regard to a more recent debate in the history of 
cancer research concerning cancer stem cells. Like Malaterre and Berto-
laso argue in the context of SMT versus TOFT, I argue that this debate is 
better characterized as a gradual shift in understanding and assimilation 
of novel ideas. The stem cell theory and “classical” approach are not so 
starkly at odds, representing incompatible theories. Indeed, in my view, 
progress in cancer research is not well framed as shifts in theory; cancer 
research is largely problem-driven as opposed to theory-driven. There are 
few if any paradigm shifts in science, and cancer science is no different 
in this respect from other cases. This is piecemeal theory change rather 
than replacement, and perspectival realism can shed light on how. The 
contrasts offered up between these different perspectives on cancer are 
not between incommensurable worldviews. This is my historical thesis. 
 Second, my philosophical thesis is intended to dovetail with the histori-
cal thesis. Searching for a unified theory or one necessary condition on 
carcinogenesis is exactly the wrong strategy. Contrary to what defenders 
of these “revolutionary” new theories suppose, cancer is not either a dis-
ease of mutations  or a disease of the tissue microenvironment, a disease 
of genes  or a disease of stem cells. Rather, each of these research pro-
grams provides a novel but  partial perspective on a complex, heteroge-
neous disease. Each approach has shed light on the mechanisms that yield 
cancer, though emphasizing quite different temporal and spatial scales. 
 The view I defend here, in other words, may be characterized as a 
kind of theoretical pluralism. According to Beatty, this is the view that a 
domain of inquiry is 
 essentially heterogeneous, in the sense that a plurality of theories or 
mechanisms is required to account for it. . . . There is no single theory 
or mechanism—not even a single, synthetic, multi-causal theory or 
mechanism—that will account for every item in the domain. 
 ( Beatty 1995 , 65) 
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 Beatty has suggested that we ought to expect theoretical pluralism in the 
biological sciences. His rationale is as follows: 
 Why should we adhere to a methodology that dictates the search for 
unitary accounts of each domain of biological phenomena—e.g., a 
unitary account of inheritance, or a unitary account of carbohydrate 
metabolism, or a unitary account of gene regulation, or a unitary 
account of speciation—unless we have reason to believe that the out-
comes of evolution are  highly constrained? . . . 
 . . . Unless we believe the outcomes of evolution are always severely 
constrained, then perhaps we should be on the lookout for multiple 
accounts in each domain. 
 ( Beatty 1995 , 75) 
 Beatty thinks that unless we have special reason to think that a biological 
process is evolutionarily constrained, we ought to seek out not unitary 
but pluralistic accounts of phenomena. Is the pathway to cancer con-
strained either from an evolutionary perspective or otherwise? In some 
sense the pathway is constrained, but this is only insofar as all cells in 
a multicellular organism are the product of a long history of evolution 
of cooperative organization. However, constraints on disruptive growth 
have evolved in different ways in different tissues (and, indeed, in dif-
ferent sexes and different species!); many different constraints on can-
cer have been selected for, and there are also many ways in which these 
constraints fail. This is why cancer is, after all, not one disease; each 
cancer has its own distinctive site of origin and so also its own distinctive 
pattern of failure, unique genetic signature, pattern of progression, and 
likely outcomes—as well as, of course, its distinct remote and proximate 
causes, from viral infection to environmental factors. Cancers are hetero-
geneous in a variety of senses, both genetic and phenotypic, or if you like, 
distinct in ontogeny and phylogeny. At only the most coarse-grained level 
of description is there one way in which a cell becomes a cancer cell, a 
cancer cell becomes a population of cancer cells, and a population of cells 
invades and metastasizes to neighboring tissues. 
 The right lesson to take away from the history of cancer research, 
in other words, is that the question of which among many possible 
research programs is the most “unified” or gives the “true theory” is 
simply the wrong question to ask. Giere’s perspectival realism is useful 
here: in the face of complexity, making progress in science is not a mat-
ter of searching for one true theory or view from nowhere. The right 
way to consider the problem is to note how and why different research 
traditions are epistemically fruitful—where this means that they yield 
knowledge of causes or properties of the system that help us better 
understand, predict, and successfully intervene. 6 Now I will turn to my 
historical analysis. 
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 2 SMT versus TOFT 
 In 1999 Soto and Sonnenschein published  The Society of Cells , in which 
they set out what they take to be incommensurable views of carcinogen-
esis. On what they take to be the widely accepted and yet false view—the 
somatic mutation theory (SMT)—mutations are acquired during somatic 
cell division by the precursors of cancer cells. Some such mutations yield 
the hallmarks of cancer—cancer cells proliferate, are not sensitive to apop-
totic signaling (signals that indicate cells should become senescent), acquire 
a blood supply, and acquire the capacity to invade and metastasize. This 
picture of cancer, they argue, presupposes that the default state of meta-
zoan cells is quiescence—cancer is a departure from this default, and the 
explanation for the departure from this state is, in their view, “reduction-
ist.” In contrast, they advance what they take to be a holist view, the “tissue 
organizational field theory” (TOFT). According to TOFT, the default state 
of cells is proliferation, and the cause of cancer is disruption of reciprocal 
interactions between cells that ordinarily serve to maintain tissue organiza-
tion. They argue that their picture of cancer can explain phenomena that 
SMT cannot; in particular, it explains and predicts the fact that cancers 
exhibit a great deal of heterogeneity, and that it is possible, by altering the 
tissue microenvironment, for cancer cells to revert to healthy, normal cells 
and develop into differentiated tissue. Therefore, in their words, we ought 
to adopt this novel paradigm and reject the false and failed alternative. 
 There are two components of my argument; one historical and another 
conceptual. First, it is not clear to me that any advocates of the somatic 
mutation theory (whom Soto and Sonnenschein only rarely identify) ever 
were committed to the view they describe about the default state of cells, 
or for that matter, that a single or few oncogene(s) may induce cancer. 
In other words, it seems to me that Soto and Sonnenschein give at best 
a very thin caricature of mainstream cancer researchers’ views. Second 
(perhaps not surprisingly), once we get a more robust picture of the main-
stream view, we need not take these views as incompatible. Indeed, many 
of the classic studies that Soto and Sonnenschein cite in support of their 
novel theory are not only consistent with the presence of mutations in 
cancer cells but also mutually reinforcing. There are reciprocal interac-
tions between tissue organization and signaling pathways controlled in 
part by many mutations to cancer cells. By couching the issue as revolu-
tionary, and so enforcing a sharp divide between precursors and succes-
sor paradigms, one is bound to view history as a vanquishing rather than 
a progressive adding of novel perspectives on the same phenomena. 
 3 CSC Theory: Cancer Stem Cell Theory 
 In her recent book, the philosopher Laplane argues that the CSC the-
ory has various advantages over the alternative classical theory ( Laplane 
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2016 ). Tellingly, she does not attribute the classical theory to any particu-
lar author or set of authors. In fact, she defines the classical theory primar-
ily in terms of how it differs from CSC theory. So it may be helpful first to 
describe what she takes to be the four fundamental theses of CSC theory: 
 1. CSCs are capable of self-renewal, thus producing new CSCs. 
 2. CSCs are capable of differentiation, thus producing cells of different 
phenotypes. 
 3. CSCs represent a tiny subpopulation of cells, distinct from other can-
cer cell populations, and are in theory isolatable. 
 4. CSCs initiate cancers. 
 It is worth noting that the first two claims, as she points out, concern 
the concept of a stem cell. The latter two claims concern carcinogenesis 
itself: how cancer arises. It is the latter two theses that Laplane takes to 
be in tension with the classical view. On the classical theory, she claims 
that “all cells are capable of self-renewal” ( Laplane 2016 , 33) and “dif-
ferent cell types are able to initiate new tumors” ( Laplane 2016 , 33). The 
capacity to initiate new tumors arises as a consequence of the acquisition 
of random mutations, what she calls the “stochastic model.” This same 
capacity—the acquisition of random mutations and the evolution of cell 
lineages—also is taken to explain the heterogeneity of cell populations 
and the capacity for cells to acquire resistance to chemotherapy. She takes 
these additional commitments of the classical theory to be ad hoc and 
contrasts this failure in “parsimony” of the classical view with her pre-
ferred CSC theory. 
 That is, she claims that CSC theory has the “ability to explain various 
phenomena (cancer development and propagation, as well as relapse) 
from a very limited number of hypotheses” ( Laplane 2016 , 28). In con-
trast, the classical view neither predicts nor explains these phenomena 
but must invoke special (“additional” or “ad hoc”) theories to explain 
them. The CSC is thus more parsimonious than classical theory because it 
unifies a number of explanations, or shows how different phenomena can 
be explained by a common unified theory. In particular, the low clonicity 
of cancer cells and high heterogeneity of tumors is best explained by CSC. 
In contrast, the classical theory must invoke many different additional 
hypotheses. Thus the CSC theory is more parsimonious than the alterna-
tive classical theory. Moreover, the CSC theory has the advantage that it 
connects “basic research to biomedical interventions by suggesting a new 
therapeutic strategy for cancers” ( Laplane 2016 , 28). 
 It is not the case that these two theories are as a matter of fact inconsis-
tent once we begin to explore a point that Laplane herself draws our atten-
tion to: namely, that the concept of cancer stem cell is multiply ambiguous. 
Indeed, there are different variants on the same general theory that disagree 
on one specific point, namely, the origins of cancer stem cells. To explain: 
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if, as a matter of fact, all cells at least potentially may acquire the properties 
typical of cancer stem cells (which is an independent empirical question, the 
evidence for which is still being gathered), then the CSC theory is perfectly 
consistent with the classical theory. Indeed, some populations of cells in a 
tumor appear to all have the features of a cancer stem cell or the potential 
to behave like a stem cell. That is, “stemness” is a property associated with 
certain capacities that are not fixed but acquired. The plasticity of many 
types of cancer cells makes it the case that many cancer cells can shift back 
and forth between “stemness” phenotype and non-stem phenotype. Given 
this, it appears that the CSC is just one of a continuum of general views, 
some of which take only specific types of cells to be precursors to cancer 
and others that grant that many different types of cells have the poten-
tial to develop such properties. But this points to a more substantial issue, 
one she herself is at pains to defend: stemness itself is a relatively unstable 
category in the cancer literature. Is stemness just a proxy for whatever 
properties there are that allow a cancer to arise? Is having such properties 
just what it  means to be a CSC? For if a CSC is just any cell that initiates a 
tumor, then CSCs  must exist (something must be initiating a tumor!) and 
the classical theory  must endorse the existence of CSCs. It is by definition 
true that cancer stem cells exist if cancer stem cells are just those cells that 
initiate tumors. So the real question at issue here is whether the cells that 
initiate a tumor are in some way distinctive or require distinctive precur-
sors. But classical theories of carcinogenesis of course granted that the cells 
that initiate a tumor must possess a variety of features that make them 
distinctive. The real question is what features those are, which (at least 
initially) was an open question on the classical theory. So it is unclear, then, 
what the purported disagreement is about. 
 Moreover, the CSC theory is not as parsimonious as Laplane makes 
out initially in chapter 2. As she later acknowledges in chapter 5, the CSC 
theory can (and indeed must) help itself to the somatic evolution theory if 
it is to explain a variety of features of cancer development and metastasis. 
So this extra, or additional, hypothesis that renders the classical theory 
less parsimonious is one that the defender of the CSC theory (eventually) 
endorses as well. 
 The real innovation of cancer stem cell theory, in my view, is in giv-
ing a label to something that classical theory already acknowledged as a 
legitimate and even likely possibility. Namely, there are special or unique 
features belonging to all and only those cells that initiate a tumor and/or 
cells that propagate tumors or yield metastases. It is, after all, still an open 
empirical question whether any cell in the body is capable of acquiring 
these properties or only some. In other words, what is at issue between 
the two is whether all cells have the potential to acquire the properties of 
those cells that can initiate and propagate cancers. But this is a matter of 
debate within the CSC literature. So it’s perfectly possible for defenders 
of the classical view to endorse (at least one version) of the CSC. The two 
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are not so starkly opposed as Laplane makes out. As Laplane documents 
at some length, the very concept of a cancer stem cell is multiply ambigu-
ous, in the following ways: 
 • First, when we speak of cancer stem cells, we may be referring to 
their capacities or properties, or to their historical role or genealogy, 
that is, to the fact that they were the cells from which other cancer 
cells originate. That is, some take cancer stem cells to be defined 
in terms of their distinctive capacities and some in terms of their 
relationship to other cells—in particular, to their ancestor-descendent 
relationships in a population of cells in a tumor. The “cancer stem 
cell model” is sometimes simply taken to refer to any model of a 
tumor that treats the population of cells as having a hierarchical rela-
tionship, where one or a few cells propagate the tumor, whether or 
not those cells have distinctive properties that cause them to stand in 
that relationship. 
 • Second, there are several different kinds of historical role that CSCs 
might play: they may be all and only those cells that initiate a cancer 
under natural conditions, they may be those cells which propagate a 
cancer in situ, or they may be those cells that are capable of propa-
gating a cancer in an experimental animal. 
 • Third, some take the concept of CSC to be restricted to normal stem 
cells, which some believe are the most likely precursors to cancer. 
Others hold that cells that originate a tumor have stem-like proper-
ties but may or may not derive from normal stem cells. 
 Cancer researchers have attempted to give greater clarity to the debates 
about cancer stem cells by using different terminology to distin-
guish between these different senses: “cancer-initiating cells,” “cancer-
propagating cells,” “cancer stem-like cells,” and so on. But in Laplane’s 
view, none of these attempts at clarification did the work the authors 
hoped. For it turns out that even the expression “cancer-initiating cells” 
could refer to either precancerous cells that have acquired some but not 
all of the properties necessary to initiate a tumor, cancerous cells that ini-
tiate tumors in patients, or cancerous cells that initiate tumors in experi-
mental animals. All three senses have been used in the literature, leading 
to some confusion. 
 Here’s where it becomes clear that Laplane has set up a false dichot-
omy. She points out that different experimental conditions can lead to 
different results in the propagation of cancers in experimental animals. 
Under some conditions, much higher percentages of cells in a tumor are 
capable of propagating a cancer in experimental animals. Whereas the 
initial experiments in propagation yielded a very small success rate—only 
0.00001 percent of cells in leukemia—as many as 25 percent of cancer 
cells from a melanoma could propagate themselves in NSG mice (mice 
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where a gene associated with the precursors to natural killer cells was 
disabled). Indeed, using different mice strains, and even different sexes of 
mice, yields greater or lesser success at propagation by a much higher per-
centage of “CSC” cells. Instead of viewing this as evidence in favor of the 
classical theory—namely, that any number of cells is capable of acquiring 
the features necessary to propagate a tumor—she suggests only that this 
evidence undermines “the idea that CSCs only represent a small fraction 
of cancer cells” ( Laplane 2016 , 94). But if CSCs are just any cell capable 
of propagation, this is by definition true. The real question at issue is 
whether any cell can acquire this capacity in the right circumstances or 
whether only some can. And this question is not definitively decided by 
such experiments, although they do lend greater credibility to the clas-
sical model than Laplane acknowledges. In other words, it sometimes 
seems that Laplane, despite the fact that she acknowledges that the very 
expression “CSC” is multiply ambiguous, fails to recognize that it is this 
very ambiguity that leaves the door open to seeing the CSC theory and 
classical theory as overlapping and fully consistent perspectives. 
 4 Conclusion 
 How may this account of the recent history of cancer research be brought 
to bear on the debate over perspectival realism? Recall the taxonomy of 
relationships between models discussed by  Fagan (2017 ): 
 • Direct conflict 
 • Simple additivity 
 • Subsumption 
 • Interactive process 
 • Cross-perspective translation 
 • No cumulative interaction 
 • Non-interaction 
 • Complementarity. 
 How can this picture help us make sense of debates among advocates of 
purportedly competing theories about cancer? We can see these alterna-
tives as several ways in which competing “perspectives” can be reconciled. 
Of course, different authors mean different things by “perspectives.” For 
Giere, a perspective is akin to Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix; for Massimi, 
it is the scientific practice of a given community; for  Teller (2001 ), it is 
a family of idealized and imprecise models. In this context I take a per-
spective to be a family of commitments regarding what causes are central 
or important to cancer, associated with a heuristic or framework, which 
helps us develop research questions, frame appropriate answers, and guide 
inquiry into cancer. All of these together make up a perspective. Differ-
ent research programs have focused attention on different temporal and 
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spatial scales or concerned themselves with one or another causal path-
way as central to cancer initiation and progression. These in turn provide 
us with principles to build models of cancer initiation and progression. 
The oncogene paradigm led to the identification of a variety of genes, the 
mutation of which led to uncontrolled growth, failure of apoptosis, angio-
genesis, and eventually invasion and metastasis. Early models of cancer 
growing out of this research tradition represent cancer progression as a 
stepwise, rate-limited acquisition of a series of mutations, eventually lead-
ing to uncontrolled growth. 
 Models growing out of “competing” perspectives or research traditions 
focused on the roles of tissue microenvironment and tissue architecture 
in cancer, the typical features and behaviors of stem cells in cancer, or the 
developmental pathways disrupted by or co-opted in cancer progression. 
For instance, one model that draws upon the cancer stem cell theory 
takes it to be the case that the differential incidence of cancers of different 
tissue types is largely due to the number and rate of division of somatic 
stem cells in different tissue types, given the relatively strong correlation 
between the two ( Tomasetti and Vogelstein 2015 ). But this model is not 
in tension with the classical model. In fact, both models treat cancer as a 
stepwise, iterated, and rate-limited process, where mutations and epigen-
etic alterations eventuate in disease. 
 In some cases, these different models of cancer are concerned with dif-
ferent outcomes or classes of outcome at different scales. They focus on 
different causal pathways to cancer or are concerned with different scales 
of analysis (from the molecular on up to evolutionary history). So on 
the one hand, we might say that these models are complementary and 
non-interactive; they are not in conflict, insofar as they are concerned 
with different questions. However, in other cases, several models have 
been developed for describing progression to disease, the dynamics of 
progression, or subsequent metastasis within a single cancer type or sub-
type, such as breast cancer. In these cases, there appears to be a relatively 
seamless integration of theory and data with mutual constraint, draw-
ing upon evolutionary and developmental perspectives, knowledge about 
metabolic changes to cancer cells, and structural and developmental fac-
tors in cancer, genetics, and stem cell theory. Indeed, arguably, the classic 
multistage model predicts that the hierarchical structure of differentia-
tion in tissue is a protective mechanism against cancer and thus serves as 
a kind of anticipation of stem cell theory. For if a normal self-renewing 
population of stem cells acquires mutations or epigenetic changes that 
yield increases in proliferation or resistance to apoptosis, then they can 
yield a cancer via somatic evolution ( Pepper, Sprouffske, and Maley 
2007 ). According to the current stem cell theory, stemness properties 
could either be a defining feature of some subpopulations of cells in a 
tumor or could be a transitory property of all cells in a tumor. For can-
cer cells appear to be highly plastic and can transition back and forth 
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between stem and non-stem states ( Kreso and Dick 2014 ). Ultimately, 
however, genetic changes, epigenetics, and changes to the tumor microen-
vironment all contribute to the emergence of disease. These perspectives 
are not in tension but complementary; and seeing how and why they 
are mutually informative has been a progressive, gradual process. The 
integration of theory and data is iterative, as more information about 
the various properties that contribute to cancer progression, heteroge-
neity, and resistance to chemotherapy, and their mechanistic bases, is 
acquired ( Plutynski 2013 ). Massimi’s interactionist approach seems the 
best fit here. Different models of the same cancer or cancer subtype (e.g., 
breast cancer) that focus on different causal pathways each relevant to 
the larger outcome can be seen as yielding complementary information 
about constraints on this process. 
 The attempt to tell this story as one of vanquishing the old and replacing 
with the new is, in my view, a mistake. This model of successive theory 
vanquishing, or of the replacement of one incommensurable paradigm with 
another, is inappropriate here and leads to unproductive battles. Instead, 
what has occurred is a progressive integration of diverse perspectives on 
the same phenomena or alternatively, in some contexts, the development 
of models concerned with slightly different, and equally important, ques-
tions or problems, or different targets of inquiry. 
 Notes 
 1. Or at least this is one very influential reading of Kuhn, though one Kuhn pro-
tested ( 1977 ). 
 2. There are, as a matter of fact, several “middle-ground” perspectives that have 
been offered, some to the effect that the debate proposes a false dichotomy. 
See, e.g.,  Stein (1989 );  Fine (1984 ). 
 3. Giere’s proposal was initially intended as a middle ground between extreme 
versions of “objectivist” scientific realism (the thesis that theories can in prin-
ciple provide “a complete and literally correct picture of the world itself”; 
Giere 2006b, 6) and constructivist antirealism (“scientific claims about any 
reality beyond that of ordinary experience are merely social conventions”; 
Giere 2006a, 26). 
 4. There are, of course, a variety of competing views about what it means to say 
that the world is in some sense “complex.” For a discussion, see, e.g.,  Wimsatt 
(1994 ) and  Mitchell (2003 ). Perhaps it is needless to say that not all agree 
that the world (in general) is complex or in what sense(s). My own view is 
that perhaps only some types of systems exhibit both what Simon (1962) calls 
“organizational” and “dynamic” complexity (e.g., organisms, beehives, cities). 
 5. I take it that some families of models are informed by a research tradition that 
includes a commitment to certain claims as well supported by evidence, but 
nothing like a set of laws or “theoretical” principles. It is unhelpful to speak 
of “theories” in this context, at least in the sense of lawlike, exceptionless 
generalizations about cancer initiation or progression of the sort that philoso-
phers (at least historically) have identified with laws of nature. Instead, going 
back as far as  Virchow’s (1863 ) proposal that cancer may result from irrita-
tion, it is rarely (if ever) the case that cancer scientists assume or confidently 
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assert (unless they’re being incautious or writing for a popular audience) that 
any particular distal cause or proximate mechanism is a necessary condition 
on cancer. Instead, over the course of the history of cancer research, viruses, 
“oncogenes,” “tumor suppressor” genes, metabolic changes to cells, or “stem-
ness” properties are taken to be highly probable, plausible, or likely candidate 
causes of cancer initiation, progression, or recurrence. 
 6. Morange (2015 ) makes a similar (but more general) point. He argues that 
 in some cases . . . contrasts (between competing perspectives) are hard-
ened by participants. Both sides demand that a choice be made between 
the different explanations. In other cases, the need for a choice vanishes 
when knowledge of the system under study increases . . . the discontinu-
ity (between approaches) is progressively disappearing. 
 ( Morange 2015 , 40–41) 
 The latter is very much the case in cancer research, in my view. 
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 1 Introduction 
 Contemporary science studies complex structures and behaviors at a 
variety of levels of organization, from the most basic component parts 
to the entire system, using representations of different degrees of preci-
sion, from fine- to coarse-grained. The relationships among these mul-
tiple scientific models continue to be in dispute. Reductionists argue that 
all explanations and predictions in principle, if not in practice, can be 
crafted from descriptions of the properties and behaviors at the most fun-
damental level of physical substance. The argument presumes that since 
all more complex arrangements are composed from the basic physical 
building blocks, knowledge of the basic level could or will eventually 
tell us everything about composite structures and their behaviors. Thus, 
if this were the case, all causal information that appears in higher-level 
models should be recoverable in models of the lower or lowest level. Yet 
some coarse-grained explanations or predictions that appeal to higher-
level structures seem to be required to explain at least some features of 
complex behaviors. 1 I have argued ( Mitchell 2009 ) that this reductionist 
argument confuses compositional physicalism with “physics-ism.” The 
first, compositional physicalism, is a metaphysical presumption that is 
constitutive of scientific practice, while the second, physics-ism, is a claim 
about scientific representations, one which is unsustainable. Scientific 
representations do not mirror the compositional relations of natural sys-
tems; rather, they encode perspectives. 
 This chapter explores some consequences of the perspectival nature 
of representation. Following  Giere’s (2006a ) seminal discussions, I argue 
that if representational models are both partial and perspectival, then in 
order to acquire knowledge of natural systems, science must employ a 
plurality of models, methods, and representations. If perspectival plural-
ism is correct, a further question arises. What are the relationships among 
multiple models and representations of the “same” phenomenon? I will 
argue that perspectivism gives us resources for understanding those rela-
tionships in new ways. I will provide a detailed example of contemporary, 
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experimental models in structural biology that both exemplifies the par-
tial, perspectival character of models in general and the epistemic value 
of pluralism. In section 2, I will present the argument from perspectivism 
to pluralism. In section 3, I illustrate how perspectivism works in the 
case of modeling protein folding. In section 4, I will consider the pos-
sible relations among multiple models and philosophical resources for 
understanding those relations. I will then argue for the epistemic value 
of integrative strategies for managing a plurality of models of a single 
phenomenon. 
 2 Perspectivism and Pluralism 
 Giere has identified several important features of scientific perspectivism, 
a view he casts as an alternative to both objectivist and constructivist 
accounts of scientific models. In his words: 
 general principles by themselves make no claims about the world, 
but more specific  models constructed in accordance with the prin-
ciples can be used to make claims about specific aspects of the world. 
And these claims can be tested against various instrumental perspec-
tives. Nevertheless, all theoretical claims remain perspectival in that 
they apply only to aspects of the world and then, in part  because they 
apply only to some aspects of the world, never with complete preci-
sion. The result [is] an account of science that brings observation and 
theory, perception and conception, closer together than they have 
seemed in objective accounts. 
 ( Giere 2006a , 15) 
 For Giere, theories and their associated models represent only some 
aspects of the phenomenon studied and do so with something less than 
perfect precision. 2 This is in contrast to a “mirror of nature” complete-
ness in which every feature of a phenomenon is precisely described in a 
one-to-one mapping into a model. Indeed, no representational model can 
attain this type of completeness without it being an exact, to-scale copy 
of the target phenomenon. Cluttering the lab with duplicates of the phe-
nomenon studied would fail to bring science much closer to explaining 
and predicting natural behavior than directly engaging with the original. 
Complete models, in this sense of completeness, would be of no scientific 
use. To be useable, a representational model has to leave some things out 
by abstraction or simplify by idealization. That is, scientific models are 
partial and imprecise. 
 The flip side of partiality is that by leaving some features out, every 
method, model, and representation “selects” features to be included. This 
“selection” reflects a perspective. Is this the result of deliberative choice? 
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Many have argued that models and representations have an intentional 
component. Giere summarizes this as “agents 1) intend; 2) to use model, 
M; 3) to represent a part of the world, W; 4) for some purpose, P” ( Giere 
2010 , 269).  Suárez (2010 ) presents a comprehensive overview of the dif-
ferent positions regarding the role of intentionality in both the analysis 
of what constitutes representations and in how representations are used 
in scientific practice. 
 I agree with both Giere and Suárez (see also  van Fraassen 2008 ) that 
for something to  be a model representing some aspect of nature, an agent 
must use it for that purpose, otherwise it is just cardboard and glue, ink 
on paper, or pixels on a LCD screen. But which features are left out and 
which are kept in may not always be explicitly intended. What needs 
further explication, and what contributes to the content of a perspec-
tive, is how and what particular features are selected to be represented 
in the model. Part of the answer may come from the intentions of those 
developing models with a goal in mind, but part may be a function of the 
methods and medium themselves. What features at what degree of preci-
sion can an instrument detect? The experimental model that is inferred 
will reflect the methodological constraints. What form of representation 
of the model is used to communicate its predictive and explanatory con-
tent? Graphical, pictorial, and mathematical forms, among others, also 
impose constraints on what can be depicted ( Perini 2012 ). For example, 
as I will detail in section 3, the variety of scientific models developed to 
predict the structure of a functional protein vary in the key features rep-
resented, in the methods for generating a prediction, and in the idealized 
contexts in which the models most directly apply. But before doing so, let 
us take a closer look at the relation between perspectivism and pluralism 
about models. 
 Partiality and perspectivism entail model pluralism. A single model 
cannot deliver a complete, maximally precise representation of a given 
aspect of nature. What it leaves out could be, and often is, represented by 
other perspectival models. If the features that are left out in one model 
but included in another are causally independent, partitionable into dis-
tinct subfeatures, or neatly mereologically nested, then the multiple mod-
els might be simply combined to form a single, more complete model of 
the phenomenon. If they are not, then a plurality of models is entailed by 
the partiality of representation. Since a single model cannot deliver all the 
causally relevant aspects of a given phenomenon with complete precision, 
using multiple models may be required to be adequate to the explanatory 
or predictive goal. I will show below that integrating multiple, compat-
ible models can increase scientific knowledge of nature. While the endur-
ing plurality of models cannot be reduced or unified to produce a single 
model, they can be interactively integrated, yielding increased accuracy 
while retaining perspectival pluralism. This is the situation I will explore 
in the rest of the chapter. 
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 Different scientific perspectives are characterized by different assump-
tions, methods, instruments of observation, experimental arrangements, 
concepts, categories, and representations, all of which are associated with 
specific pragmatic concerns and explanatory or predictive projects. How 
a natural phenomenon “looks” to one perspective is different from the 
way it “looks” to another. Consider by analogy how the world looks 
to beings that have different visual systems—a bee and a human, for 
example. Bees and humans are trichromatic; that is, they each have three 
photoreceptors within the visual system by which color perception is con-
structed. Humans base color combinations on red, blue, and green wave-
lengths, while bees base all their colors on ultraviolet, blue, and green. 
Thus the same flower from the perspective of a bee and the perspective 
of a human looks very different ( Giere 2006b ;  Chirimuuta 2016 ). It is 
the same flower made of the same material in the same environment, but 
the visual apparatus of a bee and the visual apparatus of a human access 
different visual signals that are afforded by the same flower. 
 Or consider how sensory modalities are integrated in human beings, 
as another example. Our five senses—sight, sound, taste, hearing and 
touch—permit us to acquire information about nature. These different 
modalities detect different aspects of a given phenomenon. Again, per-
spectivism and partiality are evident, but here they are not choices we 
make—rather they are what types of signals are accessible by a given 
sensory apparatus. Consider sight and sound. What information can we 
acquire visually? Reflectance, saturation, color, and light reflection and 
refraction. Simply put, the human eye has a cornea—like a camera lens—
that focuses light onto the retina. The retina includes millions of light 
sensitive cells, rods, and cones. When light hits the rods and cones, it is 
converted into an electrical signal that is relayed to the brain’s visual cor-
tex via the optic nerve. What about sound? What auditory information 
do we acquire? Now it is sound waves, not light, that is detectable. The 
basilar membrane in the inner ear detects frequencies of sound waves by 
vibration. Different frequencies activate different groups of neurons on 
this membrane. In addition to detecting what tone is being emitted by the 
target source, hearing also can locate the source of the sound by using the 
difference in loudness and timing between the two ears. As the eye and 
ear illustrate, the same organism can have multiple apparatuses to detect 
different features or different aspects of the same feature of what might 
be spatiotemporally identified as the same phenomenon. The auditory 
and visual models of the relative location of an entity, for example, may 
be different reflecting as a result of the causal interaction of signals from 
the source with the detecting apparatus. 
 For most tasks in which we engage something in the external world, 
we employ multiple senses. Humans use vision to see an object, detecting 
its color, shape, and so forth relative to background and foreground to 
infer from visual cues the distance of the object from the observer. The 
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observer can also use hearing to discriminate sounds coming from the 
object from background noise. Tactile cues and olfactory cues can also 
be detected by touch and smell. The representational resources vary with 
the sensory modality. An object affords different, but equally accurate, 
representations through these different sensory modalities. The individ-
ual senses may have optimal usefulness in different circumstances. Not 
surprisingly, experimental results have shown that the collective use of 
multiple modalities, like vision and audition, increases the likelihood of 
detecting and identifying events or objects above those of only one. What 
might be surprising is that the degree to which multisensory integration 
is better is superadditive. Multimodal integration in the brain has been 
studied at both the neuronal level and by the results of experiments on 
task completion: “the integrated product reveals more about the nature 
of the external event and does so faster and better than would be pre-
dicted from the sum of its individual contributors” ( Stein and Stanford 
2008 , 255). So not only does using different perspectival senses provide 
more information than using a single modality, the cross-modal interac-
tion of stimuli can lead to multisensory integration, which yields a non-
linear, superadditive neuronal response and faster than computationally 
additive time to task completion. 
 I suggest that these aspects of sensory perspectivism are analogous to 
how different scientific models represent the same phenomenon. They 
use different theoretical or experimental apparatus that access different 
aspects of the phenomenon. The conceptual framework, particular pre-
conceptions as well as the representational medium, and the problems 
pursued and the methods for answering them all vary between different 
scientific perspectives. Multiple models from different perspectives can be 
used together, in non-unifying and non-reductive ways, to explain or pre-
dict the same phenomenon. A constitutive assumption of scientific mod-
eling is that there are phenomena in nature independent of us. However, 
all scientific engagement with phenomena is refracted through the lenses 
of different modes of causal interaction (via experience and experiment, 
akin to vision or audition) and conceptual, mathematical, and proposi-
tional representations. 
 Take the example of a protein as a phenomenon in the world. A protein 
is classified by its linear polypeptide chain of amino acids (produced in 
sequence in the cell from the coding information of DNA). The amino 
acid sequences can realize up to four levels of structure. The first, the lin-
ear amino acid sequence, can form into a secondary structure of a sheet 
or a helix by means of hydrogen binding. The tertiary structure describes 
the overall three-dimensional shape of the entire protein including sec-
ondary structures plus the linear structure. This conformation includes 
bends and twists in irregular patterns formed by the bonding interactions 
of the side chains of the amino acid components. Some of the binding 
sites on the protein can be buried in the interior of the structure, while 
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others are exposed on the exterior. Thus the conformational structure 
that a protein takes permits or prevents binding with other molecules, 
thereby allowing it to perform specific biological functions. Some bio-
logical functions require larger, stable aggregate units or protein com-
plexes composed of multiple proteins or of proteins and other molecules. 
This is the quaternary level of structure. Tertiary structure (or, sometimes, 
quaternary structure) is the functional unit of biological activities, such as 
oxygen transport (hemoglobin), light signaling for vision (rhodopsin), and 
immune response (cytokines). The protein structure scientists (and drug 
design engineers) aim to discover is the stable, functional structure of the 
protein. Scientists predict that structure from within different perspec-
tives. So although there is some objective phenomenon in the world—the 
tertiary structure of a protein—it can appear differently when refracted 
through different scientific perspectival models. 
 As I will detail below, ab initio models and varying experimental mod-
els can display different locations and relations of the atomic components 
of the very same protein. Is at most one of these true? Are the others 
false? If they differ, are the models inconsistent with each other? 
 Defenders of model perspectivism have appealed to the non-propositional 
representational relationships found to illustrate some of the features of 
scientific representations that are not adequately captured by treating 
models as truth-bearing descriptive statements about the world. As Giere 
puts it, “strictly speaking, it makes no sense to call a model itself true 
or false. A model is not the kind of thing that could have a truth value” 
(Giere 2006a, 64). Instead, the model-world relationship is one of simi-
larity, not a matter of truly describing all features with perfect precision 
( Teller 2001 ). Although models support propositions, they are not them-
selves propositional. For the same reason, it follows that model-model 
relationships cannot be said to be consistent or inconsistent. Logical 
vocabulary appropriately attaches to propositions, not to models. 
 Maps are non-propositional modes of representation that have been 
used to shed light on scientific model-world relationships. Maps encode 
relational, typically spatial, information that can be isomorphic, homeo-
morphic, or otherwise similar to the part of nature it maps. Consider 
multiple maps of the same place, say a street map of intersecting and 
parallel lines, which by convention we interpret as representing the rela-
tive location of different roads, and a topographic map, which by varying 
circular lines or shaded areas different elevations may be represented and 
interpreted. Both maps can be accurate in depicting the features they rep-
resent, but they differ in precision, scale, and adequacy to serve a specific 
purpose. A street map is not true or false, nor more or less realistic than 
a topographical map. Two street maps might be compared for accuracy: 
if one puts the freeway to the north of the river and the other puts it to 
the south, then empirical evidence will determine which better fits the 
location of the freeway. But purpose or goal will determine the adequacy 
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of a map, not its accuracy. Appeal to maps reveals how multiple scien-
tific models of the same phenomena can be equally accurate but depict 
different features and vary in adequacy relative to a given purpose. This 
is an example of how multiple partial, perspectival representations can 
provide greater resources for different purposes than trying to unify or 
reduce all the information into one, even if it is at the finest granularity of 
representation the medium allows. Superimposing a topographical map 
onto a street map, for example, would make it less useful for driving from 
the city center to the botanical gardens, although it might help those who 
want to walk or bicycle there. 
 While both reductive and abstractive strategies have significant roles to 
play in science, they are not always, perhaps not even often, sufficient on 
their own to capture the ways in which science works. In particular, for 
complex behaviors, where the phenomena display multiple components, 
multiple causal factors, emergent properties, robust dynamics, and more, 
unitary strategies are most likely to fail ( Bechtel and Richardson 2010 ). 
Integrative pluralism provides an alternative picture of the plurality of 
models. Integrative pluralism recognizes the multiple epistemic sources of 
the theoretical, explanatory, and instrumental pluralism that character-
izes scientific practice. However, it is not equivalent to “anything goes” 
pluralism ( Feyerabend 1970 ), as empirical evidence continues to serve 
as a methodological foundation for the acceptance or revision of scien-
tific beliefs. In addition, scientific models are better described in terms of 
compatible differences or competing alternatives than as inconsistent or 
incommensurable theories ( Mitchell 2000 ,  2003 ,  2009 ). 3 For example, 
single idealized causal models are often developed to explain what part 
of a result is due to a particular cause. Genes and environment both con-
tribute to all traits of an organism. In complex traits, like psychiatric 
disorders, genetic factors have been identified as explaining familial pat-
terns, for example in major depressive disorder. Similarly, environmental 
pathogens, like childhood trauma from abuse or the loss of a parent, also 
contribute causally to the incidence of major depressive disorder. There 
are studies that indicate that genes moderate responses to environmen-
tal factors ( Caspi and Moffitt 2006 ;  Tabery 2014 ). Caspi and Moffitt 
showed that individuals with one or two copies of the 5-HTT short allele 
(a polymorphism in the promoter region of a serotonin transport gene) 
were more likely to suffer from depression than those with two copies of 
the long allele when those individuals experienced stressful events. But 
it is also the case that environmental factors moderate gene expression 
( Robinson, Grozinger, and Whitfield 2005 ). Caspi and Moffitt suggest 
that the epidemiological perspectives of gene-environment interactions 
are limited, and “therefore its potential will be better realized when it 
is integrated with experimental neuroscience. Neuroscience can comple-
ment psychiatric genetic epidemiology by specifying the more proximal 
role of nervous system reactivity in the gene environment interaction” 
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( Caspi and Moffitt 2006 , 584). Genetic, environmental, and neurologi-
cal causal models of psychiatric disorders are compatible and integrable. 
They are not reducible or unifiable. 
 Clearly, not all cases of multiple models of a single phenomenon stand 
in the same relationship to each other. They might stand in a reduction 
relationship, if in fact all the causal content of one can be represented, 
without loss, by the other. They might be in competition, where at best 
only one should be retained and the other eliminated. The focus of this 
chapter is on the possibility and value of integrative relationships, where 
models are neither reductive nor incompatible. In the next section, I turn 
to protein structure prediction to illustrate compatible perspectival mod-
els and the ways in which integrative strategies can produce not knowl-
edge of more features but more accurate knowledge about the same 
phenomenon. 
 3 Multiple Perspectives, Multiple Goals 
 There are many ways to characterize the multiple perspectives displayed 
by predictive models of functional protein structure. One can crudely dis-
tinguish between physical, chemical, and biological perspectives. These are 
loosely correlated with different contexts in which proteins are studied: in 
silico, in vitro, and in vivo, respectively. The three perspectives each pro-
vide partial and not completely overlapping accounts of the phenomenon. 
Learning about protein structure from the physics perspective, consider-
ing the basic atomic components of proteins and forces acting on them, 
will inform, but not determine, what is detected from an investigation of 
the protein’s chemical structure. Knowing the chemical details, in turn, 
informs, but does not completely specify, biogenesis, interaction, and the 
biological functions of the macromolecule. At the beginning of advances 
in the study of protein structure in the 1950s, it was believed that a reduc-
tive approach, that is, ab initio modeling the thermodynamic features of 
atomic components of the amino acid sequence of a protein, would be 
sufficient for predicting the tertiary, biologically functional structure. As 
Francis Crick proposed, “it is of course possible that there is a special 
mechanism for folding up the chain, but the more likely hypothesis is that 
the folding is simply a function of the order of the amino acids” ( Crick 
1958 , 144). This view contains two inferential steps: that protein sequence 
contains all the information necessary to determine structure and that 
protein structure is sufficient to determine its function ( Berg, Tymoczko, 
and Stryer 2002 ;  Dill, Ozkan, Weikl, Choder, and Voelz 2007 ). 
 However, developments in protein science have revealed a more com-
plex story. Anfinsen’s discovery ( Sela, White, and Anfinsen 1957 ) of the 
spontaneous refolding of a denatured protein in vitro seemed to support 
the reductionist hopes that nothing more than the interatomic interactions 
of the atoms making up the primary structure of a protein were required to 
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determine the thermodynamically lowest energy state in a particular envi-
ronment and that would allow inferences to biological function. Indeed, 
it was on the basis of Anfinsen’s discovery in support of the “thermody-
namic hypothesis” ( Anfinsen 1973 ) that he was awarded a Nobel Prize in 
1972. Yet in 1969 Levinthal offered a thought experiment that generated 
a “paradox” for this hypothesis. The number of possible configurations 
a protein could acquire is astronomical (10 143 ). If configurations were 
sampled sequentially, it would take longer than the age of the universe for 
a protein to find its energetically minimum structure. However, proteins 
fold sometimes in milliseconds. Levinthal claimed that protein structure 
is not a simple derivation from the physics of the component parts find-
ing their native state: “if the final folded state turned out to be the one of 
lowest configurational energy, it would be a consequence of biological 
evolution and not of physical chemistry” ( Levinthal 1968 , 44). 
 Some scientists today still hope to find the holy grail of a reductive 
algorithm that will predict a protein’s functional structure. But that hope 
has not been realized ( Mitchell and Gronenborn 2017 ). Instead there is a 
proliferation of models, methods, and representations aiming to provide 
the means to predict protein structure. Rather than viewing the physics 
models of proteins reductively, I suggest we consider them perspectivally. 
 How can one model protein transformation from a string of amino 
acids into a functional three-dimensional structure? On the basis of what 
features can its structure be predicted? These questions have been inves-
tigated by looking at the phenomenon from different perspectives, but 
the answer cannot be obtained from any one alone. The  functional struc-
ture is not a consequence of the atomic arrangements in the amino acid 
sequence alone, nor of the hydrophobic and hydrophilic responses of the 
atoms of a protein with the surrounding molecules in its environment 
alone, nor of the complex interactions with other proteins that are impli-
cated in the biogenesis of complex proteins in the messy environment of 
a cell. All three perspectives are needed. 
 The physics perspective targets the thermodynamic features of folded 
and unfolded proteins, that is, their mean free energy, and the kinetics of 
change from denatured through intermediate states to the native state. 
Coarse-grained and all-atom approaches are used to calculate atomic 
interactions and to simulate energy landscapes. The unique amino acid 
string specifies the atomic components of the protein, and the energy con-
tent of all possible configurations is computationally sampled to deter-
mine which structure possesses the lowest free energy. Thus, the physics 
perspective investigates protein folding in silico. In answer to Levinthal’s 
paradox, if the energy surface on which the atoms of a protein move is 
appropriately biased, then even a stochastic search can lead to native 
structures in realistic times (computationally, as well as in vitro or in 
vivo). For some proteins, intermediate states act as local minima between 
the denatured and native states, constituting kinetic traps that can stall 
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the search or prohibit reaching the stable native structure ( Bryngelson, 
Onuchic, Socci, and Wolynes 1995 ). But where does information about 
the bias of the energy surface come from? It is not exclusively found in 
the atomic components of the amino acid sequence; it may be the result 
of activities of other molecules in the protein’s cellular context. 
 One track through the chemistry perspective targets the detectable 
three-dimensional structure of a protein by experimentally manipulating 
an actual protein (chemically or thermally denaturing it, for example) and 
allowing it to fold in a simplified environment in vitro. The solution con-
ditions of the protein, like temperature, pH, and salt concentration, can be 
varied to be more or less similar to what would be found in a living cell. 
The structure is detected by means of x-ray crystallography or nuclear 
magnetic resonance spectroscopy, with the relative positions or distances 
between the atoms in the protein computed from x-ray diffraction pat-
terns or spectra shifts. The chemical, experimental perspective that tracks 
protein interactions in vitro will be discussed in detail in section 4. 
 The biology perspective studies the protein in the cells in which it is 
born, functions, and dies—that is, in vivo. The cellular habitat is densely 
populated, consisting of tens of millions of molecules, and it is in this 
environment that small and large proteins alike have to fold into their 
native three-dimensional structures to realize their biological function. 
Fluorescence microscopy can be used to “see” inside the cell, but it can-
not resolve anything at very fine detail or in a very fast time frame. How-
ever, evidence of interactions of an unfolded protein with other proteins, 
chaperones and chaperonins for example, has been detected in the pro-
cess of folding ( Hartl and Hayer-Hartl 2009 ). 
 When proteins are made on the ribosome, the leading portion of the 
polypeptide chain is produced prior to the completion of the anterior por-
tion. This affords the opportunity of the initial portion of the sequence 
to bind aberrantly to other molecules in the cell, prior to the formation 
of the anterior region that may be required for interactions that lead to 
correct folding. Some molecules, called chaperones, bind to the amino 
terminus of the growing polypeptide chain, stabilizing it in a partially 
folded configuration (safe from any interfering molecules) until synthesis 
of the polypeptide is completed. Release of the posterior sequence from 
the ribosome and detachment of the chaperones then permits anterior 
and posterior portions of the chain to bind and thus for the protein to 
fold into its functional three-dimensional conformation. 
 Each of the three perspectives investigates the problem of predicting 
protein structure. But they differ in the features targeted for study, the 
habitat in which the system is studied, and the methods and the repre-
sentations used to describe what is known about the system. No single 
approach targets all the features that are relevant to predicting struc-
ture. If no representational model is complete, then why should one 
adopt a particular perspective with its target features, methods, and 
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representations? It is here that pragmatic interests enter. What the inves-
tigator wants to  do provides the source of criteria for judging representa-
tional model adequacy. Different models can each correctly describe the 
same complex system and yet not be reducible to a single representation 
from a single perspective. Empirical confirmation warrants correctness, 
while pragmatic concerns decide adequacy. For example, if one wants to 
determine the relative energetic stability of different conformations of a 
protein under different conditions, without regard to the specific set of 
conditions that are found in a living cell, then the physics perspective may 
deliver results that are both correct and adequate. However, if the goal is 
to use knowledge of the structure to explore therapies for misfolding dis-
eases, then it will be necessary to go beyond the boundaries of the physics 
perspective ( Karplus 1997 ). 
 Ab initio physics models provide insight into the physical constraints 
and dynamics protein conformations must meet. When the final folded 
conformation of a protein is thermodynamically stable, that is, has the 
least free energy, then to move to that conformation from the initial 
unfolded state is theoretically spontaneous. Chemical processes follow 
paths toward least free energy. Thus in ideal circumstances, predicting the 
functional structure of a protein would be finding the thermodynamically 
stable conformation for that string of amino acids. 
 However, kinetic factors will decide whether the thermodynamically 
stable state occurs in fact, under specific environmental conditions, as well 
as which pathway or pathways through the energy landscape the process 
of folding is likely to take, and whether it will trapped in a local minima 
or reach the least energetic conformation. These features of protein fold-
ing are targeted by chemical and biological perspectives. The conditions 
under which proteins fold might be under the control of other molecules, 
the chaperones, which are part of the cellular environment, the in vivo 
habitat that is not modeled by either physics in silico or chemistry in vitro 
methods. “Protein folding occurs in vivo in the environment quite unlike 
that under experimental, in vitro conditions. A large fraction of newly 
synthesized protein chains do not fold spontaneously but are assisted by 
molecular chaperones” ( Kmiecik and Kolinski 2011 , 10283). This study 
showed that periodic distortion of the polypeptide chains by chaperone 
interactions can promote rapid folding and lead to a decrease in folding 
temperature, changing the conditions under which thermodynamic sta-
bility would be defined. It also demonstrated how chaperone interactions 
can prevent kinetically trapped conformations, thus providing a mecha-
nism for reaching a pathway to the least energy conformation. 
 In summary, the relationships among the three perspectives for study-
ing protein structure is not one of reduction but rather one of integra-
tion. Each provides a partial grasp of the phenomenon, and each requires 
input and ongoing engagement with the other perspectives, especially if 
the aims are real-world complex, like finding therapies for misfolding 
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diseases like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s disease. This is how the partial-
ity of perspectival models that leave some factors out (interactions with 
other molecules in the example above) can be informed and corrected by 
the perspectives that target those very features. But what if two perspec-
tives target the very same features of the phenomenon and predict what 
appear to be incompatible models? 
 4 Multiple Models, One Target 
 How do we accommodate multiple models that disagree or diverge? I 
will consider the situation in which the goal is the same—characterizing 
the atomic structure of a protein—but the methods used to do this are 
different and the representational models they generate of the same pro-
tein diverge. Prima facie, this appears to be a case of conflict. But I will 
argue that for some divergent models perspectivism offers new insights 
on how they can be used together. 4 
 The plurality of scientific perspectives of protein structure can be used 
to increase our knowledge of nature, not only by filling out more features, 
as in the case of chaperones above, but by correcting the systematic biases 
of different methods. Scientific models derived from different experimen-
tal devices, for example, can work in this way. Different experimental 
protocols are used to detect the structure of a protein. They target differ-
ent features of the protein and appeal to different background assump-
tions and theories in order to interpret the detected signals and generate 
a predictive model of the protein. When different experimental results 
agree, this is taken as a defense of the reality of the result ( Norton 2000 ). 
But what should be inferred in the case where the results disagree? I will 
consider a case where two protocols, x-ray crystallography and nuclear 
magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy, engaging with the same pro-
tein, yield  different predictions of the protein’s tertiary structure. 
 X-ray crystallography and NMR spectroscopy are the most used and 
trusted experimental methods to generate predictive models at the atomic 
level of resolution of protein structure. Indeed, the results of these experi-
ments are taken as arbiters in judging the success of competing algorithms 
for predicting protein structure from sequence ( Moult, Pederson, Judson, 
Fidelis 1995 ). Ab initio approaches were discussed above; however, the 
most successful algorithms for predicting the structure of large proteins 
from their amino acid sequences are semi-empirical, constructively using 
data from x-ray and NMR experiments in their development ( Mitchell 
and Gronenborn 2017 ). When x-ray and NMR target the same protein, 
the structures that result can diverge. If we describe those representations 
as propositional claims about the actual protein in the world, then we 
are faced with claiming that at most one of the representational models 
is true. Perspectivism allows a different resolution to divergence, one that 
more accurately captures scientific practice. 
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 X-ray crystallography and NMR spectroscopy involve setting up 
experiments to causally interact and measure features of a protein that 
are accessible to their different instruments. For x-ray experiments, a pro-
tein is crystallized and then a beam of incident x-rays is diffracted by the 
electron clouds of the atoms of the protein into many specific directions. 
The angles and intensities of the diffracted beams are measured to pro-
duce a three-dimensional electron density map. From this, the mean posi-
tions of the atoms in the crystal can be inferred. In contrast, for NMR 
the target protein is prepared in solution and placed inside a very large 
magnet. By so doing, the normal spin of the nuclei of the different atoms 
in the protein is realigned by the magnetic field of the instrument. A radio 
pulse is introduced to disrupt this new equilibrium and the return to equi-
librium is tracked, revealing information about the effects not just of the 
experimental magnet but of other nearby atoms. Measurements provide 
a map of how the different atoms are chemically linked—thus how close 
they are spatially. 
 In short, the x-ray perspective detects electron cloud reflectance, while 
the NRM detects nuclear magnetic changes. Each has a partial perspective 
on the target phenomenon—namely the atomic tertiary structure of the 
protein. X-ray experiments allow an inference to the relative positions of 
atoms, and NMR experiments permits inference to the relative distance 
of atoms. Clearly the scientific models of the phenomenon are each par-
tial and perspectival, and they generate different predictive representa-
tions by using different methods to interact with different target features. 
When the two experimental protocols are operating as they should and 
yet deliver different predictions, which one is correct? I suggest that just 
as in the case of sensory modalities vision and audition discussed above, 
the answer is both. Each experimental modality correctly detects the fea-
tures it targets and correctly represents the protein from that perspective. 
 In addition, in the case of x-ray and NMR experimental models of pro-
teins, there is also a correlate to multisensory integration, namely joint 
refinement. Joint refinement is a method of mutual error correction that 
recognizes the different systematic biases that are present in each of the 
experimental approaches. A joint refinement procedure investigates the 
compatibility of the two data generated by the two methods and, when 
possible, attributes differences to the instrumental biases. For example, 
proteins that are crystallized are in a different physical state from those 
in solution in the NMR experiments, and that difference may account 
for some of the divergence in the predicted structures. Other sources of 
divergence include different degrees of error in the data retrieved or in the 
ranges of uncertainty in the inferential algorithms ( Carlon et al. 2016 ). 
When the known systematic biases have been resolved, then the data 
from the two experiments can be used to predict a protein structure that 
is more accurate than what could be obtained by either method alone. 
The blind spots of x-ray crystallography and NMR cannot be removed, 
but when they are system relative, then they can be exposed by the 
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mutual analysis of joint refinement. “Joint structural refinement using 
both NMR and x-ray data provides a method to obtain a more reliable 
structural model, which may disclose additional relevant information on 
its functional mechanisms” ( Carlon et al. 2016 , 1601). 
 Notice that there is no third perspective from which to judge the accu-
racy of either the x-ray or NMR perspective, the view from nowhere of 
the objective protein. What scientists have in order to judge the accuracy 
of any representative model are the data. When you have data from one 
perspective, it provides justification for a predictive structure of a pro-
tein. When you have data from a plurality of perspectives, it can provide 
stronger justification for a predictive structure. Joint refinement is a form 
of integration that is pluralism preserving. At the end of joint refinement, 
there is not global unification of two methods into one or reduction or 
elimination of two methods to a single perspective. Just as in the case of 
sensory integration, each of the modalities, vision and audition, can be 
improved to make better discriminations and increase precision. How-
ever, you cannot teach the eyes to hear or the ears to see. The information 
afforded by a phenomenon to the different modalities when jointly inte-
grated can yield more accurate information than any one sense could ever 
yield. In both cases, the preservation of pluralism is the means to increase 
our knowledge of nature. 
 5 Conclusion 
 The goal of this chapter was to illustrate the relation between scientific 
perspectivism and a view I have advocated over the years called “integra-
tive pluralism.” Contrary to viewing a plurality of perspectives as expos-
ing the temporary inadequacies of sciences en route to either unification 
or reduction, multiple perspectives are best seen as enhancing our ability 
to explain or predict phenomena. This is well illustrated by the case of 
protein folding, where a plurality of perspectives is seen in the plural-
ity of predictive methods that can yield different representations of the 
structure of a protein. Yet it is precisely via this exercise of integrating 
different perspectives—while retaining their unique features—that new 
insights about the real nature of proteins can be gained. 
 Notes 
 1. Robustness in biological systems is one such property that requires appeal 
to system-level properties. Robustness is the ability of a structure to main-
tain a system-level function despite internal or external perturbation. It is the 
dynamic network of relations rather than the properties of the relata that 
explain this property ( Kitano 2004 ;  Mitchell 2008 ). 
 2. This is akin to what  Cartwright (1983 ) means by how laws “lie,” in that they 
fail to map exactly onto their domains, containing both abstractions and ide-
alizations. See also  Teller’s (2001 ) rejection of the perfect model. 
 3. See  Longino (2013 ) for a contemporary defense of a form of incommensurability. 
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 4. This is a partial answer to Morrison (2011) who claims, “it isn’t clear how 
perspectivism can help us solve the problem of interpreting the information 
that inconsistent models provide” (343). 
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